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This is a study of the responses of three major Elizabethan writers—Philip Sidney, 
Edmund Spenser, and William Shakespeare—to the classical republican account of 
political personality. Much recent scholarship has sought to demonstrate the relevance 
and availability of republican thought in England in the years before 1600. Taking those 
facts as established, I ask instead how and why authors apparently well positioned to take 
up republican concepts declined to do so, or took them up only in such a way as to 
emphasize their problematic character. My proposal is that the most troubling features of 
the republican ethic appeared when it was considered in the dimension of time. The 
defining feature of that ethic is the reciprocal, mutually definitive relationship between 
good action (“virtue”) and good structure (“balance”). We become virtuous by acting in 
the establishment, direction, and defense of a civic structure that, in turn, allows our 
action to remain virtuous by balancing it against that of our fellow citizens. The three 
authors who are the focus of this study represent alternative critical positions on 
republicanism, so defined, from the perspective of its temporal character. Sidney and 
Spenser each seek, in opposite ways, to loosen the definitional relationship between 
enduring structures and virtuous action. For Sidney, political life must be oriented to a 
structure more durable than one standing and falling by mere action; for Spenser political 
action is vitiated unless it can look beyond its attachment to the endurance of worldly 
structures. Alone of the three, Shakespeare accepts on its own terms the republican nexus 
of structure and action; what he finds in it, however, is not a prospect of permanently 
joining virtue and stability, balance and dynamism, but rather a vision of the tragic 
finitude entailed by their incommensurability. 
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History would be for ever unsatisfying if it did not cast a wider net for the 
truth; for if in one aspect it is the study of change, in another aspect it is 
the study of diversity. The historian like the novelist is bound to be glad 
that it takes all sorts of men to make a world. Like the novelist he can 
regret only one kind—the complete bore—and take care not to describe 
him with too great verisimilitude. For the rest, all is grist to his mill. His 
greatest limitation would be a defect of imaginative sympathy, whether it 
were the refusal to go out to understand a Scotsman or the refusal to put 
all his humanity into the effort to understand a Jesuit, a tyrant, or a poet. 
—Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History1 
 
This is a study of the responses of three major Elizabethan writers—Philip Sidney, 
Edmund Spenser, and William Shakespeare—to the classical republican account of 
political personality. In recent years, those who have taken up this and similar topics have 
usually done so with the intention of showing how far minds of this period possessed the 
capacity and the inclination to respond affirmatively to republican ideas, whether 
accessed through continental sources or through older traditions of English humanism. 
My concern is roughly the opposite. Accepting the premise that republican concepts were 
in fact a readily available way of cognizing the norms of political conduct and its proper 
institutional framework, I ask instead how and why other minds equally well positioned to 
appreciate the force of those concepts declined to take them up, or took them up in such a 
way as to emphasize their problematic and unstable character. The answers, I propose, 
require restoring to view a line of analysis that once featured prominently in the work of 
scholars of republicanism such as Zera Fink and J.G.A. Pocock, but has since fallen into 
relative obscurity, according to which what distinguishes the republican position most 
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sharply from its adjacent competitors is its notion of temporality, of political action and 
structure as phenomena in time.2 
In its most condensed form, that analysis runs as follows. The community 
characterized and valorized as “the republic” is one through which the citizen becomes 
virtuous by participating in its establishment, direction, and defense. Because this 
community is neither cosmopolis nor Church militant, but a localized political 
organization defined by a particular formal structure, it might conceivably collapse as an 
effect of events in time; then again, because that structure is so ordered as to cultivate and 
mobilize the maximum of virtue in its support, it conceivably might not; and therefore the 
endurance of the institution that conditions virtue becomes at once virtue’s object and its 
measure. In what follows, I seek to demonstrate, first, the degree to which just such a 
temporal paradigm orients Sidney’s, Spenser’s, and Shakespeare’s respective 
understandings of what the republican ethic is really about, and, second, the seriousness 
and sophistication with which each in his very different way probes its external limits and 
internal tensions. My aim, then, is not to posit republicanism as a framework for the 
critical evaluation of Elizabethan institutions, as others have sought to do, but rather to 
reconstruct a series of Elizabethan frameworks for the critical evaluation of republicanism 
as a philosophy of institutions and action. 
 
I 
What is the classical republican account of political personality? Perhaps it will be easier 
to begin by saying what classical republicanism is, and then to work our way back to the 
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notion of political personality—that is, the range of moral commitments, practices, and 
dispositions that define one as a political actor—implicit in it. As a first approximation to 
a definition, let us say that classical republicanism is a tradition, tracing itself to Aristotle, 
Polybius, and Cicero, holding that the best kind of state is one in which the members of a 
citizen body rule and are ruled as political equals, bound by the rule of law and by the 
imperative to pursue the interests of the community as a whole, neither subject to the 
dominance of an external power nor dependent on the patronage of an internal faction. (I 
use classical here in both senses: “drawn from ancient texts” as well as “canonically typical 
but admitting of variations.” Throughout this study, unless otherwise noted, “republican” 
and “republicanism” may be taken as synonymous with “classical republican” and 
“classical republicanism.”) At this point it is customary to invoke the warning of John 
Adams that “there is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than 
republicanism”; Adams also said that on this point “any other man of sense and learning,” 
provided he “has any regard to his character,” would find himself compelled to say the 
same.3 Chastening as this may be, it should be noted that the context of Adams’s remark 
was his frustration at the variety of specific constitutional structures—“constitutional” in 
the Aristotelian sense of being concerned with the organization of political offices and the 
allocation of powers among them—that could be denominated as “republics” and hence 
their advocates as “republicans.”4 It would be more accurate, then, to say that republic is 
virtually an unintelligible word, because of the persisting ambiguity whether it refers to 
some more or less specific empirical phenomenon (say, government without a king, or 
government under the law) irrespective of the type of arguments by which it is justified, or 
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whether it is simply the name for any constitutional form whose appeal rests upon the 
normative principles characteristic of the republican tradition. Does one become a 
“republican” by supporting a “republic,” or does something become a “republic” because 
“republicans” can plausibly support it? 
In the tradition of classical republicanism, it is clear that definitional priority runs 
in the latter direction. There is a more formal as well as a more substantive point to be 
made here. The formal point is that there is no kind of constitution, no matter how loosely 
or restrictively defined, support for which will automatically make one a republican in the 
classical sense.5 A republican believes that a good constitution is one that can be counted 
on to fulfill certain desiderata. Human nature and the nature of political activity being 
what they are, it is possible to generalize to an impressive degree about which forms of 
constitution will most consistently do so in practice. That said, the variation in 
sociological and geostrategic constraints from one place and one time to another is 
sufficiently great that it would be folly to prescribe any one form as the universally 
applicable standard. Hence the fact that one or another constitutional form comes to be 
referred to as “the republic” should be taken as an artifact of empirical regularity rather 
than as a sign that that form’s distinctive characteristics are a part of the term’s conceptual 
definition. 
The substantive point is that the basis for republican constitutional theory is 
Aristotle’s sixfold classification of constitutions—monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (later 
called democracy), and their degraded counterparts, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy 
(later called mob-rule or ocholocracy)—plus the principle, rather differently conceived of 
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by Aristotle on the one hand and by Polybius and Cicero on the other, that the mixture of 
two or more of the simple forms may be superior to either simple form alone. The first 
establishes that a regime’s legitimacy or illegitimacy is not a matter of where authority is 
located. The governments of the one, the few, or the many are all potentially good in 
themselves; their degeneration into misgovernment is a matter of authority’s misuse, not 
of its having been alienated from its natural source (say, a contracting community, or an 
anointed sovereign). The second establishes that the means of preventing misgovernment 
is by a kind of distribution of authority that is obviously not at all identical to a simple 
expansion or diversification of the makeup of the ruling group. It is often noted in 
discussions of this sort that republicanism need not mean support for democracy, and that 
it is actually conceivable for a republican to accept a system involving some form of 
monarchy. This is completely correct, but put in such a way it rather understates the point. 
Cicero, for instance, suggests that monarchy is in fact superior to democracy (though he 
also says it is a close call between them).6 There is nothing especially anomalous about 
this. What makes Cicero a foundational republican is, first, his definition of the republic 
or “commonwealth” as an association for the pursuit of the good of the whole and of the 
citizen’s virtue as the active sustaining of its institutions; and, second, his assertion of the 
preferability of the mixed constitution to all of the legitimate simple forms, monarchy as 
well as democracy. The two positions are closely related to one another; in fact, as I will 
now try to show, it is precisely the way in which they are related that defines each as a 
fundamental republican principle. 
Let us begin with the nexus of virtue and the common good, as it is presented in 
Aristotle’s Politics, before then taking up Polybius and the mixed constitution. According 
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to Aristotle, the difference between each of the good constitutional forms and its negative 
antitype is a question of whether the ruling element (whether one, few, or many) governs 
with a view to the good of the whole or to the good particular to itself.7 Note that the gap 
between the two kinds of good cannot be closed simply by making the ruling element 
identical with the whole of the population. This is because even the numerically largest 
group of citizens will have a particular and one-sided conception of what is just, tied to 
whatever it is constitutes it as a group.8 Typically, the many think in terms of citizens’ 
equal responsibility to provide for the city’s military defense, and so extend this principle 
into a demand for equality in everything; conversely, the few think in terms of citizens’ 
unequal contributions to the city’s commercial prosperity, and so extend this principle 
into a demand that everything be made correspondingly unequal. But the city, or polis, is 
the association within which not just one or two but all of the goods necessary to living 
well may be realized.9 Therefore, the criterion for its decisions ought not to be any one of 
those lesser goods, military or economic or otherwise, but rather the good of the city itself: 
resources should be distributed based on the degree to which citizens are equal or 
unequal in their capacity to contribute to its direction, that is, on their “virtue.”10 
A virtuous government looks to the common good, but the content of this 
“looking to the common good” turns out itself to consist in the recognizing and promoting 
of virtue. So what, then, is virtue? In the first place, Aristotle tells us, we are concerned 
here with the virtue of the citizen, and this is not necessarily the same as the virtue of the 
good man. The task common to citizens is “the preservation of the community,” and 
specifically the community insofar as it is determined by its political constitution 
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(politeia).11 Thus political virtue is something relative to the constitution of the particular 
society in which it operates, in a double sense: virtue is directed at sustaining the polis in 
its constituted form, but the form in which the polis is constituted also determines the 
occasions for virtue’s development, as well how closely the virtue of the citizen will 
approximate to the virtue of the good man. Where rule is by unequals over unequals, the 
capacities appropriate to those who command and those who serve will be sharply 
differentiated; and while such a system of government need not be degenerate, neither 
will anyone involved in it acquire political virtue in the fullest sense. Conversely, where 
political equals rule and are ruled by each other in turn, it is open to each to cultivate the 
capacities proper to both activities: “the good citizen should know and have the capacity 
both to be ruled and to rule, and this very thing is the virtue of a citizen.”12 In sum, 
political virtue is (1) the good a well-governed society will organize itself to discern and 
promote, (2) the ensemble of capacities necessary to preserving such a society in the form 
in which it has been organized, and (3) something most fully realized where citizens are 
able by turns to rule virtuously and to recognize and defer to the virtue of others. 
With regard to the structure of the good constitution, then, we can see that this 
conception of virtue subjects it to competing imperatives. On the one hand, to prevent 
degeneration it is necessary to put authority into the hands of those who possess a virtue 
that is highly asymmetrically distributed, closely tracking (without being reducible to) the 
economic independence that allows for the cultivation of a disinterested standpoint. On 
the other hand, virtue is best developed in conditions of political equality, in which a 
given individual might rule at one moment and be ruled at another; moreover, occasions 
for the development and exercise of virtue are not merely an instrumental means to the 
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end of the city’s continued stability, but are also the most significant of the positive goods 
the city ought to provide as many of its citizens as possible. There is a sense in the Politics 
that the way to satisfy both imperatives is by some kind of mixture of the forms of 
government, but in Aristotle’s view this basically means defining the ruling group in such 
a way as to place it midway between the “few” and the “many”; Aristotle is the ultimate 
source for the notion that popular government is workable if and only if its social basis is a 
sufficiently large group of small-scale proprietors.13 
It is Polybius who systematizes the concept of “mixed government” and presents it 
as a qualitatively distinct and superior alternative to any of the simple forms.14 Three 
innovations are particularly significant here. First, Polybius reworks the static taxonomy of 
common-good-seeking and sectional-good-seeking regimes into a dynamic and cyclical 
theory of their historical succession.15 Political society is said to begin when the rule of a 
primitive strongman evolves into legalized kingship; but with the accompanying rise in 
prosperity, subsequent kings become increasingly bent on high living and degenerate into 
tyrants. They are then overthrown by a group of nobles, who set themselves up as an 
aristocracy, governing reasonably until, after a few generations, their descendants forget 
the basis of their privileges and use them to support lives of peculation and debauchery. 
They are overthrown by the common people, and much the same process repeats itself 
until the multitude has reverted to total anomie and turns to a monarch to restore order, 
beginning the cycle again. 
Second, Polybius argues that because the potential for degeneration is intrinsic in 
each of the simple forms, the only way it may be arrested is for that form’s natural course 
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to be checked by the counteraction of one or more of the others. The ideal is a system in 
which elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (Polybius, unlike Aristotle, calls 
it this) all operate to keep each other in a state of controlled equilibrium—a system such 
as Lycurgus devised for Sparta in a single stroke of genius, and such as Rome has evolved 
by a long, accretive process of trial and error.16 One way of understanding this theory is as 
an expansion and radicalization of Aristotle’s notion that the virtue that preserves the 
state is best developed in a context of continuous interaction with the virtues belonging to 
one’s equals. Here it is not simply the individuals composing a single coherent ruling 
group, but multiple distinct constitutional agencies, in which each enfranchised citizen is 
enrolled at some level, that work at “ruling and being ruled in turn.” Balance among the 
different elements thus becomes the structural correlative to what the choice of the 
common over the sectional good is at the level of ethical commitments, and it becomes 
correspondingly imperative that none of the elements be anything less than fully engaged 
in acting upon, or anything less than fully independent of, the other two. 
Finally, Polybius offers the mixed constitution as a way of accounting not only for 
a regime’s justness and acceptability to its own citizens, but also and explicitly for its 
geopolitical prudence and military strength. The Histories are presented as an explanation 
of the unprecedented rapidity with which Rome has achieved unrivalled mastery of the 
Mediterranean world, and Polybius takes it as given that the ultimate causes of such 
events are to be found in the analysis of political systems.17 The examination of Rome’s 
constitution is inserted at the point when the historical narrative has reached the 
aftermath of Cannae, he tells us, because it is most instructive to consider the merits of a 
                                                        
16
 Ibid., VI.x. 
17
 Ibid., I.i: “Is there anyone on earth so narrow-minded or uninquisitive that he could fail to want to know 
how and thanks to what kind of political system almost the entire known world was conquered and brought 




system when circumstances have placed it under the greatest stress.18 In prosperity, the 
mutual restraining power of the three elements—consuls, Senate, and people—prevents 
any one of them from growing too great in arrogance and complacency; in adversity, on 
the other hand, “the state gains extraordinary abilities” as a result of the multiplied 
energies they independently bring to bear upon the crisis. “This,” concludes Polybius, 
“gives the Roman state its characteristic feature: it is irresistible, and achieves every goal it 
sets itself.”19 
We are now in a position to say what is the classical republican account of political 
personality. Its defining feature is what we may call the reciprocal relationship of good 
structure and good action. The political structure of a well-ordered society is a structure of 
action. It is the “balance,” the “mixture” within which each element is freed to assert itself 
in action while acting in such a way as to give place to the action of others in their turn. 
The action of one, few, or many is not something reserved for use in a last resort, never 
exercised precisely because merely the thought of it is sufficient to keep government 
responsible. In the republican system the agency of the various elements may vary in its 
tempo of activity and in the extent of its legal formalization, but what is essential is that 
they collectively constitute the actual participatory structure through which society is 
governed, and that the operation of each is informed and constrained by that of the others. 
Conversely, action itself is evaluated primarily from the standpoint of its tendency to 
preserve the political structure that, in its turn, gives further occasions to action. The 
capacity to act in a way conducive to the preserving of good structure is what Aristotle 
calls the virtue of the citizen, which is said to approach virtue simpliciter in the degree to 
which the structure it preserves is one of a multiplicity of actors in balance with one 
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another. The type and extent of occasions through which virtue may be developed and 
exercised is dependent upon the political structure; but the existence and character of that 
structure is itself dependent upon the willingness and ability of those composing it to act 
virtuously on its behalf. 
 
II 
These positions are not platitudes. There are very good reasons, for instance, why a 
Senecan Stoic or an Augustinian Christian ought to find them deeply problematic. The 
republican thinks of one’s moral development as constrained not so much by the limits of 
one’s ability to conform oneself to invariant norms of conduct discernible in the rational 
structure of the cosmos or opened to humanity by God’s special revelation, as by the 
conditions obtaining in the political society—the particular, time-bound society—in 
which one happens to live. If events transpire such that one of the elements in the 
constitution of your society defaults on its virtue, and constitutional imbalance results, 
then your society will have so much the less ruling and being ruled in turn, so much the 
more outright dominance of one agency over others. The key claim is that the 
consequence of your living in such a society is that you will be in some sense a worse 
person, regardless of whether you find yourself on the side of the dominators or the 
dominated. There is an obvious sense in which that claim is going to be hard to square 
with the core Stoic thesis that the well-being of the virtuous person, rightly understood, 
cannot be affected by external circumstances. The Stoic can perhaps accept the republican 
analysis as an analysis of the causal reasons why occasions for virtuous action, considered 
as an external good, are available in some times and places and not in others. But he 




endurance of the structure that enables virtuous action. For the Stoic the structure with 
which virtuous action must harmonize is that of the cosmos as a whole, the “cosmopolis” 
of which all humans (some contemporary followers of this set of intuitions may want to 
include at least some of the animals) are “citizens”; and the significant thing about that 
structure is that its endurance is quite beyond being affected by anything you or I might 
do or fail to do. 
The characteristic Stoic move, then, is to attach political virtue to a structure that 
is not itself a structure of action. The characteristic Augustinian move is to attach political 
virtue to an action that is entirely orthogonal to the existence of any particular structure. 
Let us recall that for Aristotle the reason the polis becomes the unique criterion of the 
citizen’s virtue is that it is self-sufficient, in the sense that all the goods necessary for living 
well can be found there, by contrast with more limited associations devoted to the pursuit 
of one or another good in particular. Having reached this status, qualitatively distinct 
from any lesser association, it becomes essential that the polis not degenerate by allowing 
an internal faction to sway the balance in the direction of any good narrower than that of 
the polis itself.  For Augustine, the set of “human associations capable of securing all the 
goods necessary for living well” is an empty set. Since there are no self-sufficient political 
bodies, the criteria of political virtue cannot be based on the distinction between 
preserving and degenerating from self-sufficiency. Rather, the character of a political body 
is to be defined by its relationship to something outside of it that it lacks, something that, 
in Augustine’s vocabulary, it “loves.” The really important political question to ask about a 
society is not how it is organized but what it loves. In the case of a polity staffed by good 
Aristotelian republicans, the answer is clear: it loves itself. To desire what one already has 




have permanently what one already has, and such permanence is what one cannot but 
lack. So what the republic, the City of Man, is really in love with is its own permanence. 
The alternative is the City of God, which has no institutional structure and nothing 
intrinsically to do with permanence. It is the invisible collection of those who treat 
persisting political bodies not as ends in themselves, as the republicans do, but as 
instruments in the service of an end that exceeds them, the realization in time of the 
kingdom in which time will be abolished. 
 We are starting to see just how much the assessment of the republican attempt to 
join action to structure and structure to action has to do with the specifically temporal 
characteristics of the structure in question, and with the contrast between action oriented 
to the temporality of such structures and action temporally independent of them. The 
temporality proper to the republic is defined by Cicero himself in a famous passage that 
we know from Augustine’s quoting and commenting critically upon it: 
From those penalties of which even the stupidest men are sensible—such 
as destitution, exile, chains, and stripes—private individuals often escape 
by adopting the proffered alternative of a speedy death. But for states death 
is itself a punishment, though for individual men it seems to be a 
deliverance from punishment. For the state ought to be so organized that it 
will endure forever. Hence, death is not a natural end for the 
commonwealth as it is for a human being, whose death is not only 
necessary but frequently even desirable. But when a state is destroyed and 
wiped out and annihilated, it is somewhat as if—to compare small things 
with great—this whole world should perish and collapse.20 
Political bodies, then, are in the permanence game, and we can see how the two critical 
moves just outlined represent alternative ways of accepting this fact while rejecting a 
republican understanding of its implications. For the Stoic, politics is in the permanence 
game, and this means that political personality ought to be based on that which is really 
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permanent, and this can hardly be something so tenuous as a structure dependent upon 
action. For the Augustinian, politics is in the permanence game, and so much the worse 
for politics: political virtue, supposing we still want to call it that, ought not then be left to 
the arbitration of anything itself political, or anything otherwise tainted by the ontological 
falsity of the search for permanence. There is a third critical possibility, which is to accept 
the republican account on its own terms, but to ask how far permanence really is or can be 
the outcome of the joining of action to structure. Here two sharply different possibilities 
are available to classical republicans, although one can sometimes find both of them 
adopted by the same author in different contexts, as is the case with Polybius. 
 On the one hand, there is the optimistic narrative we have already considered, 
according to which the benefit of the mixed constitution is precisely that it stops the 
processes of political degeneration in their tracks and so creates a system hypothetically 
capable of enduring forever. On this view, while of course it might in practice not be 
possible to balance the mixture so perfectly that there would be no danger of future 
instability, there is no intrinsic theoretical reason why degeneration should befall a system 
ordered on mixed-constitutional principles. But then in a later passage Polybius explains 
that the constitution of Carthage was basically the same as that of the Romans, only at the 
time when the two cities went to war Rome’s constitution was still in its period of vigor, 
while that of Carthage, being older, had already entered a phase of terminal decline.21 This 
unexpected reappearance of the theory of cyclical degeneration, now applied to the mixed 
constitution itself, initially seems hard to square with Polybius’s earlier explanation of its 
superiority to the simple, degenerative forms. Something of an explanation is offered, 
though, at the end of his book on constitutions when he tells us that the outlines of 
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Rome’s future can be clearly foreseen. The conquests brought about by the effectiveness of 
the city’s political system will eventually generate so much luxury, arrogance, and 
ambition that that system will no longer be able to channel and contain it: liberty will 
collapse into license, and mixed government into some variety of despotism.22 The 
thought would appear to be something like this: it is true that the more perfectly mixed 
government constitutes itself as a structure of action, the greater is its power to restrain 
each actor’s potential to degenerate; but the greater, too, is the power and the scale of the 
action it unleashes. And action is a dynamic factor just as structure is a conservative: the 
two can be held in equilibrium for a time, but at some point the quantity of dynamism the 
mixed constitution enables will set off processes of change too disruptive for it to 
accommodate. 
 It is through thinking of this sort, given its most influential expression in Sallust’s 
explanation of the decline of Roman virtue as a consequence of the military expansion 
that virtue had itself made possible, that classical republicanism acquires a kind of tragic 
sensibility unusual among political theories. Especially in its Renaissance varieties, 
classical republicanism sometimes appears less as offering a single prescriptive program 
for the joining of structure and action than as enforcing a consciousness of the necessity of 
choosing between them and suffering the consequences either way. Could virtuous action 
be reconceived in such a way as to pose less danger of upsetting the structure that 
conditioned it? Yes, possibly, though this might mean military weakness and a 
demoralizing as well as practically problematic alienating of one’s capacities onto hired 
mercenaries. Could structural balance be reconceived as something more atomized and 
antagonistic, and thereby be stretched to accommodate more kinds of dynamic change 
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and causes of internal disharmony? Yes, possibly, though this might ultimately amount to 
letting the candle burn at both ends, facilitating more glory but not assuring its endurance. 
From the sixteenth century onward the antithesis around which these options, what 
Harrington was to call the “commonwealth for preservation” and the “commonwealth for 
increase,” was that of Venice to Rome. Harrington thought a synthesis of the two was 
possible, and it would be interesting to consider his proposal in the terms this study has 
set up, whereby it might be said that he attempts to recast possession as a kind of virtual 
or prospective action, and to redefine the republic as the structure of balanced possession. 
 That history, however, lies outside the scope of this work, which is concerned 
rather with the conceptualizing of classical republicanism at an earlier moment in English 
political thought. The earliest of the literary works that make up its primary focus, 
Sidney’s Old Arcadia, dates from around 1580, the latest, Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, from 
around 1608. This is a period traditionally seen as falling between two rather more robust 
moments of English interest in the forms and ethos of classical politics, and in Venice as 
that politics’ living exemplar: on the one side, Thomas Starkey, Thomas Smith, and the 
reforming counselors of mid-sixteenth-century humanism; on the other, Milton, 
Harrington, and the classical republicans of the Interregnum. Recent decades have 
witnessed some prominent attempts at revising that traditional view, however, and so 
before I proceed to outlining my argument, it will be well to begin by getting a more 
detailed sense of what the older narrative is and of how exactly it has been challenged. 
 
III 
The newer work is generally framed as correcting J.G.A. Pocock, who is thought to have 




that it could not have been otherwise, that English political culture was simply too 
pervaded by contrary assumptions about the nature of the body politic for republican 
arguments to have gotten even a serious hearing. This debate is of some special interest 
here, for two apparently opposite reasons. On the one hand, my intention to analyze 
thought about republicanism (which may or may not be republican thought) around and 
before 1600 puts me more or less in the revisionists’ camp. On the other hand, my analysis 
of what republicanism is and what conceptual problems it raises—the republic as a 
structure of action, the particularly temporal character of such structures—is substantially 
Pocock’s, whereas it is an analysis the revisionists appear largely to have abandoned. If 
some kind of synthesis or compromise between the two positions is to be attempted, then, 
the first step is perhaps to acquire a slightly more nuanced understanding of the content 
of Pocock’s negative judgment on the possibility of a pre-1642 English republicanism, by 
setting that judgment back in the context of The Machiavellian Moment’s larger historical 
narrative.23 
Pocock’s historical point of departure was the analysis of “civic humanism” offered 
by Hans Baron, who had claimed that praise of the active, public life and of the republic as 
its venue had sprung up with a novel intensity in Florence’s crisis period of 1400, when the 
city’s independence was threatened by Giangaleazzo Visconti’s Milan.24 The Machiavellian 
Moment’s key innovation was to reframe the “moment of crisis” so that it became less the 
circumstantial context from which civic republicanism had emerged than the explanatory 
domain to which it laid claim. Medieval political theory, in Pocock’s view, was fitted 
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primarily for the task of comprehending the principles of transtemporal entities. To the 
extent it was capable of seeing in particular events anything but the irrational flux of 
fortuna, it was compelled to do so either by assimilating them into the longue durée of the 
customary, through which the legal traditions of a country such as England had developed 
by slow accretion, or by making them the objects of the ruler’s ad hoc statecraft, a 
mysterious art irreducible to law and obscurely related to Providence. By contrast, the 
theorists of the republic sought to generalize normatively about political societies’ ways of 
responding to novel configurations of circumstance; they sought to present as the 
directing element of such societies the citizen, for whom acting in response to contingent 
events was the more or less continuous condition of his existence; and they sought above 
all to understand the specific sequences of events through which a society’s direction 
could be usurped when its citizens ceased to function properly as such. 
What distinguished “the republic,” then, was less its specific organization—
whether, for instance, it did or did not have a prince—than the fact that it was conceived 
as a structure of action, the character of which emerged out of the involvement of multiple 
distinct individuals and groups in the process of government. This much we have already 
seen in examining republicanism’s classical sources. In the context of late medieval and 
Renaissance England, though, we need to consider more specifically what a structure of 
action was not. What it was not was exclusively or primarily a structure of rights, in which 
government is one unitary, functionally differentiated agency working to secure all the 
other, non-governing agencies in the enjoyment of their legal and customary status. 
Behind this opposition we might see the influence of C.H. McIlwain, who draws a similar 
contrast between the medieval regime for restraining arbitrary power through legal 




through political balancing.25 In the former conception, to which McIlwain is emphatically 
more sympathetic, rule is not divided among a diversity of agents expected to constrain 
and cooperate with each other through regularized interaction. Instead, the single ruler is 
utterly freed to act within his own sphere, but that sphere is hemmed and abutted in every 
direction, not by the activities of competing co-rulers, but rather by a great complex of 
rights, privileges, precedents, customs, and statutes, all of which it is the ruler’s function 
and obligation to uphold. 
If this distinction is accepted, a couple points may become clearer. A desire to 
restrain the crown’s assertiveness may be a necessary condition for the emergence of 
republicanism, but it certainly is not sufficient, since republicanism represents only one of 
at least two fundamentally different ways of conceptualizing restraint, and the one with by 
far the less broad and deep presence in English constitutional history. We would expect, 
then, that a viable republicanism would be associated with the meeting of two further 
conditions, one negative and one positive. The first is some sort of breakdown of 
confidence in the more purely legalist view of constitutional order. The second is a way of 
making plausible the alternative view of the constitution as a structure of action, that is, 
an ability to embrace what I have called the account of political personality according to 
which virtuous citizens contribute their independent agencies in support of the structure 
that allows them to do so. But, as we have seen, that account was neither uncontested 
since antiquity nor immune to fragmenting into its component parts, and Pocock’s claim 
was that in England it had either failed to coalesce or failed to overcome its competitors 
until a relatively late date. 
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This was clearly and explicitly distinguished from the claim that English thought 
in earlier periods was unreflectively attached to a static and traditional “world picture.” To 
be sure, the venerable idea of the commonwealth as a hierarchy of functional units 
continued to exert its influence, and in Pocock’s judgment it still partly limited the 
institutional imagination of the humanists of Starkey’s generation who promoted the 
figure of the reforming counselor as a kind of quasi-republican citizen.26 The problem, 
however, was not so much that the explanatory space in which a classical republican 
account of the citizen as political agent would have operated did not yet exist, as that it 
was already occupied by a number of competing claimants. On the one side, the ancient-
constitutionalist saw himself as engaged in a constant process of discerning and defending 
institutions that were in themselves structures not of action but of usage, property, and 
right. On the other, the radical saint saw himself as engaged in an action that would carry 
him beyond the possibility of commitment or even deference to institutions that had 
proved inadequate to the demands of godly rule.27 Pocock’s conclusion was that “new 
modes of civic consciousness and action there were in some profusion” circa 1600, “but as 
yet there was no way of envisaging the political community as the sum of these interacting 
modes,” without which we are still missing “the essence of the theory of the polis.”28 
One way of contesting this narrative would be to argue that the English polity in 
this period really was practically if tacitly “republican,” in the sense that government was 
not only legally limited but was also a product of genuine balance among independent 
political actors. This would be as much as to say that when Thomas Smith, writing in 1565, 
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used the vocabulary of the mixed constitution to describe the structure of what he called 
the Republica Anglorum, notwithstanding that the “kingdome of Englande is farre more 
absolute than either the dukedome of Venice is, or the kingdome of the Lacedemonians 
was,” he pointed to a real continuity as well as a real difference; and that when in the 
succeeding decades that vocabulary fell into general disuse, the reality it had sought to 
capture did not disappear with it.29 Something very like this was in fact said by Patrick 
Collinson, who criticized Pocock for scanting what he called “the quasi-republican modes 
of political reflection and action within the intellectual and active reach of existing modes 
of consciousness.”30 Collinson’s focus was partly on the power of local and municipal 
governments, partly on the extent to which the uncertain succession compelled the 
contemplating of an acephalous polity, even if only in the temporary context of a 
formalized interregnum. That plans for such an interregnum were conceived at the 
highest levels of government suggested to Collinson that “when it came to the crunch, the 
realm took precedence over the ruler. So citizens were concealed within subjects.”31 
Collinson was concerned more with political than intellectual history, more with 
what went on at the level of practice than how it was accounted for at the level of theory. 
The reverse was the case in an important 1995 book by Markku Peltonen, in which it was 
argued that while the concept of the mixed constitution had indeed fallen largely into 
disuse in the later sixteenth century, the concurrent demise of the political ethic of active 
citizenship had been rather more exaggerated. In Elizabethan moral treatises, citizens are 
not so much concealed within subjects as they are loudly declared to be there, albeit with 
considerable vagueness about what institutional consequences ought to follow. 
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Furthermore, what can only be called full-dress republicanism did show up in Elizabethan 
England, although it was confined to what Peltonen calls various “marginal” contexts: 
town- and county-level politics of the sort Collinson had already pointed out32; discussions 
of Irish policy; and translations of foreign works on contemporary republics, such as 
Gasparo Contarini’s celebrated treatise on Venice, of which much more will be said in the 
chapters to follow. 
Finally, the literary scholar Andrew Hadfield has gone beyond these more 
measured proposals to produce a picture of a culture in which republicanism was not only 
conceivable but widespread, offering a language of dissent and discontent to an 
impressive roster of poets and dramatists.33 Hadfield has been sharply criticized in some 
quarters for tortured reasoning and sometimes outright factual error, and it must be said 
that his enthusiasm for the possibility that authors such as Spenser and Shakespeare 
might be deemed “republicans” often outstrips any very clear sense of what the 
designation is supposed to mean.34 However, it must also be said that he has done a 
valuable service in assembling a body of evidence that, in its sheer volume, does suggest 
that classical republican sources played a larger role than has always been appreciated in 
shaping the kinds of questions Elizabethan political culture posed to itself, even if a 
conversion to republicanism was not the usual way those questions got answered. 
In sum, then, here is what the revisionist studies can be said to have collectively 
demonstrated. An ethical doctrine of the classical citizen was continuously present and 
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confidently articulated throughout the period under study, and was not utterly crowded 
out by Pocock’s lawyerly and saintly alternatives, or by any others. A conception of the 
English polity as a balanced structure to which that citizen might contribute, while not 
talked about quite so much, was also not so overwhelmingly distant from the way 
government worked in practice, or might work under certain plausibly imaginable 
circumstances, that descriptions of other societies in such terms would have seemed 
automatically irrelevant. And, lastly, the conditions of Elizabethan literary culture were 
such that most writers of significance probably had sufficient exposure to classical 
republicanism for them to have formed some kind of opinion about it. 
That is all to the good, but let us also notice what has dropped from view. First, 
there is a diminished sense in general that anything is to be gained by studying the history 
of republicanism—or, for that matter, of any other tradition of political thought—as part 
of a history that includes its relationships to adjacent and competing alternatives. Second, 
and more specifically, there is a diminished sense of republicanism as a specific way of 
configuring action and structure in relation to one another, such that an emphasis on one 
term over the other might not simply make a given author 50 percent republican, but 
might point us to a split between opposing republicanisms, or—where one term is 
developed to the exclusion of the other—might indicate we are dealing with something 
actively anti-republican. Third, and most specifically, the strong sense in Pocock’s work 
that the faultlines dividing such internal and external contenders from one another are 
most clearly delineated as alternative conceptions of time, of the temporal relations 





The chapters to follow aspire to profit from the newer studies’ insights while 
remedying some of what seem to me their conceptual and contextual foreshortenings. On 
the one hand, I do not begin from the presumption that classical republicanism was an 
intellectual force of little consequence in Elizabethan culture, or one of relatively minor 
interest simply because we can point to other currents that flowed deeper and more 
continuously. On the other hand, neither do I presume that the full measure of its 
consequence can be taken by asking how many “republicans” it created, nor that this is 
the most pressing question we might ask about the nature of an author’s relationship to it. 
Rather, each chapter here examines one of what are arguably the period’s three most 
definitive literary figures, with the intention of showing how the distinguishing 
characteristics—formal and aesthetic as well as topical and ideational—of his own highly 
particular approach to political thought emerge out of an engagement of some type 
(hostile, bemused, elated-and-then-deflated, and so on) with the classical republican 
paradigm. These do not form a consecutive historical narrative so much as they play out a 
set of logical alternatives determined by the different possibilities for configuring the three 
terms of action, structure, and permanence. Those alternatives, personified respectively in 
Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare, correspond more or less closely to the three critical 
positions I distinguished earlier, those which we might call the Stoic, the Augustinian, and 
the Tragic Republican. 
 
IV 
Sidney is the logical starting point, not only because he comes first chronologically, but 
also because, great-uncle of Algernon Sidney and intimate of the Huguenot resistance 




whatever in the England of the 1570s and 1580s was continuous with republican moments 
elsewhere in place and time.35 Hence the first chapter also deals at rather greater length 
than do the others with the existing critical literature, in part simply because there is so 
much more of it, but in part also because it raises important questions about how to 
define and distinguish our subject. Are, for instance, resistance theory and classical 
republicanism better thought of as continuous, discontinuous, or even in some respects 
opposed to one another? Do positions on constitutional form and positions on political 
morality always closely track one another, or should they be regarded as following their 
own distinct trajectories? 
These questions matter especially in Sidney’s case because the strongest recent 
account of the politics of his Arcadia, that offered by Blair Worden, sees Sidney as 
developing something very much like the republican account of political personality—
what we might call a “citizen ethic”—while carefully decoupling that account from any 
kind of prescription concerning the constitutional arrangements that would support it. If 
that is indeed what Sidney thought, it is by no means a necessarily incoherent position, 
though neither is it in any strict sense a republican one. However, as I argue in Chapter 
One, while the separation of virtuous action from constitutional structure may at a certain 
analytical level help us to cut neatly through the Arcadia’s political tangles, when we turn 
to its notion of virtuous action we discover that the question of separability reappears as 
its defining internal tension. On the one hand, Sidney wants virtue to be constancy, 
meaning action informed by knowledge of one’s intrinsic moral immunity to any change 
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in one’s time-bound circumstances. On the other hand, he wants the constant self’s 
actions to confirm its identity as that of an essentially political being. 
As we have seen, however, the republican citizen knew that if the republic were 
overrun or tipped into imbalance it would count as a real, not an illusory, diminishment of 
his moral well-being. Sidney could conceivably have had a citizen ethic without it being a 
republican ethic so long as he remained agnostic about which type of structure was the one 
required in order to allow the citizen to enjoy a virtuous, because a political, existence. 
What Sidney could not do while retaining that ethic was to say categorically that there 
could be no such structure; in that sense, conversely, the citizen could never be constant. 
So Sidney faced the choice of doubling down on the citizen and all that temporally went 
with him, or taking the characteristically Stoic route of situating the political actor in 
relation to a structure that stood by virtue of something far less temporally variable than 
mere action. Sidney, as we shall see, takes instead the characteristically Sidneyan route of 
a compromise; but it is a compromise that results in displacement of the citizen by the 
disciplinary prince as the paradigmatic type of political personality. 
What in Sidney is thus a complexly and inconsistently held philosophical 
principle—indifference to the temporal careers of republics—is in Spenser a brute, 
unadorned fact, and it is from this that Chapter Two begins. In this chapter I attempt to 
account for two of the more strikingly idiosyncratic features of Spenser’s political thought. 
First, its marked tendency to take the form of a succession over time of single, isolated 
figures, preempting the standard republican analysis of a society’s constitution in terms of 
the distribution or concentration of authority across a diversity of social actors. Second, its 
complete indifference to that particular narrative of succession according to which Rome’s 




into a corrupt principate. I argue that both features can be explained by seeing Spenser’s 
politics as informed by Augustine’s seminal critique of classical republicanism, which 
attacks not so much the alleged desirability of a “republic” as its very coherence as a 
normative category. It is not simply that Spenser, like Sidney, is less concerned with 
institutional forms than with individual virtues, though that is certainly true. Rather, 
Spenser’s very notion of what political virtue is is intrinsically bound up in his Augustinian 
rejection of the assumptions underlying the republican analysis of institutions. 
In the chapter’s first section I show how Spenser’s Ruines of Time effectively 
recapitulates Augustine’s foundational critique of Roman republicanism. It is Augustine’s 
basic duality that structures Spenser’s poem: lovers of the City of Man treat political 
institutions as ends in themselves, and tragically commit themselves to their endurance; 
lovers of the City of God recognize them as transient instruments to be directed to ends 
beyond this world. I then turn to what happens when Spenser directly confronts one the 
starkest arguments imaginable for the necessary relation of virtue, constitutional structure, 
and civic permanence: Contarini’s treatise on Venice, for which Spenser penned a 
commendatory sonnet. Contarini’s interest is in finding the arrangement of actors and 
institutions whose perfect balance allows the city to preserve itself permanently. Spenser 
ignores this entirely, and instead inserts Venice into the sequence of world-monarchies 
found in the Book of Daniel and given historiographic authority by Augustine and his 
successors. Where Contarini tries to get constitutional order right in such a way as to 
allow temporal change to disappear, Spenser shrinks the social world to exactly one actor 
at a time, in order to focus on that actor’s place in the ongoing history of temporal power. 
In a final section, I show how this distinction informs Spenser’s political analysis in the 




Ireland’s reformation; what matters is the work of individual officeholders in modeling the 
sort of disciplined, lawlike temporality that Ireland otherwise lacks. Political virtue for 
Spenser, then, looks less like participating in an enduring system than like producing out 
of one’s own mode of action what continuity is possible in a world where this can be 
grounded in nothing else. 
When we come to Shakespeare’s treatment of Venetian political life in Othello, by 
contrast, we find for the first time a vastly greater willingness to work within the terms of a 
classical republican problematic of time and virtuous action. In Chapter Three, Contarini’s 
republicanism moves to the center of the inquiry, as I seek to show that the seriousness 
and originality of Shakespeare’s engagement with it in the later of his two Venetian plays 
is even greater than has yet been appreciated. To see this, however, it is necessary to 
restore the centrality of a line of argument that modern scholars have at times wished to 
scant, namely that dealing with the difference between societies defended by citizen-
soldiers and societies, such as Venice, defended by mercenary professionals, such as 
Othello. Spenser had assimilated the thesis of Venice’s permanent endurance to the whole 
conceptual field of classical republicanism, casting Venice as Rome’s successor in order to 
point up the difference between the emulation of secular values and the sublation of those 
values in providential history. Shakespeare, by contrast, directs our attention to that 
aspect of Contarini’s Venice most liable to criticism on intra-republican terms, and in so 
doing he opens up the republican nexus of structure and action such that it becomes less a 
definitional unity than a means of juxtaposing dialectically different kinds of republics: 
serene and permanent Venice against agonistic and glorious Rome. 
Shakespeare’s tragic republicanism consists in dramatizing, not the Venetian 




those terms that Shakespeare wishes to count the costs. The tragedy leaves the city serene 
and unperturbed, but only because it has so completely severed the ligatures connecting 
the soldier’s actions to the political structure he is engaged to protect. For Sidney 
permanence was the ultimate criterion that trumped politics; for Spenser it was the false 
god that politics had to deny; in the dialectic that Shakespeare inherits from Machiavelli 
and Contarini it is a value chosen by some polities and not by others, against the backdrop 
of the alternative possibility of choosing action. Othello, I argue, should be read in terms 
of the habitual sixteenth-century opposition between circumscribed, inviolable, disarmed 
Venice and the expansive, dynamic, militarized republic of Rome. This, I propose, offers 
new ways of contextualizing not only the play’s racial politics of inclusion and exclusion, 
but also the epistemological crisis that overtakes Othello’s marriage, understood here as a 
confrontation between the two republics’ antithetical, and strongly gendered, kinds of 
virtue. Venice achieves (as does Rome) one complex of republican values by foreclosing 
another. Both in his exploration of the tradeoffs and in his location of them specifically in 
the space left by the citizen-soldier of classical theory, Shakespeare may be said to 
anticipate something of the subsequent course of Anglo-American republican thought; 
perhaps he may also be said to give it something of a future. 
 
V 
That may seem a strange place to end a story that has been in large part about the salience 
of classical republicanism’s competitors. But it is perhaps less inappropriate as a 
conclusion to what is also a story about the irreducible facts of plurality and choice in the 
field of political thought. This brings me to the quote I have chosen for my epigraph. 




study of those whom he saw as having authored the moral and practical realities with 
which he could himself identify—chiefly, it would seem, Protestants, Parliamentarians, 
and the unpoetic—standards of evidence and degrees of sympathy wholly unlike those he 
brought to the study of their opponents. How far the criticism applies to contemporary 
historians I would not presume to say. But it should be said that when and where its 
equivalent tendency in literary studies operates, it does so with far greater perniciousness 
and potential for mischief. 
The Whig historian’s task, like that of any historian, is the reconstruction of causal 
processes; for this he often requires the reactionary, as the villain of the piece. About the 
fact of meaningful disagreement the Whig historian is never in doubt, however prejudiced 
the manner in which he seeks to understand it. The task of the literary critic, on the other 
hand, is the reconstruction of significant ideations. With the historian, that which is not 
seen to be a cause may be seen to be an impediment, and so at least granted the dignity of 
its intransigence. But that which is not seen to be a significant ideation may be seen to be 
an insignificant ideation, and so to drop entirely from that area of reality which is the 
critic’s concern. So it is when a critic comes to his material in the belief that it has a claim 
on his attention only insofar as it can anticipate or give comfort to habits of mind he 
currently regards as congenial. The effect is not so much that of describing a battle from 
the vantage of one side as it is that of presenting a world in which conflict and choice have 
receded to a lower order of reality, in which the thought that does not excite the critic 
becomes something incapable of rising to a level of moral and epistemic parity with the 
thought that does. Whatever else I have gotten wrong in my attempt at reconstructing the 
conflicting ideas about political virtue implicit in the works of my chosen authors, it is 






Constitution, Constancy, and Crisis in the Old Arcadia 
 
Of the three authors to be treated in this and the following chapters, the question of 
Sidney’s relation to republican thought has by far the longest and deepest presence in the 
critical tradition, reaching back at least to the work in the 1930s of William Dinsmore 
Briggs. Briggs drew, as have many critics since, on the intimate personal connections 
between Sidney and several of the progenitors of what would come to be called 
“monarchomach” theory, or the theory of legitimate resistance to tyrants developed by 
mostly Huguenot writers in the period between the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre and 
the death of the Duke of Anjou, whereby the Protestant Henry of Navarre became heir to 
the French throne. The principal texts of this movement are the Francogallia of François 
Hotman (1573), the Droit des magistrats of Theodore de Bèze (1574), the De jure regni apud 
Scotus of George Buchanan (1579), and the anonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos (also 
1579), authorship of which has been interminably disputed between Hubert Languet and 
Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.1 Sidney was a protégé of Languet, a close friend and translator 
of Mornay (as was his sister Mary), and a friendly acquaintance of Hotman; and such 
biographical facts alone appear almost sufficient motivation for Briggs’s judgment that 
had Sidney ever written a work of formal political theory “it would have stood somewhere 
between the Vindiciae and the Francogallia, but nearer to the former” (161).2 
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Additionally, the concepts of tyranny, on the one hand, and rebellion, on the other, 
dominate Sidney’s literary output with a pervasiveness and explicitness unmatched in any 
other major English writer of the period—with the possible exception of his biographer 
and literary executor Fulke Greville.3 In other words, Sidney’s fictional idiom is more 
directly commensurable with that of contemporary political thought than are those with 
which will be dealing in later chapters. We have not to do here with Spenser’s radical 
foreshortening of republican constitutionalism to fit onto the single axis of its philosophy 
of time, nor with Shakespeare’s complex sociological, epistemological, and metadramatic 
extrapolations from the premises of republican thought. Spenser shrinks down, 
Shakespeare explodes out, but Sidney’s Arcadia occupies a conceptual universe that 
contains more or less the same kind and number of objects as do the works of formal 
theory and topical controversy with which it might be compared. This does not exactly 
mean the interpretation of Sidney’s political thought is an easier matter—the Arcadia’s 
political objects are many, some are in flagrant tension with one another, others change 
their relative positions over time, and nearly all are subject to the extreme ambiguities of 
tone and effects of authorial endistancing at which Sidney so excels—but it does make the 
task in some sense more straightforward. Finally, the presence of monarchomach theory 
“in” the text is not simply a matter of a continuity of concern and outlook, but of Arcadia’s 
being populated by characters who literally give expression to its contents, adduce them 
as justification for their actions, and reap the consequences of having acted in the way 
they appear to dictate. 
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The question, then, is not whether the legitimacy of resistance is a matter 
contemplated by Sidney’s text, but rather what attitude the text adopts toward it. But how 
closely should we connect the question of attitudes to resistance theory with the question 
of classical republicanism?4 Genetically speaking, resistance theory has its beginnings in 
the attempt to deal with a problem that is not even remotely “classical”: the insistence of 
Luther and other magisterial Reformers that the Pauline epistles, particularly Romans 13 
and its statement that the powers that be are of God and owed a duty of conscientious 
submission, are, as Quentin Skinner puts it, “the final authority on all fundamental 
questions about the proper conduct of social and political life.”5 Those putting forward 
theories of resistance were thus compelled to do so in a manner constrained by their 
acceptance of a premise that would hardly have occurred to Aristotle or Cicero, and that 
could easily be seen to trump any aid and comfort a pagan theorist might otherwise have 
given to potential resisters. Moreover, republicanism is a discourse of good forms of 
government, and there is an obvious difference between asking what makes a form good 
in its kind and asking at what point it has become so bad that its validity can be set at 
naught, just as there is a difference between asking what is a good way for a person to act 
and asking at what point a person has acted so badly that we may take away his freedom 
of action altogether. There is, of course, much discussion in Polybius of vicious regimes 
being overthrown, but this is presented deterministically, as what follows by nature from a 
regime’s being vicious, and it is to be understood that the overthrowers, or their 
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institutional descendants, will shortly become vicious in their turn. The point of the mixed 
constitution is to bring about a situation in which there would be no need for further 
overthrowing, not to assign legitimacy to it when it happens. 
This can be observed quite nicely in Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, the 
first portion of which is given to a broadly classical exposition of mixed-constitutional 
theory as applied to English institutions. Following a chapter on the sixfold classification 
of constitutions, Smith proceeds to consider “chaunges in the maner of Governement,” 
which generally go from kings to tyrants, tyrants to aristocrats, and so on through the 
cycle, summed up as a kind of physiological process affecting bodies politic, “for the 
nature of man is never to stand still in one maner of estate, but to grow from the lesse to 
the more, and decay from the more againe to the lesse, till it come to the fatall end and 
destruction.”6 At this point it occurs to Smith to wonder what happens when the 
naturalistic frame is suspended and we ask not whether the overthrowing of a bad 
government is predictable but rather whether it is justified. Smith is reduced to noting that 
when such a thing takes place the common people judge it by “the event and successe,” 
the learned by the doers’ motives and by “the estate of the time then present.” On the 
crucial question of whether there are in fact any such things as circumstances “of the time 
then present” that would justify resistance to a duly constituted ruler, his conclusion is as 
follows: “Certaine it is that it is alwayes a doubtfull and hasardous matter to meddle with 
the chaunging of the lawes and governement, or to disobey the order of the rule or 
government, which a man doth finde already established.”7 That is all. We move on to the 
proposition that commonwealths are often not simple but mixed, and back into the 
framework of physiological metaphor, Smith preferring to think of the balancing of kinds 
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of government on the model of the balancing of the four humors. The paradigm in which 
Smith is working, in other words, allows the issue of the limits of obligation to show up as 
a lacuna, but does not itself offer him resources for resolving it. And, in fact, classical 
republicanism is not among the primary discourses from which the monarchomachs 
derive the architectonics of their arguments, remaining ancillary at best to covenantal 
theology, historical legal studies, and scholastic natural-law contractualism. 
On the other hand, it does play one significant if indirect role which is of some 
special interest here. One way of meeting the objection that there could be no justified 
resistance to the powers that be might be to increase the range of actors who could be 
counted as powers (Paul having been silent on whether one power was allowed to resist 
another). This would be a substantial incentive to redescribing the system of king and 
Estates, not as an arrangement in which the former required the advice and occasionally 
the consent of the latter in order to vindicate its property and privileges, but rather as a 
mixed constitution, in which a multiplicity of political beings had been apportioned some 
role in the collaborative activity of ruling. In the later sixteenth century this strategy came 
to be so closely associated with one word that the simple invocation of it could be taken as 
code for the entire underlying argument: “ephor.”8 Calvin in the final chapter of his 
Institutes, after a lengthy affirmation of the view that tyrants are ordained for the 
chastisement of the people and must be suffered patiently, had added, almost as an 
afterthought, that he had been speaking only of “private persons.” “For if there be, in the 
present day, any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the 
moderation of the power of kings, such as were, in ancient times, the Ephori, who were a 
check upon the kings of the Lacedemonians,” then Calvin would not only allow but insist 
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that they carry out their duties and counteract the prince, for otherwise they would 
“fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, of which they know that they have been 
appointed protectors by the ordination of God.”9 
Note that Calvin puts the point in the subjunctive: “if there be” in modern states 
officials with duties like those of the Spartan ephors, then consequences such as these 
would follow. Nevertheless, even raising the possibility represented something rather 
different from the more familiar application of the doctrine of the inferior magistrate to a 
federal interpretation of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, where it could be 
used to defend a prince’s acting against the commands of a superior prince.10 An ephor 
made sense only in the context of a republic: he was plainly not a smaller sort of prince, 
the holder neither of imperium nor of dominium over a subsidiary province; rather, he was 
the agent of one of the classical elements, the many, whose function was exhausted by the 
role he played in balancing government and so bending it to the dictates of law and the 
common good. Hence the question of whether there really were ephoral officers in the 
national monarchies of post-feudal Europe came down not only to what precedents for 
them could be creatively educed from the historical record, but also to whether the 
practice and spirit of politics in those countries could or could not be described in terms 
appropriate to the experience of ancient republics. Were the leading persons of a society 
such as England or France essentially like classical citizens, coordinating their virtuous 
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concern for the common good in support of the structure that enabled them to continue 
acting virtuously? Should they be? What followed if it turned out they were not? 
How Sidney thought about questions such as these will be the subject of this 
chapter. The first section considers three different approaches to the politics of Sidney’s 
Arcadia. In the first, Sidney is closely aligned with the monarchomach view of an activist 
aristocracy with considerable latitude to resist the crown; in the second, he appears as a 
sophisticated critic of just that view; in the third, he offers an account of political 
personality broadly compatible with that of the monarchomachs—what might be called a 
citizen ethic—and yet decouples this from any strong position either on resistance or on 
constitutional structure. In the chapter’s middle section I complicate this picture by 
showing how the issue of being coupled to or decoupled from particular constitutional 
structures itself shows up as a tension at the heart of Sidney’s political ethic. That ethic is 
predicated on the concept of constancy, but does constancy mean commitment to or 
independence of the institutions that give the citizen occasions for action? In the third 
section I read the final part of Sidney’s first complete version of the Arcadia as an attempt 
at negotiating a middle way between these two opposing alternatives: one of which seems 
to leave the citizen’s virtue eminently political but also eminently fragile, caught up along 
with the particular society that sustained it in a temporality of crisis; the other of which 
seems to secure virtue’s superiority to time and change at the cost of rendering its 
relationship to any particular political structure merely arbitary. At the end of the 
negotiation Sidney has left behind not only the republic but the citizen as well; in his 
place, ready to step forth as the hero of the Arcadia’s fragmentary revised version, there 







Discussion of the Arcadia’s political alignments has centered most intensely on the 
eclogue known as “Ister Bank,” in which the authorial persona Philisides recites a song 
once taught him by “old Languet,” “the shepherd best swift Ister knew” and the only 
historical individual identified by name in either version of the text. The song offers an 
Aesopian version of I Samuel 8, a text routinely claimed by both royalists and their 
opponents in this period: the beasts, playing the part of the Israelites, enjoy a “harmless” 
senatorial aristocracy until, for reasons that remain obscure, they resolve to ask Jove for a 
king. Jove warns them that a king will appropriate the goods of the commonwealth to 
serve his own interests, but acquiesces and creates Man, borrowing qualities from each of 
the beasts, who also agree to permanently alienate onto their new sovereign their capacity 
for speech. Man begins by ruling temperately, but soon falls to sowing factional discord, 
destroying the power of the “nobler beasts” through a combination of force and fraud and 
raising up a new class of gentry (i.e., domestic animals) who are easily bridled and 
exploited in the absence of the old magnates. The song ends with an exhortation to Man 
to “Deem it no gloire to swell in tyranny,” and a cryptic address to his subjects: “And you, 
poor beasts, in patience bide your hell,/ Or know your strengths, and then you shall do 
well.”11 
In its appeal to something like an “ancient constitution,” its depiction of kings as 
rapidly degenerating into tyrants in the absence of a strong aristocratic counterweight, its 
Scriptural allusions, its closing admonition conceivably (if ambiguously) legible as 
authorizing resistance, and its being identified as the teaching of one of the men who 
stood in a paternal relation to the Vindiciae as well as to Sidney himself, “Ister Bank” thus 
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offers itself as a sort of synecdoche for monarchomach thought in general and the 
Vindiciae in particular. The most straightforward way of understanding its inclusion in 
Sidney’s fiction has been, naturally, to interpret inclusion as endorsement. This was 
Briggs’s conclusion, and it has been restated by several critics since, with David Norbrook 
giving it its most prominent and representative expression. In Norbrook’s view, the 
eclogue “reflects the view of those aristocratic radicals”—the monarchomachs—“that only 
a strong nobility could safeguard liberty,” and is linked in “a clear line of succession” to 
“the classical republicans of the Commonwealth in the 1650s.”12 He attributes, in turn, 
much the same political outlook to the Arcadia as a whole: though there are “hesitations 
and ambiguities,” and though the New Arcadia is a less coherent synthesis than the Old, 
Sidney can clearly be seen seeking “to produce a work that men like Languet or Buchanan 
could respect on political as well as literary grounds,” and the work in question constitutes 
an “endorsement of the Huguenot theory of limited rebellion.”13 Norbrook finds Sidney’s 
politics pervaded by ambivalence, but the point is that it is exactly the same sort of 
ambivalence as characterizes the “aristocratic radical[ism]” of Languet and Mornay, 
namely the tension between the desire to legitimate action against the king insofar as it 
was initiated by the nobility and the recognition that the distinction between nobility and 
commons itself rested upon royal authority. On this view, in sum, “Ister Bank” sounds like 
Huguenot constitutionalism because this is an ideology which Sidney substantially shares, 
which informs the politics of both versions of the Arcadia at large, and which is of a piece 
with the classical republicanism that reaches full expression in later English writers. 
Mutatis mutandis, this has remained the majority view among Sidney scholars, and it is 
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often presented as virtually self-evident by critics who discuss “Ister Bank” in a separate 
context.14 
When we zoom out to consider “Ister Bank” in the context of the Arcadia’s other 
fairly explicit references to the resistance literature and its themes, however, the self-
evidence of this interpretation rapidly dissolves. In a trenchant and underappreciated 
study, Martin Raitiere has gone so far as to argue for the exactly opposite view, namely 
that Sidney brings monarchomach theory into the Arcadia precisely in order to subject it 
to a systematic critique.15 For Raitiere, the essence of the monarchomach position is, first, 
a restatement of the republican thesis of mixed government, according to which the 
balancing of authority between the king and so-called “subaltern magistrates” is to ensure 
the fidelity of government to the common good; and, second, the identification of these 
“subaltern magistrates” with the feudal nobility, who are alleged in the deep past to have 
made a revocable grant of powers to the king on behalf of the sovereign community, the 
terms of which the nobles remain authorized to enforce. Sidney’s reaction to these 
arguments, as Raitiere sees it, is essentially that of Jean Bodin. The choice is presented as 
between a republicanism that attempts to derive a “balance” out of the existing 
configuration of social elements, thereby ratifying the latter’s inequalities and 
antagonisms, and a unitary sovereignty in which one element is set apart from the 
configuration, so that all the others are made to stand toward it in a relation of isometric 
equality. The real issue, then, is the relation between aristocratic social dominance and 
the principles of political order, and read in these terms “Ister Bank” emerges as a 
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Bodinian progressive fable about the rise of the State and its necessarily violent but 
ultimately beneficent crushing of noble power. This is an ingenious way of approaching 
the eclogue, in both the good and the bad senses of the word, and it is perhaps 
unsurprising that it has not met with wider acceptance. That said, the breezy 
dismissiveness with which Sidneyans have tended to treat Raitiere’s broader thesis is 
unfortunate: at the very least, Raitiere demonstrates that there are equally coherent and 
credible alternatives to the assumption that Sidney must have been some species of 
monarchomach.16 
Finally, a third way between these opposing positions is offered by Blair Worden in 
his voluminous study of political themes in the Old Arcadia. Worden’s Sidney is neither 
the English Mornay of Norbrook’s analysis nor the English Bodin of Raitiere’s. Rather, 
Worden criticizes Sidney scholars for what he sees as their excessive preoccupation with 
the whole issue of resistance theory, arguing that Sidney’s primary concern is essentially 
with the ethos of politics, only incidentally with its formal structures of obligation.17 
Contra Norbrook, Sidney appears to have taken a singularly dim view of the sort of 
aristocratic republicanism implicit in the Vindiciae, as is apparent for instance in the New 
Arcadia’s portrait of a Sparta (the iconic aristocratic republic for sixteenth-century 
thinkers) riven by internecine strife. Contra Raitiere, however, Sidney’s objections appear 
more pragmatic than fundamental, insofar as he shares much of his language and 
assumptions with those of a classical republican analysis of political systems. 
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Sidney agrees that no government can fulfill its functions and preserve its stability 
unless it is built upon a foundation of “virtue”; that “virtue” is to be identified with the 
commission of actions in the public, political domain; and that monarchy is a form of 
government especially pernicious to virtue, because of its tendency to shrink or enervate 
the sphere of “public life” in the absence of which virtue cannot do its work. The core 
political problem for Sidney, then, is the “inherent defects of kingship”; and yet for 
solutions he looks almost exclusively to a moral revitalization of existing monarchical 
institutions.18 This moral program is worked out in terms of a stark opposition between 
constant, unflinching vigilance in defense of public liberty, identified with Protestantism 
and the rule of law; and passive, “sleepy” acquiescence to circumstances, identified with 
absolutism, Catholicism, and the “causeless yielding” of liberty in the face of arbitrary 
power. These were consistent elements in the vocabulary of the “forward Protestant” party 
for which Sidney served as a spokesman and, later, a totem, but they took on a special 
intensity in the crisis year of 1579, when Elizabeth’s rejection of its preferred foreign policy 
of confessional alliances appeared likely to culminate in her marriage to a Catholic son of 
the woman widely seen as the author of St. Bartholomew’s Day. Worden reads the Old 
Arcadia as a record of the “political and ethical philosophy” with which the forward 
Protestants “met that crisis,” a crisis they understood essentially as a failure of nerve, in 
which the Queen was seeking to accommodate herself prudentially to external forces 
rather than “standing alone” upon the solid ground of virtue.19 
Likewise Worden reads “Ister Bank” as less concerned with the final moment at 
which resistance must be contemplated than the initial lapse of constancy in which the 
animals lose confidence in their own capacities and so set themselves on the slippery slope 
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to tyranny. He concludes that the closing lines are probably closer to affirmation than 
rejection of the monarchomach position, but also that this is not really the point: 
“Arguments justifying resistance answer the question whether we are entitled to get 
ourselves out of the hole we are in. The thrust of Sidney’s fable addresses what for him is a 
larger question: how we got into the hole in the first place”; and this is ultimately less a 
matter of constitutional form than of psychological health.20 And so a theory of political 
personality in terms of “something we can loosely call citizenship” shows up in Worden’s 
Sidney as if it were wholly detachable from any assertion of the necessity or preferability 
of any particular form of government.21 In turn, questions about the limits of the 
obligation to obey a degenerate monarch are considered parenthetically, in a manner that 
only confirms their secondariness to a more urgent inquiry into the moral habits and 
dispositions that keep monarchies from degenerating to begin with. 
It should be said, moreover, that if Worden is right that Sidney combined a civic-
humanist ethical orientation with a demurral from proposals for a non-monarchical 
constitution, the combination need by no means be attributed simply to a temperamental 
conservatism or to a failure of imagination. A powerful monarchy with a strong but 
decidedly subordinate conciliar element may, in fact, have been the system best suited to 
the realization of the forward Protestant party’s substantive political goals. The one thing 
republican politics seems to have been concretely “good for” in the late-sixteenth-century 
northern monarchies was securing a more reliable measure of protection for a religion 
that was a minority in the sense of not being shared by the monarch. However much 
Sidney sympathized with the position of his Huguenot allies, this obviously never formed 
a part of his own preferred domestic program. (It is probably not a coincidence that the 
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only large territorial state in Europe to move in the direction of a republican form of 
government in the sixteenth century, the Polish Commonwealth, was also the one with a 
tradition of accommodating alternative forms of Christianity long predating the 
Protestant Reformation.) As Richard Tuck has argued, while its Genevan origins have led 
to a tendency to associate Calvinism with republicanism, in fact the consistent preference 
of Calvinist politicians was for a monarch who would act as a guarantor of Reformed 
discipline, using prerogative powers to curb traditionalist as well as antinomian dissent. 22 
If it was those whom we have come to call Anglicans who succeeded in “capturing” the 
monarch for this role, it by no means follows that those pressing for a faster Reformation 
were any less desirous of a prince willing to play it.23 
There is, however, one complication that needs to be introduced into this picture. 
It has to do with something implicit but not yet remarked in my discussion of Worden’s 
study, namely his decision to focus on the Old Arcadia, with the New Arcadia not ignored 
but considered only for the sake of the light it sheds upon its predecessor. Since the 
relation between the two texts will be important here as well, it is worth pausing to give a 
brief account of it. Probably sometime in 1577 Sidney began composing the so-called Old 
Arcadia, which he had completed and presented to his sister, the Countess of Pembroke, 
by 1581 at the latest. This work consists of five “Books or Acts,” intercalated with long 
sections of eclogues sung by the shepherds of Arcadia (including “Ister Bank”), which 
together account for nearly a quarter of the text. As this already suggests, the Old Arcadia 
is a very complex generic hybrid with considerable affinities to drama, resembling 
Italianate and later Elizabethan comedy in its bed-tricks, cross-dressing, and other witty 
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stratagems, even as it recalls tragedies of state such as Gorboduc in its profusion of 
forensic debates and its preoccupation with the drastic consequences of a ruler’s 
improvidence. The ruler is Basilius, Duke of Arcadia, who, worried by an oracle that seems 
to presage the loss of his state and the misalliance of his daughters, disregards counsel and 
retires into the countryside with his family, leaving the business of government in the 
hands of a subordinate. Meanwhile, two foreign princes passing through Arcadia, 
Musidorus and Pyrocles, are smitten with Basilius’s daughters Pamela and Philoclea and 
disguise themselves as a shepherd and an Amazon, respectively, in order to gain access to 
them. A series of increasingly perverse intrigues ensues, at the climax of which Basilius is 
found apparently dead, Musidorus is foiled in an attempt to abscond from the country 
with Pamela, Pyrocles is caught naked in bed with Philoclea, and Arcadia descends into a 
dangerously volatile succession crisis. The final Book depicts the trial of the princes for 
their (real and imagined) crimes by Euarchus, a neighboring sovereign who has been 
appointed as Protector for the duration of the crisis and who also happens to be Pyrocles’s 
father and Musidorus’s uncle, though their identities are obscured from him throughout 
the trial. The princes are convicted and set to be executed for treason and rape, at which 
point Basilius miraculously revives and issues—or so it is implied—a general pardon. 
Not long after completing the Old Arcadia, Sidney began to subject it to an 
extensive program of revision, which by the time of his death had generated complete new 
versions of Books One and Two and a substantial but unfinished Book Three. These made 
up the first printed version of Sidney’s fiction, published by Fulke Greville in 1590 with the 
evident intention of preempting the circulation of an Old Arcadia that Greville regarded as 





what we call the New Arcadia.24 Generically it is closer to romance-epic than to 
tragicomedy, beginning in medias res and incorporating an incomparably larger cast of 
characters, range of settings, and profusion of episodes, as well as a pervasive atmosphere 
of chivalry entirely absent in its predecessor.25 In Books One and Two, a significant 
amount of new material, much of it narrated in flashback and dealing with the princes’ 
exploits curbing tyrants in Asia Minor, is interspersed with the events of the 
corresponding books of the Old Arcadia, with some of the latter expanded, such as the 
abortive popular revolt that closes Book Two, while others, such as those featuring the 
comic buffoonery of Basilius’s stupid and pompous servant Dametas, are curtailed. 
Basilius is now referred to as a “king,” but in every other respect he has been demoted 
from his previous centrality; and in Book Three the New Arcadia breaks from the Old 
entirely, shifting its attention to the rebellion of Basilius’s nephew Amphialus and sister 
Cecropia, who abduct the princesses and the disguised Pyrocles and subject them to 
increasingly harrowing physical and psychological torments. 
Worden justifies his privileging of the Old Arcadia over the New by claiming that it 
is much the more rewarding text for the understanding of Sidney’s political thought: it has 
a “political edge” lacking in its successor, and this is because “political events are closer to 
the front of Sidney’s mind in the first version than in the second.”26 Worden concedes, 
however, that it is not exactly the case that there is less political commentary in the New 
Arcadia; in fact, in a number of senses there is more. But the Old Arcadia’s politics are, it 
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seems, more really political—we might almost say, more politically political—for a variety 
of reasons that basically all return to its being the product of a moment of crisis in a way 
that the New Arcadia, written in a period of factional détente, is not. The later text’s 
“contemporary application” is “less pointed”: it aims for emblematic generality and a sense 
of “timelessness”; whereas the earlier version, urgent, explicit, polemical, presumes and 
aspires to a very particular kind of timeliness.27 The Old Arcadia’s circumstances as a 
speech-act thus correspond to the theory of public personality as vigilant alacrity that 
Worden takes to be the essence of Sidney’s political message. 
What Worden does not quite say, though, is that the narrative of the Old Arcadia 
itself takes the concept of a “moment of crisis” as its fundamental and explicit principle of 
organization. In the earlier text the plot is set in motion by Basilius’s learning that such a 
critical point of inflection in the course of the state is imminent (he is even told the exact 
duration of the critical period); a debate immediately follows concerning the merits of two 
opposing ways of comprehending and addressing oneself to a crisis (avoidance, 
engagement); subsequent events are presented as either consequences or displaced 
repetitions of Basilius’s choice of one mode of response over the other; the narrative 
climaxes with the precipitation of just that epochal rupture of continuity in the state that 
he had meant to forestall; initiative then passes to a character formally tasked with 
determining a resolution to the crisis-moment; and resolution is finally achieved, and the 
narrative concluded, only through the restoration of values and judgments clearly 
associated with the course of action Basilius had decided against in the beginning. Some 
of these things also happen in the New Arcadia, but they are no longer the primary 
determinants of civil order and disorder, nor do they continue to constitute the basic 
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structure of the narrative. Furthermore, the extended trial scene that concludes the crisis, 
and with it the Old Arcadia, turns to a considerable extent on arguments over who is and 
is and is not entitled to call himself a “public person,” and this too is characteristic of the 
earlier text: the explicit remarking of distinctions concerning the nature of public as 
opposed to private functions, and the consideration of what is due to those who carry 
them out, plays a much larger and more constitutive role in the plot than it does in the 
New Arcadia. 
In other words, the act of distinguishing actions and values that by their nature 
carry a “political edge” from those that do not, much like the appeal to the paradigm of 
crisis, is dramatically foregrounded in the Old Arcadia and notably discarded or 
diminished in significance in the New. What Worden takes as the occasion for the Old 
Arcadia’s explicit articulation of Sidney’s political philosophy—a “moment of crisis”—
turns out to look less like that philosophy’s circumstantial point of application and more 
like its basic conceptual content. Likewise, what Worden takes as a difference between the 
respective orientations of the two Arcadias—one text is a kind of “public person” whose 
activity consists in responding in real-time to the contingencies of political life, the other 
is not—turns out to be a difference given great weight within the earlier work’s political 
scenes, and largely, presumably deliberately, abandoned in those of the later. So this 
leaves us with two kinds of questions about the Old Arcadia’s political ethic. First, is there 
a more than coincidental connection between the foregrounding of distinctions between 
public and private personality, on the one hand, and the foregrounding of crisis as a 
temporal form, on the other, such that the two would stand and fall together in Sidney’s 
imagination? Second, what is it about the conjunction of the two, as it plays out across the 





revise it he was to sharply scale back the significance of both, thereby producing not 
merely a more muted version of the same consistent philosophy, but rather something of 
a qualitatively different sort? 
 
II 
Arcadia is first presented to us as a temporal phenomenon, defined essentially by concepts 
of time. This is true in the sense already noted, that Sidney’s narrative is set in motion by 
the announcement of an impending crisis, leading to a debate over competing notions of 
how one ought to fit one’s actions to the shape of time that a crisis represents. Even before 
this, however, the Old Arcadia’s opening lines frame the work as an essay in what we 
might call the political philosophy of time: 
Arcadia alone, among all the provinces of Greece was ever had in singular 
reputation, partly for the sweetness of the air and other natural benefits, 
but principally for the moderate and well tempered minds of the people 
who (finding how true a contentation is gotten by following the course of 
nature, and how the shining title of glory, so much affected by other 
nations, doth indeed help little to the happiness of life) were the only 
people which, as by their justice and providence gave neither cause nor 
hope to their neighbors to annoy them, so were they not stirred with false 
praise to trouble others’ quiet, thinking it a small reward for the wasting of 
their own lives in ravening that their posterity should long after say they 
had done so. Even the muses seemed to approve their good determination 
by choosing that country as their chiefest repairing place, and by bestowing 
their perfections so largely there that the very shepherds themselves had 
their fancies opened to so high conceits as the most learned of other 
nations have been long time since content both to borrow their names and 
imitate their cunning. (4) 
 
The burden of the first two sentences is to define Arcadia’s tranquility as not a literary 
premise but an institutional product. Arcadia is not a pastoral fiction, in the sense of a 





precisely because it is separated from that world, as it were vertically; rather, Arcadia is 
the hypothesis of a society possessing those arrangements that provide for the minimum 
possible degree of exposure to disruptions arising out of a world with which it remains 
horizontally connected. It does not stand for a more stable reality because it has singing 
shepherds; it is because its laws and customs conduce to such a level of stability that even 
the shepherds there have learned how to sing. 
 The next sentence appears to tell us that the character of this society’s ruler is well 
suited to his circumstances:  
In this place some time there dwelled a mighty duke named Basilius, a 
prince of sufficient skill to govern so quiet a country where the good minds 
of the former princes had set down good laws, and the well bringing up of 
the people did serve as a most sure bond to keep them. 
 
But it also alludes to a distinction found in Machiavelli’s Prince, and in so doing 
transforms the initial picture in a rather complicated way. Machiavelli divides all 
principalities into two classes, the “hereditary” and the “new,” explaining the difference as 
a matter of the degree to which the prince may rely upon accumulated habits and 
traditional institutions, as opposed to his own prudence and “industry,” in order to 
maintain his position.28 The continuity of the hereditary principality is secured not by 
anything distinctively excellent in its rulers, but rather by how comprehensively its form 
of government has worked itself into the social fabric through long experience. Mere 
incompetence is not sufficient for a prince in such a case to lose his state; he would have 
to go about perversely attacking the customary order that otherwise sustains him by sheer 
momentum. By contrast, the continuity of the new prince’s state is staked much more to 
his own radically individual and continually tested ability to adjust himself to new 
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contingencies. Hence the question of the precise qualities—the virtù—that make him able 
to do so takes on a qualitatively higher order of importance as well as complexity. It is as 
an inquiry into virtù that The Prince is organized, and after this point the hereditary prince 
effectively drops out of its analysis. Or, as Pocock suggests in his discussion of this passage, 
the hereditary prince remains in the background as an implied “control case,” the case in 
which a ruler possessing zero virtù would be likely to succeed, ceteris paribus, through 
institutional effects alone.29  
 It is sometimes said that Sidney is taking a sly swipe at Basilius, implying that he is 
not good enough to be the sort of prince whose situation obliges him to be any good at 
anything, and so anticipating his shocking mishandling of the events set in motion by the 
oracle’s warning. That may be so, but in a sense it misses the point. One need not find 
Basilius’s plan to retire into recreative idleness admirable or prudent to recognize that, if 
he really were in the situation of Machiavelli’s hereditary prince, it would be entirely 
unobjectionable from the standpoint of the stability of the state. Indeed, the proposal 
Basilius offers appears almost as if contrived to test the proposition that he is in fact in 
such a situation. He gives no indication of intending to alter Arcadia’s established laws 
and offices; he simply means to reduce his own factor of personal initiative to the 
minimum degree consistent with the retention of his title; the gambit is that the political 
cost of this, whatever it may be, will be no greater than the disruption presaged by the 
oracle, namely an actual loss or change of sovereignty. 
 Basilius turns out to be wrong about that: the consequences of the ruler’s 
slackening his active involvement are in fact immediate and drastic. The logic would seem 
to be this: Basilius is a good enough prince to keep hold of the sort of country that can be 
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kept hold of by falling over backwards; Basilius’s attempt to hold onto Arcadia by falling 
over backwards is a failure; therefore Arcadia must not, after all, have been that sort of 
country. And yet nothing we have been told, or will learn subsequently, about Arcadia 
contradicts in any way the strong initial impression that it corresponds to Machiavelli’s 
ideal-type hereditary principality, in which the legal and cultural underpinnings of the 
state are as conducive to continuity as one could possibly hope them to be. Sidney has, in 
other words, retained Machiavelli’s theoretical category while evacuating it of any 
empirical significance. The set of “countries ‘so quiet’ that the ‘well bringing up of the 
people’ in ‘good laws’ is ‘a most sure bond to keep them’” remains heuristically in use, 
coextensive as it is with the set of “countries governable by Basilius”; but it is an empty set. 
As in Machiavelli’s Prince, it marks off the outer boundary of a more pressing inquiry into 
those states founded on active and personal virtue or virtù. For Machiavelli, though, what 
lies beyond that margin is a range of obviously real but (to him) analytically uninteresting 
situations such as that of the king of France in his own hereditary lands. Sidney sets the 
margin so close to the limits of political reality that it appears that what lies over it is 
really just the world of the literary pastoral. 
 The Old Arcadia’s first political lesson, then, is that all states stand or fall only on 
the basis of whether they are actively upheld at every moment by what Sidney calls virtue 
and Machiavelli virtù. This does not mean, incidentally, that the Old Arcadia is terribly 
interested in the Machiavellian question of how far a virtù so defined will have to depart 
from the expectations of conventionally moral behavior.30 In general Sidney does not seem 
to think it a very pertinent question whether princes get themselves into trouble by, say, 
too much scrupulousness in keeping promises to their subjects. In the Old Arcadia, at any 
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rate, this is largely preempted by a great deal of conventionally immoral behavior in the 
rather less prepossessing sense of Basilius and his wife Gynecia trying to outmaneuver one 
another to be first to seduce their cross-dressed “Amazon” guest. So Sidney’s political ethic 
does not, by being political, cease to be recognizably an ethic. But that still leaves open the 
question of what implications for the ordering of political life might follow from its 
specific ethical content. What, then, is this “virtue” upon which Philanax insists Basilius 
must “stand?” 
 The debate between Basilius and Philanax over the wisdom of the former’s plan to 
retire is meant to give us an answer. It is immediately followed by a second colloquy, 
between Pyrocles and Musidorus, in which that answer is reiterated and amplified. 
Everything about the presentation of the two debates is designed to encourage the 
impression that they represent parallel expressions of one consistent moral outlook; it is 
entirely possible that at one time this was exactly what Sidney took them to be. My claim, 
though, is that at some point in the composition of the Old Arcadia Sidney became acutely 
aware that they were not, and that by the end of the narrative his interest has shifted from 
enforcing their common themes to working through their implicit points of opposition.31 
But first we need to get a sense of what the two colloquies—Philanax 
unsuccessfully counseling Basilius, Musidorus unsuccessfully counseling Pyrocles—have 
in common. Both advance a doctrine of virtue as constancy through action in public life. 
Let us consider each of these terms in turn. Constancy is the central concept at stake for 
both speakers, and a principle appealed to over and over again across the entirety of the 
text. Musidorus defines it as the condition of “a mind well trained and long exercised in 
                                                        
31
 For a strong statement of the contrary view, that there is no more than superficial variation in Sidney’s basic 
ethical outlook, whether within or between the two Arcadias, see Peter Lindenbaum, “Sidney and the Active 





virtue” that “doth not easily change any course it once undertakes,” because, “being 
witness to itself of his own inward good, it finds nothing without of so high a price for 
which it should be altered” (13). Characters remain themselves, and so do well, or deviate 
from themselves, and so do badly. Constancy, however, does not mean always following 
the same course of action so much as it means always making the inward self, and never 
external circumstance, the arbiter of the course of action one is to follow. Philanax insists 
to Basilius that the only way one can truly be harmed by fortune is to make the mistake of 
behaving as if one could be harmed by fortune. Greville claimed that Sidney had written 
the Arcadia in order to teach us “how to set a good countenance upon all the 
discountenances of adversity, and a stay upon the exorbitant smilings of chance.”32 
 Sidneyan constancy is not, however, an ideal of contemplative withdrawal. When 
Musidorus reproaches Pyrocles for inconstancy, his concern is that his friend’s conduct 
suggests “a relenting, truly, and slacking” of his “main career,” and this is a career of 
“continual wise proceeding and worthy enterprises” (13). Not to act, or even to act with a 
diminished alacrity, is as if to “let your mind fall asleep.” Or, what for Sidney may come to 
nearly the same thing, to die. Philanax asks Basilius rhetorically, “Why should you deprive 
yourself of governing your dukedom for fear of losing your dukedom, like one that should 
kill himself for fear of death?” (8) The analogy rests upon the premise that the relation 
between remaining a thing and continuing to act as that thing is as tautologous, and as 
little admitting of temporal variation, as the relation between not dying and continuing to 
live. The imperative of constancy always takes the form of a worry that external 
circumstance, if too much is conceded to it, might divert one from what Sidney likes to 
call “well doing” and into “contemplation,” which is really “but a glorious title to idleness” 
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(16). If there is a corresponding worry that circumstance, if yielded to, might divert one 
from contemplative integrity and into an alienating and compromising version of the 
active life, we do not hear much about it here. 
 Finally, opting for action is presented as equivalent to opting for existence in a 
sphere of public, political concerns. Musidorus warns Pyrocles that by hanging around 
Arcadia, supposedly to savor its beauties and to turn his mind to higher things—the real 
reason, of course, is that he has fallen in love with Philoclea—“you subject yourself to 
solitariness, the sly enemy that doth most separate a man from well doing” (14). 
“Solitariness” does not simply have its usual modern meaning here, functioning instead as 
something like Sidney’s technical term for the type of life Basilius has chosen by 
suspending his own career of political action. Indeed, the princes’ whole discussion of 
constancy and the vita activa takes place against the background of the previous argument, 
in which the stakes of ceasing to be “active” are explicitly those of ceasing to inhabit a 
specific political role. When Philanax tells Basilius “to stand wholly upon your own virtue 
as the surest way to maintain you in that you are,” he means in part that by not depending 
upon anything outside himself Basilius will not be changed into anything other than 
himself—this being the generic thesis of constancy—but he also means more narrowly 
that Basilius will “remain what he is” in the sense that he will keep hold of his office (8). 
The two meanings are at this point not really separate: to be constant is constantly to act, 
and to act is to possess a political identity and a political field to act in; conversely, to have 
a political identity is to have something that exists only by its constant enactment, and 
constantly so to act is the way to ensure that what one remains what one is. 
 Matters get more complicated, though, if we look at the two exchanges not simply 





Pyrocles’s desire to stay in Arcadia counts as a desire to stay in solitary-land is because 
Basilius’s retirement has effectively re-zoned the country, depriving it of an active life and 
so making it irrelevant to the princes’ course of political education. Thus it is supposed to 
count as an expression of Musidorus’s commitment to the active, political life when he 
urges Pyrocles to depart for someplace else. But does constancy really mean the 
willingness to change political venues the moment one of them ceases to offer the most 
congenial space for action? This is not a question with which the princes immediately 
have to reckon, insofar as their present public responsibility may be said to be educating 
themselves for roles they will only assume at some indefinite point in the future. But what 
about Philanax? Should we say that because he is a good counselor stuck dealing with a 
dimwitted and willful prince, that he should take his services elsewhere where they will be 
more actually effective? That sounds consistent with Musidorus’s advice to Pyrocles, but 
not especially consistent with Philanax’s own advice to Basilius. The young prince tells his 
friend to make choice of the context that best gives occasion to virtuous action. But the 
old counselor tells his prince that what virtuous action means is remaining in an office one 
cannot abandon for any occasion. 
 And why doesn’t Basilius listen to Philanax? One kind of answer would be to say 
that whatever may be the structure of Arcadia’s political institutions, it has not been 
sufficient to the task of getting Basilius to listen. In this sense, Arcadia’s constitution must 
be imperfectly balanced: too much latitude is given to one man’s untutored judgment; 
those who might assist that judgment by contributing to it their own independent 
intelligences lack a reliable framework through which to do so. There is nothing terribly 
surprising about this: happy indeed is the society whose constitution is even close to 





balance, once achieved, could be other than hugely consequential, marking a real 
diminishment in one’s ability to be a political being, an active being, and so, perforce, a 
constant being. And yet the existence of political balance is obviously a circumstance in 
time, dependent upon innumerable factors beyond the control of any individual. So which 
is it? Is the virtuous person constant but not really political, not actually so vulnerable in 
his moral identity to whether or not a particular polity gives him occasions to participate 
in its direction? Or is he political but not really constant, not actually so defined in his 
moral identity by his indifference to every kind of external temporal circumstance? 
As I have suggested, the paralleling of the two exchanges, along with the 
somewhat idiosyncratic grounds for the princes’ being in Arcadia to begin with, militate 
against this question’s becoming explicit in the Old Arcadia’s opening episodes. There may 
be other reasons, too, why it is not immediately taken up. Pyrocles’s rebuttals in defense 
of the contemplative life are said to be so stilted and unconvincing that Musidorus gets 
suspicious, stops arguing, and gets Pyrocles to confess to being in love. Nancy Lindheim 
has drawn attention to the importance of this moment, suggesting that the dialectic of 
action and contemplation is for Sidney so obviously resolvable in favor of the first term 
that it fails even to generate a credible opposition; hence the turn to a new and more 
evenly matched dialectic of “reason” and “love.”33 We might explain the difference by 
saying that for Sidney love appears less as virtue’s absence or deficiency than as its positive 
symmetrical inverse. If virtue is standing upon oneself, and the vice of a Basilius is 
accommodating oneself to what is outside oneself, love involves assimilating oneself to the 
other so far as actually to generate an alternative self, a counter-self modeled in the other’s 
image, as Pyrocles will do in recreating himself as the Amazon “Cleophila,” “turning,” as he 
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says, “Philoclea to myself, as my mind is wholly turned and transformed into her” (18). 
Sidney thus allows the Philanax-Musidorus account of active public constancy to stand, its 
own tensions unexamined, as a benchmark against which to measure the erotic inversions 
and perversions that occupy the narrative’s middle sections. 
The point at which the tensions can no longer be deferred is when the Arcadian 
succession is thrown into doubt by the discovery of Basilius’s body, apparently dead, in a 
cave intended for use in an ill-fated assignation with “Cleophila.” Indeed, when we come 
to Sidney’s analysis of the succession crisis, the assumption that citizen virtue is 
something relative to, and hence vulnerable to changes in, the constitution of the 
particular society is so prominently featured that it seems odd in retrospect that such 
virtue could ever have been confused with the Stoic’s categorical immunity to temporal 
circumstances. 
There was a notable example how great dissipations monarchal 
governments are subject unto; for now their prince and guide had left them, 
they had not experience unto rule, and had not whom to obey. Public 
matters had ever been privately governed, so that they had no lively taste 
what was good for themselves, but everything was either vehemently 
desireful or extremely terrible. Neighbors’ invasions, civil dissension, 
cruelty of the coming prince, and whatsoever in common sense carries a 
dreadful show, was in all men’s heads, but in few how to prevent: 
hearkening on every rumor, suspecting everything, condemning them 
whom before they had honored, making strange and impossible tales of the 
duke’s death; while they thought themselves in danger, wishing nothing 
but safety; as soon as persuasion of safety took them, desiring further 
benefits as amendment of forepassed faults (which faults notwithstanding 
none could tell either the grounds or effects of); all agreeing in the 
universal names of liking or misliking, but of what in especial points 
infinitely disagreeing; altogether like a falling steeple, the parts whereof (as 







The analysis would appear to go like this. Because Arcadia put “public matters” in the 
hands of one man and his immediate circle, the larger political nation failed to develop 
the virtue that would enable them, now that circumstances demand it, to take the tiller for 
themselves. But to say that Arcadia had been “privately governed” means something more 
than simply that it had been governed by comparatively few people; it means also that the 
ruling group was limited in such a way that, lacking the virtue of others to check and 
challenge it, it deteriorated into partiality and so forfeited its own. (As regards Basilius, at 
least, this seems basically correct.) For a society to degenerate from “public” to “private” 
government is to destroy its virtue, or at least to create conditions under which it cannot 
possibly endure. And yet the only thing capable of forestalling degeneration is the 
balanced distribution and continuous engagement of virtue itself. 
 And so Sidney faced a choice. He could accept the problem of time that the 
citizen’s virtue created, recognize that the surmounting of crisis required bringing to bear 
the full complement of virtues themselves vulnerable to crisis, and so start building the 
structure that would keep those virtues in balance. This is an option Sidney rejects with 
remarkably little hesitation. The contenders in Arcadia’s disputed succession come in a 
bewildering variety of shapes and sizes: there are various legitimist parties championing 
various members of Basilius’s family; a popular movement to make Philanax’s authority 
permanent; and a clique of nobles who resent Philanax’s influence and will accept virtually 
any arrangement that promises to limit it. Of all these, the only group Sidney treats as 
wholly nonserious is the one that wants to institute a non-monarchical republic, on the 
model either of democratic Athens or aristocratic Sparta. (Recall, too, that in the fiction 
these are similarly-sized neighboring states with which Arcadia has military and 





proposal only make themselves irrelevant to the disposing of the real questions in a 
country that has known princely government since time out of mind; these are, Sidney 
says, “rather the discoursing sort of men than the active, being a matter more in 
imagination than practice” (321). In Sidney’s idiom, that is damning language indeed. 
 But the fact of its being so damning reminds us how difficult it would be for Sidney 
simply to accept the obvious alternative course open to him. That is, to make his peace 
with the vita contemplativa, and so to concede that while the virtuous person’s altruism 
might now and again lead him into activity that happened to pass through political 
institutions, constancy’s relation to political life was no more fundamental than was its 
relation to any other arena of activity that might or might not happen to present itself at a 
given moment. For a great many of us a great part of the time, it really might be the better 
part of virtue to cultivate our gardens. If there was good news in this, it was perhaps that 
the collapse of the civic edifice, no doubt only hastened by our collective run on the 
deposits of virtue that might once have supported it, had now become itself a matter of 
corresponding moral indifference. But was there yet a third way? Some way of redefining 
virtue’s relation to the public, political sphere so that the actual, particular organization of 
that sphere was neither elevated to all-embracing importance nor demoted into 
insignificance? This, I will now go on to suggest, is the problem to which the Old Arcadia’s 
final book is devoted to finding a solution. 
 
 III  
The interpretation of the crisis that eventually prevails is Philanax’s, according to which 
the dukedom must ultimately be settled upon Basilius’s natural heir, but only after an 





to justice. So it is that Book Five is the scene of a criminal trial, with Philanax prosecuting, 
Gynecia, Pyrocles, and Musidorus as defendants, and Euarchus—installed as “judge of the 
late evils” and “protector of this country”—sitting in the judgment seat (364-5). It needs to 
be said that my method of presentation, focusing on the initial expression of the principles 
of Sidney’s citizen ethic and then on their rearticulation in the trial scene, cannot but 
obscure a large part of the latter’s emotional effect, the sense of genuine surprise and 
awkwardness many readers feel when the romantic high jinx that have occupied the 
intervening narrative space are suddenly subjected to solemn legal scrutiny. The strategy 
has been aptly described by Mary Ellen Lamb as one of “reader entrapment”: the bait is the 
privatized mode of response we have been encouraged to adopt toward the princes’ erotic 
intrigues; the snapping bar is the humiliating rebuke represented by Euarchus’s 
reinterpretation of those events from a stringently “public” perspective that has been held 
carefully in reserve.34 I raise the point because it is from Sidney’s masterful way of 
springing of this particular “trap,” as much as from anything in the trial scene taken alone, 
that the Old Arcadia’s reader acquires a cumulative sense of the work’s insistence on the 
act of discriminating public from private roles and values. The distinction, Sidney seems 
to be telling us, must be terrifically important indeed if it is capable of generating two 
such palpably opposite modes of perception and interpretation. 
 The trial scene thus has the formal burden of representing “the public” by contrast 
with what is now retrospectively recast as “the private.” But the trial ends up turning upon 
the public/private binary not only in its form but in its content as well. As regards the 
determination of matters of fact, it turns out to be largely a non-starter. Gynecia, racked 
by guilt over her intended adultery and her role in Basilius’s accidental poisoning, wishes 
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only for a speedy death and so falsely confesses to having murdered her husband 
deliberately. The princes manage to deflect Philanax’s specious accusations of conniving at 
the duke’s murder, but each freely admits to sexual offenses carrying the death penalty, 
Pyrocles (falsely) to raping Philoclea, Musidorus (truthfully) to attempting to convey 
Pamela away from her father and country. These facts not being in doubt, much of the 
substance of the trial has to do with the princes’ attempts, first, to deny jurisdiction, and, 
second, to advance an entirely different interpretation of the implications of their actions, 
on the basis of their being “public persons.” Moreover, since they are obviously not public 
officers of Arcadia in any formal sense, the question of whether this appeal to public 
personality can succeed basically comes down to the question of what is the scale of the 
structure within which such an appeal makes sense, whether it extends beyond or is 
reducible to that of the particular national state. Both of the princes’ attempts are rejected 
by Euarchus, and the immediate effect of this is to reinforce the identification between 
political personality and the particular complex of institutions it is obliged to support. 
However, other aspects of the trial scene suggest that that identification is coming under 
strain, and that Sidney is thinking through how far it can be loosened without 
compromising the whole of his existing moral system. 
 How exactly to deal with the content of Euarchus’s decisions has long been a 
problem for critics. This is in part because of the acute emotional ambivalence I have 
described Sidney as engendering around the whole phenomenon of public judgment in 
the Old Arcadia’s closing book. Hence for some critics Euarchus simply represents “the 





Debora Shuger.35 Shuger points out that, once it has been revealed to Euarchus that the 
men he has sentenced to death are in fact his son (Pyrocles) and nephew (Musidorus), his 
situation becomes strikingly similar to that of Brutus in that quintessential bit of 
republican lore, the killing of his sons after they conspired to restore the monarchy. By 
ruefully refusing to modify his original sentence, Euarchus declares himself on the side of 
the rule of law as against the rule of discretionary equity, meaning in this case paternal 
indulgence toward the erotic proclivities of well-connected young men. In Shuger’s view, 
Sidney does not mean for us to see this as a good thing. 
On the other hand, recent criticism has shown itself increasingly willing to take 
seriously the specific legal concepts underpinning both Euarchus’s assumption of 
jurisdiction and his substantive rulings in the trial scene. Notable here is Brian Lockey’s 
proposal that Euarchus is an idealized exemplar of the natural-law theory of “charitable 
intervention” developed by such neo-scholastics as Francisco Vitoria and Bartholomé de 
Las Casas.36 According to this reading, Sidney portrays Arcadia as corrupted by precisely 
the sort of abominable but ameliorable vices thinkers such as Las Casas saw in the 
Amerindians, and Euarchus as the benevolent and temporary custodian called upon to 
restore the rule of universal principles of natural justice. The proposal has some merit, 
particularly insofar as it focuses our attention on the fact that political action in Sidney’s 
narrative centers on international intervention as much as on the dynamics of intrastate 
government.37 Unfortunately, it is obliged to ignore Euarchus’s own explicit statements on 
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the relationship between natural law and positive law, which make clear the latter’s 
primacy. Behind this lies a larger interpretive problem: Euarchus is not trying to root out 
those responsible for Arcadia’s unnatural condition but casting judgment on the princes 
as violators of its statutory laws, and it is not clear why, for instance, Musidorus would not 
have much the same natural-law justification for removing Pamela from a sodomitical 
commonwealth that Euarchus has for reforming it. Euarchus is so far from thinking of the 
issue in that way that he sentences Musidorus to death on what seem like the most 
particularistic of grounds, those of having acted in a manner prejudicial to the Arcadians’ 
interest in an assured dynastic succession. 
So, pace Shuger, something more involved seems to be going on in Euarchus’s legal 
talk than simply the representation of a generic commitment to the rule of law. But, pace 
Lockey, that something cannot simply read off of the legal doctrines that seem intuitively 
consistent with Euarchus’s political position as a foreign intervener. What I would like to 
propose is that these arguments over the limits of jurisdiction, the immunities of public 
persons, and the relations between universal and particular norms should be read as a 
continuation of and commentary on the Old Arcadia’s concern with the vita activa and the 
public realm as its containing structure. Moreover, this commentary is what takes the 
place of the republican reordering of the polity that we have seen Sidney declining to 
pursue. Where the classical republican wants to redesign the organization of the public 
realm, such that a greater number of citizens will be enabled to direct their virtues to the 
support of its continuity, Sidney wants to redefine its scope, such that it will become 
something intrinsically less temporary, without utterly losing the temporal particularity 





I want to work up to these claims by pointing to one passage of special importance 
and then considering two other texts that seem to me implicated in it; this will in turn 
supply us with a more definite paradigm for considering the trial scene as a whole. The 
passage is that in which Euarchus gives his most programmatic statement of the 
relationship of local to universal law: 
There resteth, then, the second point: how to judge well. And that must 
undoubtedly be done, not by a free discourse of reason and skill of 
philosophy, but must be tied to the laws of Greece and municipal statutes 
of this dukedom. For although out of them these came, and to them must 
indeed refer their offspring, yet because philosophical discourses stand in 
the general consideration of things, they leave to every man a scope of his 
own interpretation; where the laws, applying themselves to the necessary 
use, fold us within assured bounds, which once broken, man’s nature 
infinitely rangeth. Judged therefore they must be, and by your laws judged. 
(404) 
 
The more obviously present of the two coordinate texts is, of course, the Apology for 
Poetry, believed to have been written around the same time Sidney was finishing the Old 
Arcadia. The one which is rather more a matter of conjecture, but which I will take up first, 
is Thomas Starkey’s Dialogue between Pole and Lupset, that signal document of the first 
flowering of English civic-humanist political thought, composed sometime in the early 
1530s and never published. It is hard to say for sure if Sidney would have known the 
Dialogue, and its value for us lies largely in its ability to serve as a particularly clear 
representative of a set of paradigms and assumptions that Sidney is at this moment 
working through, and arguably working himself free of. Starkey’s text is also a useful 
benchmark against which to measure the responses to Venetian political theory with 
which the next two chapters of this study will be concerned, since Starkey was in a sense 
present at the creation. He moved in the same circle of intellectuals in Venice surrounding 





precise history of their interactions, the overlap between Starkey’s text and Contarini’s 
widely disseminated work of constitutional theory is great enough that some significant 
influence must be assumed.38 Moreover, the Dialogue represents quite explicitly the 
response that some scholars seem to assume would have flowed automatically from an 
English author’s interest in philo-Venetian thought, namely, let us then Venetize our 
English institutions! Nobody has ever said this with greater sincerity than Thomas Starkey. 
 The moment I have in mind, however, comes near the beginning of the Dialogue, 
where Thomas Lupset is depicted as attempting to convince Pole, the hero of the piece, 
that his true “offyce & duty” lies in acting “to maynteyn & avaunce the wele of this,” his 
country.39 Pole confirms that he wishes “to folow wherin lyth the perfectyon of man,” but 
he wonders if this really does “stond in the actyve lyfe & in admynystratyon of the maters 
of the commyn wel,” or if it is more to do with “the contemplative & knolege of thynges?” 
So far this is rather familiarly setting up the sort of debate that we have seen Sidney 
rapidly resolve in favor of the active side, and Starkey will take only a little longer to 
resolve it in the same way. What is interesting here, though, is how closely the case for the 
contemplative life is bound up in an assertion of the priority of “the lawys that nature hath 
set in mannys hart” to “the lawys wych mannys wyt hath devysyd by pollycy,” and how far 
its refutation will thus require some way of explaining the relation between the two more 
favorable to the claims of positive law.40 Lupset’s answer is that the commonwealth is 
instituted to achieve an end inherent in man’s universal nature, which is the perfecting of 
his virtues by “commynyng” them “to the profyt of other lyvyng togydur in cyvyle lyfe.”41 
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Hence while the laws of each commonwealth are peculiarly its own, still “al gud cyvyle 
lawys spryng & yssue out of the law of nature, as brokys & ryverys out of fountaynys & 
wellys, & to that al must be resolvyd & referryd as to the end why they be ordeynyd.”42 We 
are not so much born to serve our particular community as we are born to the civility that 
particular communities mediate, just as we are born to be speaking animals more than to 
be speakers of English. Starkey’s analogy is telling: one cannot speak without speaking a 
particular language, whereas one could at least hypothetically imagine an active life not 
bound to the national community as its frame. That frame will remain definitive 
throughout the Dialogue, however, and Starkey fully recognizes that the combination of 
his way of defining virtue and the type of structure to which he has attached it makes that 
virtue uniquely vulnerable to the effects of any deformation in that structure. The solution, 
through which the body politic may be “conservyd contynually” in its virtue-supporting 
form, is to appropriate the institutions of “the most noble cyte of venyce, wych by the 
reson of the gud order & pollycy that therinys usyd, hath contynuyd above a thousand 
yerys in one ordur & state.”43 
 Insofar as we can thus hear in the dialectic of positive and natural law a kind of 
code for talking about the active and contemplative lives, Euarchus’s drift appears pretty 
clear. Reasserting the primacy of the political community and its particular ordinances is, 
on this view, of a piece with the text’s overall affirmation of a life committed to public 
action in the interests of the commonwealth. It is when we bring the echoes of the 
Apology for Poetry into the picture that things get more complicated. It is surprising to 
hear Euarchus praising the laws for constraining a nature that otherwise “infinitely 
rangeth,” since we know that in the Apology the poet is praised for “disdaining” to remain 
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“enclosed within the narrow warrant” of nature, and instead “freely ranging only within 
the zodiac of his own wit.”44 The echo seems sufficiently deliberate that we are left 
wondering if Sidney is offering some kind of undervoiced criticism of Euarchus’s position. 
But let us recall that at the core of the Apology is an argument concerning which of three 
discourses—philosophy, history, or poetry—is best suited to instruct and inform right 
action, and that the poet is said to be best because he mediates between the philosopher’s 
excessive universality and the historian’s excessive particularity.45 If we map these terms 
directly onto those of Euarchus’s choice between natural and positive laws, the echo 
makes more sense: subjection to the norms of the particular community is like history’s 
subjection to temporally relative and morally arbitrary particulars, the kind of subjection 
the poet escapes. Yet “philosophical discourses” are no good alternative either, because 
they are so detached from the conditions of action as to eject one wholly into the realm of 
the contemplative. What is needed is the middle ground supplied by the poet. But what, 
then, is the corresponding middle ground in the dialectic between, on the one hand, 
action/history/the particular community, and, on the other, 
contemplation/philosophy/the whole realm of nature? That is the question, I propose, 
that Sidney’s trial scene is really aimed at resolving. 
 The strategy for resolving it unfolds, as we might expect, by the positing of two 
vicious extremes and the devising of a middle way between them. The extremes are 
represented by the two spokesmen for what had, at the text’s outset, looked like one 
coherent moral doctrine, now reduced to wrangling over the proper use and extensibility 
of the concept of the “public” and its “offices”: the princes, primarily Musidorus, on the 
one side; Philanax on the other. The princes do not so much reject the ethic of public 
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office outright as they attempt to appropriate its terms in such a way as to make it serve 
their interests while evacuating it of any real substance. This attempt comes in two stages. 
First, the princes together question whether Arcadian courts have any jurisdiction over 
them, “since they were not only foreigners, and so not born under their laws, but absolute 
princes, and therefore not to be touched by laws” (385). They are answered, first, that “a 
stranger” is the last person who should expect to enjoy special privileges in “that place to 
which in time of need his service is not to be expected”; second, that the only evidence 
they are princes is their word, which they have discredited through their acts of 
disguising; third, that even if they are princes in Arcadia, they are no princes of Arcadia, 
which therefore ought “to acknowledge them but as private men.” Public standing is 
something entirely relative to the society that confers it; even an office as sublime as that 
of prince is a commission within a particular institutional structure, not a privilege one 
can carry indifferently from one place to another. 
Second, Musidorus argues that if the court will not regard him as a prince it must 
perforce regard him as a servant to one, that in this capacity he did not abduct Pamela but 
rather counseled her to leave the country in his company, and that the function of offering 
counsel must enjoy a specially protected status, for “who will ever counsel his king if his 
counsel be judged by the event, and if he be not found wise shall therefore be thought 
wicked” (402)? The argument makes sense if only one can simultaneously affirm the 
singular value that the citizen ethic accords to the role of counselor and conceive of that 
role as floating free of any larger system of offices. That system is what Euarchus brings 
back into view in rejecting the argument. Musidorus had no specific “public allowance” to 
act as counselor; Pamela was not at the time “effectual princess,” so that advice to her 





sovereign; and his service was owed only mediately to her, directly to Dametas and then to 
Basilius, so that he had no latitude to act in any way prejudicial to their interests (407). 
Finally, and most significantly, “counselors have great cause to take heed how they advise 
anything directly opposite to the form of that present government”: the whole concept of 
counsel is intelligible only in relation to the structure of authority within which it operates 
and toward the preservation of which it is directed; the counselor’s privileges do not and 
cannot extend to cover advice tending to its deformation. 
All this places us very much within the bounds of the citizen ethic given voice 
earlier by Philanax, and indeed gives a kind of ex cathedra affirmation of it as the Old 
Arcadia’s official morality. But if the overt attempts to subvert that framework are 
successfully rebutted, that the framework itself is coming under strain can nonetheless be 
seen in the rapid and surprising decline in moral stature of its chief representative. 
Philanax is not an exponent of republicanism as a constitutional doctrine, but he is a 
brilliantly perceptive study in certain strengths and weaknesses of the republican 
personality. His vigor in attending to his duties, his earnestness in defense of the state 
against the machinations of private factions, his genuine lack of concern for his personal 
profit are all exemplary. Exemplary too, in another sense, is the extremeness of his 
emotional susceptibility to any possible loss of the institutions from which he derives his 
identity. His meeting with Euarchus, for instance, is temporarily derailed when he notices 
the king’s resemblance to Basilius, “that prince, with whom all my love of worldly action is 
dead,” and is thrown into a “raving melancholy” over the recent disturbances of the state, 
“imagining that his pain needed not if nature had not been violently stopped of her own 
course, and casting more loving than wise conceits what a world this would have been if 





Where the consciousness of this susceptibility is projected forward rather than 
backward in time, it manifests itself as a version of what we would now call the paranoid 
style, characterized by a special animus toward the dangers of conspiracy represented by 
foreigners and cross-dressers. Even before Euarchus’s arrival, Philanax is issuing warnings 
against dithering “while strangers become our lords,” calling on “whosoever is a true 
Arcadian” to assist him in suppressing those sympathetic to the princes, and 
contemplating whether it were better “without form of justice to kill them than against 
justice (as he thought) to have them usurp the state” (325-6). The trial only gives freer 
range to Philanax’s hypersensitivity to perceived agents of subversion, his invective against 
Pyrocles carrying him away into the imagination of elaborate and preposterous 
conspiracies, climaxing in “the infamous misery fallen to this country—indeed infamous, 
since by an effeminate man we should suffer a greater overthrow than our mightiest 
enemies have been ever able to lay upon us” (388). Philanax begins the trial with his mind 
already in a condition Sidney more usually associates with the mob, “my thoughts,” as he 
admits, “being confused with the horrible multitude of them”; and by the time Musidorus 
is to be arraigned he has gone so far overboard that he can be found “utterly suppressing” 
the princesses’ letters written on behalf of the accused, “doubting his own heart might be 
mollified, so bent upon revenge” (386, 398). Philanax’s deterioration reveals his absolute 
dedication to the res publica to be not so much impartiality as partiality of an especially 
tenacious and dangerous sort.46 
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 At one extreme, then, public personality is seen as something that may be taken 
off and put on at will, without reference to any permanent commitment to any particular 
organization of offices or to one’s particular place within it. At the other, such a 
commitment is seen as so definitive of public personality that the latter is left utterly 
exposed to, and correspondingly paranoid about, the slightest possibility of disruption to 
the one unique structure that sustains it. Euarchus’s role in the trial is almost perfectly 
contrived to act as a medium between these. He is to uphold, vigilantly and scrupulously, 
the laws and institutions of somebody else’s country. Unlike Musidorus, Euarchus does not 
treat constitutional norms as useful contrivances for authorizing one to do whatever 
might happen to appear prudent at the moment. The commission the Arcadians offer him 
is explicitly bounded by the obligation to respect “the ancient prescribing of their laws” 
(361); in accepting it he announces that he will remain as judge and protector only “till 
therein it be seen what the customs of Arcadia require” (365); and we have seen how this 
approach informs his actual rulings in the trial. Unlike Philanax, he possesses an identity 
wholly independent of and prior to that of the constitution he works to protect. It is, 
indeed, precisely to the assured continuity of that identity that Philanax appeals in 
conveying to him the Arcadians’ request for his intervention: “They lay themselves open to 
you—to you, I mean yourself, such as you have ever been; that is to say, one that hath 
always had his determinations bounded with equity” (361). The idea is that the stability of 
the Arcadian polity must be made to rest upon that of Euarchus’s constant personal virtue. 
But there is no longer any suggestion that the relationship might work in the reverse 








There is something more than a little Lipsian in this, a figure whose heroic constancy 
consists in upholding the outward forms that others, having identified themselves with 
those forms and their fortunes a little too closely, lack the emotional equilibrium 
necessary to sustain.47 In the New Arcadia, that figure emerges as the heroic norm, as 
Arcadia’s crisis loses its paradigmatic status in organizing the narrative and becomes 
simply one cluster of episodes among others, many of them given over to the princes’ 
exploits suppressing tyrants and reducing commonwealths to order. Meanwhile, the 
complex legal choreographics that accompany Euarchus’s assumption of power in Arcadia 
drop out of view. In the Old Arcadia, the coherence of Arcadia’s historic constitution as an 
organization of offices and a body of laws governing their conduct remains always a 
primary concern, even as it transpires that the agency responsible for holding that system 
together has to be brought in from outside of it. In the New Arcadia, by contrast, it is 
simply asserted, as a fundamental principle of the ontology of politics, that no collection 
of elements can assemble and sustain themselves in relations of balanced interaction 
without the discipline of an external agency, irradiating the whole with the effects of its 
own constancy.48 The disciplinary princes and military man-managers who bestride the 
New Arcadia as its dominant political type do, to be sure, sometimes dress up their doings 
in a self-consciously constitutionalist account of the political order. But it is conspicuously 
only the more unhinged and self-deluded of them who choose to do so.49 
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 When Sidney wrote the first episode of the Old Arcadia, he gave its authoritative 
voice to a character fitting in every respect what at the beginning of this chapter I 
identified as the ephoral role. Philanax belongs to that role in the immediate fact of his 
acting, or trying to act, as a check on the partial judgment of a king; in his rhetorical 
setting of his function as well as the king’s within a structure that would stand only insofar 
as both supported it through their virtuous actions; and in his presumption that, whether 
that structure were to stand or fall, there would be no question of virtuous action outside 
of it. But by the time Sidney finished his initial manuscript he had reached a different 
conclusion. And in the opening passages of his newly revised version he takes us to Sparta 
to show it. The New Arcadia’s Sparta (or Laconia, or Lacedaemon) has almost no point of 
contact with the Lycurgan Sparta of mixed-constitutional theory.50 When Musidorus 
arrives there it is as part of a mission to rescue a young gentleman of Arcadia who has 
gotten caught up in the unremitting war between the ruling class of enfranchised 
Lacedaemonians and the underclass of conquered and exploited helots. Of the 
arrangements by which the citizens of Lacedaemon are governed we hear nothing beyond 
some passing references to a “King Amiclas”; at the end of the Spartan episode a treaty is 
agreed that will grant the former helots participatory rights equal to those of their former 
oppressors, but what these consist in, outside of a suggestion that at least some 
magistracies are elective, is made no more clear. 
 What Sidney does focus on is the figure who champions the helots’ interests and 
acts as their representative in negotiations with the king—the figure whom we might be 
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inclined to describe as playing (this being Sparta) the ephoral role. Given the absence of a 
functioning political constitution, however, this figure’s most important work is to instill 
what Sidney calls the “soldierly discipline” that binds the helots together into an efficient 
unit. By this work he has “brought up their ignorance and brought down their fury to such 
a mean of good government” that they have become a fighting force capable of compelling 
the Lacedaemonians to sue for peace.51 And when his helmet comes off in a final duel with 
Musidorus, he is revealed to be none other than Pyrocles. We may thus sum up the 
evolution of Sidney’s thought on the subject of political personality by inverting the line of 
Patrick Collinson’s quoted in the Introduction. When it came to the crunch, for Sidney, 
the constancy that radiated out from a disciplinary leader to sustain and to regulate 
institutions that were nothing to him personally took precedence over the constancy that 
radiated out from enduring institutions to occasion and to balance the activity of those 
committed to them. So, far from citizens being concealed within subjects, it turned out 
that beneath the covering of the ephor might be concealed the profile of the constant 
prince.  
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After Rome; Or, Why Spenser Was Not a Republican 
 
It’s become increasingly common of late to find Edmund Spenser’s name mentioned in 
connection with the concept of “republicanism.” That the question, “Was Spenser a 
Republican?” might be answered in the affirmative was first proposed in a 1998 essay of 
that name by Andrew Hadfield.1 The evidence advanced there was heterogeneous and 
local in character. Spenser moved in the same circles as political innovators such as Essex, 
Ralegh, and Thomas Harriot; he penned a commendatory sonnet for the English 
translation of Cardinal Contarini’s De Magistratibus, among the best-known texts of 
Italian republicanism; he implied at times that monarchy might not be sufficiently 
rigorous in suppressing rebellion unless it devolved power to semi-autonomous 
magistrates chosen for their virtue; and he had Artegall give a notably unsatisfying defense 
of hierarchy in his encounter with the Egalitarian Giant. But all this, taken in itself, may 
have mattered less than Hadfield’s invocation of the context supplied by Markku 
Peltonen’s influential work of a couple years before. Peltonen, as we have seen, had argued 
not only that England in Spenser’s time possessed a robust discourse of active citizenship, 
but also that it was in Ireland, at the periphery of the Elizabethan state, that this discourse 
was most likely to have developed into a self-conscious republicanism.2 One can see how 
these ideas combined to heighten the circumstantial credibility of the hypothesis that 
Spenser “was, in fact, a republican.” 
But was this, in fact, correct? There followed a debate in the pages of Spenser 
Studies between Hadfield and David Wilson-Okamura, the latter arguing that Spenser was, 
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at the most, affiliated with a conservative, “Gothic” ideology that sought to reverse the 
eclipse of aristocratic autonomy for which it found a historical paradigm in Tacitus—a 
vein of political thought that could be called “republican” only under a definition so loose 
as to be useless. (Hadfield, for his part, found the case for a Gothic ideology in Spenser 
rather overstated, and rejoined that Wilson-Okamura had drawn the boundaries of 
republicanism so stringently that virtually no Elizabethan writing could plausibly qualify.)3 
Hadfield apparently must have won this exchange, since subsequent work by Graham 
Hammill and James Kuzner speaks of “Spenser’s republicanism,” as if the existence of such 
a thing were long since settled, and the job were only to complicate and nuance it, to 
figure out what were its limits, how consistent it was, or to which republican tradition it 
had belonged.4 
 If this is how critical consensus is forged, it cannot be thought altogether 
encouraging. Hadfield in his rejoinder to Wilson-Okamura divides his time between 
defending his interpretation of Spenserian episodes as “republican”—it is never suggested 
that any structural features of Spenser’s work are illuminated by the republicanism 
hypothesis—and listing general characteristics of Elizabethan republicanism, most of 
which might as well have been selected by someone deliberately setting out to prove that 
Spenser was not a republican. For instance, he notes as one of the overlapping “elements 
and languages” of the republican tradition “a keen interest in histories of the republic and 
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enthusiasm for Livy” as well as in Lucan’s Pharsalia and representations of the rape of 
Lucrece. Spenser’s interest in these three topics was only so keen as to have produced, to 
my knowledge, not one solid reference to any of them across his entire corpus (setting 
aside Du Bellay’s allusions to Lucan in the poems Spenser translated as The Ruines of 
Rome).5 The disparity could be turned into an interesting exercise: Why is the Roman 
republic so very largely a dark continent on the map of Spenserian syncretism? Why 
doesn’t Lucan feature for Spenser in the same way as Virgil and Ovid, especially given his 
importance for a figure comparable in so many respects as Samuel Daniel?6 But the 
provocative power of Hadfield’s hypothesis—which I believe retains a real heuristic 
potential in helping us get clearer about just what sort of a political thinker Spenser was—
is mostly lost unless we weigh equally the moments when we might expect to find 
reference to a republican archive or argument, but find something quite different instead. 
 Consider the matter of “virtue.” I suspect that it is the centrality and almost 
insuperable difficulty of this concept in understanding the project of the Faerie Queene 
that accounts for the intuitive appeal for some critics of associating Spenser with 
Renaissance republicanism. Indeed, Hadfield, Hammill, and Kuzner all appear to share the 
core assumption—and in this they are joined by Peltonen as well—that Spenser’s stress on 
virtuous action makes for an intrinsic proximity to, if not an outright alignment with, 
classical republicanism’s ethical repertoire.7 My contention in this chapter is that this 
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assumption is false: Spenser’s virtue is not republican virtue; rather, it takes its shape 
partly by way of his adherence to a set of counter-republican or even anti-republican 
modes of political thought. 
 The republicanism hypothesis remains useful, nonetheless, for directing our 
attention to the kind of ethical-political concern with which we have already observed 
Sidney grappling: how the moral intelligibility of the active life is affected when action is 
seen as relative to the particular, time-bound, and institutionally ordered society. I take it 
that this is, so to speak, the problem-space into which Spenser slotted republican 
arguments when he heard them; which he saw as comprehending the most pressing 
questions about the viability of the republican ethos; and within which he developed an 
approach to the ethics of institutional time that is quite other, even in a sense 
symmetrically opposite, to that of the republican. 
 Rather than turning directly to Spenser’s allegory of virtue, then, I will take up 
some places where he seems to be worrying about the nature and limits of something like 
“republican culture.” These are not always entirely obvious, precisely because Spenser’s 
favored historiographic tradition is not Livy or Tacitus, but Orosius and Augustine—a 
tradition in which “the republic” is treated as what we would today call an ideological 
category, one that obfuscates fundamental continuities in Roman religious, moral, and 
political life. How that tradition in turn shapes Spenser’s poetic reaction to the claims of 
Renaissance republicanism, particularly where they touch upon his own very 
characteristic concerns about time, change, and worldly order, will be the subject of the 
chapter’s second part. In concluding, I will offer some preliminary suggestions about what 
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alternative framework for the relationship between virtuous action and the temporal 
career of societies Spenser appears to offer us, in default of the republic. 
 
I 
One way of approaching the hypothesis of Spenser’s “republicanism” is to ask whether it is 
intended more as a way of characterizing Spenser’s views on constitutional form, or more 
as a way of characterizing his political ethic, in line with the distinctions observed in our 
discussion of Sidney. Now, if we are considering republicanism as a theory of 
constitutional form, that is, of certain polities organized as “republics,” the Spenserian 
hypothesis strikes me as an obvious non-starter, for the simple reason that this seems to 
have been a topic in which Spenser was spectacularly uninterested. It may be true, as 
Kuzner suggests, that the Faerie Queene is unusually sensitive about the dangers of 
tyranny and arbitrary will. But to be a republican one needs more than this—one needs 
some secular basis for explaining why some societies become tyrannical and others do not, 
some way of seeing this as a problem that we contend with (or fail to) by the choice of 
constitutional design. 
The contrast between Spenser and Shakespeare is very instructive here. Both are 
deeply responsive to the idea of “Rome,” as a model for both narrative and political form, 
but in Shakespeare this means a fascination with those turning-points at which the city 
faced a transformation of its ruling institutions: the expulsion of the Tarquins, the rise of 
the tribunate, the Caesarian dictatorship, the confrontation with Oriental monarchy. For 
Spenser, Rome’s internal political history barely exists. It is a kind of mediator, a conduit 
running between a prehistory and an afterlife, between Troy and Troynovant: 
There there (said Britomart) a fresh appeard 





And Troy againe out of her dust was reard, 
To sitt in second seat of soueraine king, 
Of all the world vnder her gouerning. 
But a third kingdom yet is to arise, 
Out of the Troians scattered ofspring, 
That in all glory and great enterprise, 
Both first and second Troy shall dare to equalise.8 
 
Note the offhand assimilation of imperium to monarchy as a constitutional system. You 
may be forgiven for not suspecting that someone who doesn’t care if the Rome that ruled 
the world was actually a “kingdom” would have anything terribly acute to say about 
republicanism. Later on I’m going to return to this material, and argue that there’s 
something rather interesting going on here—indeed, that it’s to moments like this that we 
should look if we want to understand Spenser’s real political originality. For now it is 
enough to see that the narrative and conceptual vocabulary usually central to 
republicans—of how the republic won an empire, but the empire undermined the republic 
by eroding its virtue—is getting preempted by other considerations, other priorities. These 
could be negative as well as positive, Augustinian as well as Virgilian: in the dungeon of 
the House of Pride, the Caesars and the heroes of the republic are quite literally heaped in 
one pile.9 What is consistent is Spenser’s lack of concern to sort the one out from the 
other. 
 If we consider republicanism as a political ethic, on the other hand, matters look 
more promising. We know that Pocock, for instance, regards early modern republicanism 
as at its core an attempt to systematize the relation between virtue and time—specifically, 
the role of virtue in producing institutional permanence out of the discontinuous, 
nonrational time of fortuna (and that of institutional permanence in enabling or 
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corrupting virtue).10 This sounds much more intuitively like the sort of thing we would 
turn to Spenser to hear about; indeed, it would not do much violence to suggest that it is 
the central Spenserian topic. So there are at least intelligible questions to ask: how and 
how far is Spenserian virtue connected to the sustaining or expanding of a res publica, an 
enduring public interest? Does a Spenserian hero’s moral welfare have any particular 
relation to the activity of “ruling and being ruled in turn?” Is this how the challenge of 
Mutabilitie is answered? Could Spenser have written, “to fashion a citizen, in virtuous and 
civic discipline?” 11 
 But we also know that these kinds of questions cannot simply be separated from 
the first, constitutional side of things, because what is really most distinctive of the 
republican perspective on ethics is its particular way of connecting the problematic of 
good action to that of good structure. Few axioms in this area are as reliable as this one: if 
you put forward an account of what virtue is, and then say that its features have no 
implications whatsoever for the legal and institutional ordering of society, you’re not a 
republican. From this a number of consequences have been seen to follow. First, that the 
republic has a special claim on its citizens because its particular political organization is 
the shaping form of their moral personalities, is in fact what allows them to live virtuously 
at all.12 For this reason republicanism implies a positive judgment not only on political 
activity as such, but also on, so to speak, the politics of permanence, on the will to sustain 
particular, contingent political structures, in a historical time in which they could 
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otherwise deteriorate or be overwhelmed. And so the republican’s definition of virtue 
must itself, reciprocally, involve some account of the modes of belief and activity 
necessary for preserving those societies in their virtue-maximal form. In the next chapter 
we will examine how those accounts could differ internally among republicans, dividing 
on the question of the relationship between the civic and the military capacities. But at its 
outer margins the same imperative could also lead a Machiavelli to raise seriously the 
question of whether Christianity ought not to be reformulated, at least in practical 
morality, as some kind of neo-Roman civic religion.13 It is worth noting that one could 
coherently reject republicanism simply by following that chain of reasoning and finding its 
consequences intolerable, without having any particular affection for monarchy. 
 Here, the friction between Spenser and republicanism comes in a more direct, 
assertive form. In The Ruines of Time, published in his 1591 volume of Complaints, Spenser 
presents the fallen Philip Sidney as a paragon of “right and true nobilitie,” venerated for 
his patriotic martyrdom, “life exchanging for his countries good” (294, 302).14 So far, so 
republican-ish, though the very fact that the literary Sidney had left behind such a 
distinctive and yet equivocal legacy around the concept of virtue might lead us to wonder 
if Spenser isn’t also engaging in a more complicated act of appropriation. Further 
complicating things, the praise is expressed, or at least commissioned, by the personified 
voice of an actual civitas. Verlame, the “Woman sitting sorrowfullie wailing” whom the 
narrator encounters by the shore of the Thames, is the “auncient Genius of that Citie 
brent,” i.e., of Verlame or Verulamium, once a sort of little Rome in Britain, but long since 
eclipsed by “Troynovant” and abandoned utterly. “Genius of the city” is, actually, only one 
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of three initial guesses at her identity; the others are a river-nymph (personifying a 
traditional metaphor for perpetual flux) and one of the three Fates (15-21).15 That this is the 
cultural complex the civic spirit belongs to already makes a polemical point, both in its 
intense focus on transience and in its conspicuously pagan overtones. 
These are the terms in which Verlame’s lamented aspirations are cast: as 
aspirations to visible grandeur and as aspirations to material endurance, each in some 
sense the corollary of the other; and each seen by her as failed not contingently but of 
necessity, “Sith all that in this world is great or gaie,/ Doth as a vapour vanish, and decaie” 
(55-6). Verlame can weep for this, but she cannot see her way to an idea of greatness less 
strictly circumscribed by the finitude common to things. As Hassan Melehy puts it, 
“Spenser’s woman is vanity itself, the remainder of an ancient Rome that had faith in the 
durability of worldly things and hoped to eternalize itself through poetry.”16 Civic felicity, 
so far as Ruines is concerned, is relentlessly routed through the literal, solid structures that 
are, in fact, the most unworthy candidates for one’s lasting attachment: 
High towers, faire temples, goodly theaters, 
Strong walls, rich porches, princelie palaces, 
Large streets, braue houses, sacred sepulchers, 
Sure gates, sweete gardens, statelie galleries, 
Wrought with faire pillours, and fine imageries, 
All those (O pitie) now are turnd to dust, 
And ouergrowen with black obliuions rust. (92-8) 
 
If we take Verlame’s heading a eulogy for Sidney as a commentary on the relationship 
between the engaged individual and the city as an abstract ideal, the upshot seems to be 
this. There’s something admirable enough about suffering and even dying for one’s 
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country, but don’t let the “civic interest” actually buy out the franchise on defining the 
meaning of that event. In other words, don’t imagine there can be too close a relation 
between the virtuous person and the politics of permanence, the latter being the city’s 
exclusive and obsessive theme when she is allowed to speak in propria persona. Put simply, 
Sidney’s civic action is good, but the voice that would praise it for being civic action is 
getting some things fundamentally wrong. 
 The Ruines of Time thus teaches a basically Augustinian lesson: the political world, 
the world of city- and empire-building, can be the venue for action with coherence and 
integrity only so long as one does not imagine that venue itself capable of defining or 
containing its ends.17 Augustine’s great innovation was to have seen the Roman empire, as 
an empirical fact, as morally neutral: neither the vehicle of the history of redemption (as 
Eusebius had thought); nor its abiding opponent (as for the Donatists).18 It was, however, 
the common ground upon which there mingled and overlapped two diametrically and 
irremediably opposed communities of action and belief. One of these (the earthly City) 
took the good of the city as a substantive and ultimate reality; where for the other (the 
City of God) the historical city existed only relative to other ends that had no civic 
expression and could be embodied in no institutional structure. Augustine did not think 
these opposing communities, the Two Cities, could be empirically discriminated short of 
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the eschaton, but as an ideal type the republic of the republicans clearly belonged to the 
former. 
 Augustine took very seriously the picture Cicero and Sallust had painted of the 
ancient Romans’ civic virtues. The best of them had, indeed, succeeded to an 
unprecedented degree in suppressing every vice, every passion, and every weakness that 
might set the individual against the good of the whole. This left only one vice remaining, 
namely that through which the public and the personal interest were brought into perfect 
alignment: the passion for glory. 19 Here is where the argument takes an interesting turn. 
Rather than simply dwell on the moral shortcuts that the desire for glory (in the sense of 
unfounded praise) might lead one to, Augustine basically accepts that the republican 
glory-ethic promoted all sorts of truly noble and altruistic actions, so far as their outward 
form was concerned.20 Instead, he locates the problem in the ontological falsity of the type 
of community that shapes that ethic’s inner logic: 
Those Roman heroes belonged to an earthly city, and the aim set before 
them, in all their acts of duty for her, was the safety of their country, and a 
kingdom not in heaven, but on earth; not in life eternal, but in the process 
where the dying pass away and are succeeded by those who will die in their 
turn. What else was there for them to love save glory? For, through glory, 
they desired to have a kind of life after death on the lips of those who 
praised them.21 
 
What the Romans see as the form and ground of all duty, the successive existence of the 
state, turns out to be merely the process by which death is added to death. The genuinely 
sad irony of Rome is that its commitment to its own glory, which really did lead to a spell 
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of relative permanence and preeminence, was what made it useful to God as an instrument 
for purposes the city had no right or capacity to determine. The harder the Romans 
pressed to secure their place in space and time, the more they threw themselves into the 
stream of a history in which all such structures are taken up and discarded by providence, 
obscurely using them toward radically other ends. Had they accepted the particular state 
as something limited and transient, their actions, so admirable from one point of view, 
would not have suffered from this toxic self-contradiction. But then they would not have 
been republicans. 
 I’ve taken the time to summarize a small part of Augustine’s argument because it 
reminds us of an important point: that what opposes republicanism is not always a brief 
for some other system of government, monarchy or liberal democracy or what you will. 
On the Augustinian view, it is wrong to say that a “republic” is either preferable or not 
preferable to an absolute despotism. Either formulation is simply a confused use of 
language. What we might call the “thick” concept of “republic”—i.e., that by which people 
like Cicero distinguish a justly ordered polity—does not correspond to any actual or 
possible object of experience before the eschaton.22 It is used only by those with an 
objectively incorrect understanding of the nature of justice and the relation of human 
communities to God. There is, Augustine explains, a defensible “thin” usage of “republic,” 
but it is so thin as essentially to refer to the existence of political groupings as such; it 
implies none of the positive criteria republicans need for normatively evaluating one 
possible grouping against another.23 We do have an analytic instrument that implies such 
criteria, and can thus do the work the republicans try to do with “republic,” but this is in 
fact the scheme of the Two Cities, which is something different entirely. 
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 In The Ruines of Time, that latter scheme doesn’t show up simply or 
straightforwardly, but instead shadows what gradually emerges as the poem’s real 
structuring opposition: the contrast between the spurious immortality of artifactual 
culture and the genuine eternity of something like poetry. (I will get to why only 
“something like” in a moment.) To the one belong not only the pyramids and mausoleums, 
“huge Colosses, built with costly paine,” to which unpoetic sovereigns foolishly entrust 
their afterlives (407-20), nor only the essentially tectonic memory of Verlame herself, 
weeping for her towers and temples and theaters and so on. Into this orbit Spenser draws 
also her Danielic view of history, in which (without, on Verlame’s part, apparent irony) the 
particular society is seen as an idol or monstrous thing reared up only to collapse under 
the pressure of its own overweening pride: 
And where is that same great seuen headded beast, 
That made all nations vassals of her pride, 
To fall before her feete at her beheast, 
And in the necke of all the world did ride? 
Where doth she all that wondrous welth nowe hide? 
With her own weight down pressed now shee lies, 
And by her heaps her hugenesse testifies. (71-7) 
 
In later days the connection between civic loss and the solid weight of artifactual culture 
could perhaps be told as a story about virtue itself: one imagines in a modernized Ruines 
of Time the spirit of Buffalo or Trenton sighing, “We used to make things in this country.” 
But in Spenser’s version, the routing of virtue through allegiance to societies envisioned as 
statues or spiky towers or pleasure-gardens or vaunting leviathans is meant to give the lie 
to its having been virtue at all. 
 It’s in this context that the figure of Philip Sidney becomes important for much 
more than merely occasional reasons. Verlame’s imagination revolves around what we 





rising up; which allows the actor and the polity to be metaphorically condensed in the 
figure of a great tall building or monumental idol; which in turn makes the whole complex 
appear as a bombastic announcement of the endurance of what cannot endure. With 
Sidney, however, one can be coy about just where his martial virtue shades into what 
Spenser depicts as the paradigmatically opposed cultural system of poetry. 
Yet will I sing, but who can better sing, 
Than thou thy selfe, thy owne selfes valiance, 
That whilest thou liuedst, madest the forrests ring, 
And fields resownd, and flockes to leape and daunce…(323-26) 
 
Is Sidney’s “valiance” the thing he’s being praised for, or is it the poetic virtuosity which 
does the praising? In an illuminating study of the Complaints, Richard Danson Brown 
notes that Spenser’s orphic references in this poem conspicuously avoid the so-called 
“Renaissance Orpheus,” the arch-rhetor who gave primitive society laws and manners, in 
favor of the “medieval Orpheus,” the type of Christ who harrowed hell and took the soul 
for his bride.24 It seems to me that Spenser’s making Sidney’s patriotism sound like a kind 
of orphic power, while stopping short of overtly placing Orpheus at the start of the cycle 
that terminates in Verlame, fits perfectly the hypothesis that he is looking for something 
to carry the paradoxical burden of an anti-civic civility, an active life in the earthly city but 
not of it. 
 At the end of Ruines, Verlame vanishes in a flurry of “dolefull shrikes,” leaving the 
narrator pleading bafflement at the import of her “doubtfull speech.” Since nuance is not 
exactly Verlame’s mode, this goes down as one of the clunkier transitions in a text full of 
them, but it does give a certain official imprimatur to the didactic clarification that follows. 
We are offered a series of six “tragicke Pageants” of two stanzas each, each presenting an 
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image of power, structure, and natural grace—an idol and a tower like those of Babylon, a 
“pleasant Paradize” redolent of the Faerie Queene, a great and gentle giant, a bridge across 
the seas, a strong cave sheltering two bears that “saluage nature seemed not to haue”—
each then falling into dust. These are followed by six “other sights,” which reverse the 
pattern by displaying an image of death, mourning, submergence, slumber, or 
dismemberment, then showing it caught up and restored to heaven. These latter are 
linked by the figure of Sidney (“Philisides”); by Orpheus, combined again with Christian 
militancy in the figure of the rescuer of Andromeda who rides the horse of poetry; and by 
the ideal of a scriptural poetics, via a passage from Canticles that Brown notes appears in 
Bersuire’s widely known allegoresis of Orpheus harrowing hell. 
 The series culminates with “an Arke of purest gold,” preserving someone’s ashes 
“for endles memorie” before being spirited away to heaven (659-72). This is, I take it, the 
symmetrical inverse of the figure of Verlame with which the work began. If Verlame, as 
Melehy suggests, is Spenser’s caricature of the voice of ancient poetry, a poetry falling 
short of itself by backing the wrong side in its great historical conflict with the religion of 
the Word, then the ark represents what the civic culture of the Object has become when 
melted and recast into the orphic sublime. The point is not that poetry can always and 
everywhere be set against the plastic arts—Verlame has her own idea of poetry, and the 
placement of even the Faerie Queene is ambiguous at best. What matters is that what 
Verlame stands for, what she laments the failure of, can be emphatically placed to one side, 
thus clearing a place for some other vision of the social world and worldly action that 
“poetry” can heuristically indicate. In the first set of pageants, society’s temporal existence 





conservation of forces. In the second, it appears as prophetic, anticipatory and memorial, 
based in an ongoing testimony to moments of ecstatic communion and self-loss. 
Ruines, then, is not really a republican text, but one that treats republicanism as an 
alternative competing system for describing the same empirical data, that is, a life like 
Sidney’s that might look like a good candidate for understanding on the terms of 
republican virtue. There is very little in Ruines to suggest what Sidney actually did; all the 
energy goes into disaffiliating a rather vaguely sketched patriotism from the voice that 
would claim it for an English romanitas. The apparent point is that civic consciousness is 
itself incapable of grasping the ethics of “civic” action, that it lacks the means of 
representing the work done in and through the city as anything but fundamentally empty, 
if not necessarily actually wicked. To modernize slightly an analogy of Augustine’s, as a 
purely externalist behaviorism would be to a full understanding of the interactive 
harmony of the human body and mind, so a pure republicanism is to the total relationship 
between the political-institutional world and the universal pilgrimage of faith.25 
  Hammill is not wrong, then, to find in The Ruines of Time what he calls an 
“engagement with continental republican thought,” but his reading makes the poem, I 
think, at once much more republican and much less of an engagement than it really is.26 
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He finds it striking, given what he sees as the republican juxtaposition of Sidney’s virtue 
and Burghley’s corruption, that Spenser makes no overt reference to the historical 
backdrop to Sidney’s death in the Netherlands, which (in view of the debates over how the 
United Provinces were to be governed) would have taken us to “republicanism emergent 
in its concrete form.”27 Why, he wonders, does Spenser give us, instead of a particular 
political history, Verlame’s relentlessly generalizing negativity about all such histories? 
This is a reasonable question, but Hammill forecloses it by assuming that the use of 
Verlame is not about certain kinds of emptiness, but something in itself empty, a purely 
negative invitation to remark the “limits” of Spenser’s ability to conceptualize what was at 
stake in his moment. Hammill’s account of the poem’s relation to republicanism thus 
depends on treating its skeptical view of civic values as simply an absence of political 
thought—which, if it were present, might have been republicanism—rather than as 
reflecting a substantively different set of political assumptions. 
But this is presuming too much. To suppose that the possibility of political theory 
depends on an affirmative view of political life is to risk leaping to Aristotle’s position 
without staying to ask if any others are in the area. To be sure, The Ruines of Time is less 
than thoroughly dispositive in its answer. The text, while giving great play to the voice of 
something like civic consciousness in order to enact a cultural argument situating it inside 
what I’ve called the glory-permanence nexus, offers only a shadowy, approximate, even 
numinous idea of what the alternative really involves. In Spenser’s sonnet for Contarini’s 
work on the Venetian constitution, to which I now propose to turn, it is instead 
republicanism that appears oddly aqueous and peripheral, while the poem’s form and 
rhetoric are dominated by a recognizably different—and, I will argue, much more 
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Contarini gives us a useful point of departure not only because he allows us to 
counterpoint Spenser with a specific instance of republican discourse, but also because he 
presents an unusually maximalist case for the interrelation of the three factors of virtue, 
constitutional structure, and permanence. Although he is in some respects an idiosyncratic 
figure, Contarini thus represents something approaching an ideal-type republicanism so 
far as its points of contact and tension with Spenser are concerned.  
Contarini is characteristic, first of all, of republicanism’s insistence on the 
normative identification of society with its development into a politically organized form. 
Put simply, the republican views political society as the culmination of a life lived in the 
company of others. Political activity is seen basically as ruling, but this gives it neither a 
merely repressive nor a narrowly technical character; rather, participation in this activity 
is essential to the full development of one’s ethical personality, as it demands suspending 
one’s partial, contingent ends in the interest of the total association that comprehends 
those ends and creates the conditions for their pursuit.28 The capacities required to do this 
sort of thing are unevenly distributed, for reasons both natural and sociological (leading 
Aristotle, for instance, to a preference for those midlevel aristocrats who have leisure but 
not inveterate ambition).29 Nonetheless, it can be said as a rule that the constitution 
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which extends participation to as many as have an aptitude for it, in the degree and 
manner that they have an aptitude for it, will be virtue-maximizing for society as a whole. 
Thus the republican is committed to an image of society as composed of multiple 
distinct centers of decision and initiative. He sees such a society as developing in 
accordance with its nature when as many of these as possible are able to govern without 
unduly predominating (thereby at once diminishing others’ chances at virtue and giving 
too much free play to the partialities and limitations of a single ruler or group). Society’s 
teleological development is, then, inseparable from its becoming structured by the mutual 
interferences exerted upon one another by its different centers of relative power. Structure, 
in this sense, may be found in strictly codified procedures, or it may have more to do with 
diffuse traditions of liberty by which one part of society is recognized as acting as a check 
on another. Either way, there can be no serious, long-term conflict between individual 
virtue and the demands of preserving structure, because of a basic reciprocity of 
definition: virtue means conducting oneself in public life in such a way as to preserve 
“balance” or “mixture”; and what is being preserved is simply the possibility of such 
virtue’s continued exercise. If the constitutional structure is no longer that possibility’s 
concrete embodiment, it has in a real sense not changed but ceased to exist, in which case 
the republican’s attitude must change from one of preservation to one of restoration.30 
My proposal is that between Spenser and the possibility of aligning virtue, 
structure, and permanence in this fashion there stood the analytic of the Two Cities, and 
the related move by which the republican alignment was preempted and parodied in the 
form of the glory-permanence nexus. This, at any rate, is what I will try to demonstrate by 
juxtaposing Contarini’s arguments about political order against the formal argument of 
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Spenser’s sonnet, and by reconstructing the traditions upon which the latter draws. This 
will in turn point us toward what seemed lacking in The Ruines of Time, an alternative way 
of bringing those three terms back into alignment, and will thereby suggest in more 
concrete terms how Spenserian virtue might be reconciled to a more positively political 
ethic. 
 When Lewes Lewkenor’s translation of Contarini appeared in 1599 as The 
Commonwealth and Government of Venice, its original was entering its seventh decade of 
influence. Philip Sidney had thought his copy a fair trade for Hubert Languet’s of Plutarch; 
Jean Bodin, though he disagreed with him on virtually everything, found Contarini almost 
the only modern writer on the state worth taking seriously.31 The book is an interesting 
hybrid of highly detailed, concrete discussions of Venetian processes of government—
most tediously and influentially, of the conduct of elections—along with an explicitly 
idealistic account of Venice’s constitution as deduced from the tenets of Platonic, 
Aristotelean, and Polybian theory. As Felix Gilbert has argued, where most of the copious 
literature on Venice merely uses “ideal state” as a vague term of praise, in De 
Magistratibus it represents a philosophically serious effort at resolving the dialectic of 
action and contemplation that had tugged Contarini’s intellectual circle in contradictory 
directions ever since the traumas of the 1510s.32 Lewkenor well captures the tract’s 
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combination of institutional specificity and philosophical rarefaction when, in his 
introduction, he describes the Consiglio Grande as “consisting at the least of 3000 
Gentlemen…notwithstanding which number all thinges are ordered with so divine a 
peaceableness, and so without all tumult and confusion, that it rather seemeth to bee an 
assembly of Angels, then of men.”33 
 Contarini presents Venice as a commonwealth set up for the sake of its citizens’ 
flourishing in virtue. Rather more controversially—as we shall see—he also praises his 
countrymen for having chosen not to make a fetish of virtue’s military side and instead to 
profit from a largely disarmed aristocracy’s devotion to the maintenance of peaceful 
order.34 All this follows directly from his way of defining virtuous government: that is, by 
sharp contrast with “perturbation” (the calculatedly paradoxical embrace of which had 
underpinned Machiavelli’s praise of an armed citizenry).35 The judgment of an individual 
ruler is perturbed by his animal passions; the judgment of the republic is perturbed when 
the interest of private factions prevails over that of the general good.36 But on the Polybian 
view, “perturbation” in this sense is not only an ethical or psychological but a temporal 
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category. Wherever there is a government of the one, the few, or the many alone, it will 
eventually begin to substitute its own particularized ends for those of the whole. And this 
is in fact the cause of political instability (and so in some sense, the basis of political 
history as an intelligible discipline), as regimes stake a claim to rule in the public interest, 
degenerate into parochialism, and are overthrown in turn. In the Polybian paradigm, the 
study of change is essentially the study of the imbalances in a system seen statically; so 
that in the absence of imbalances there can be no theoretical reason to anticipate change. 
Contarini’s premise, then, is that the basic political task is to construct a system in which 
all the potential actors will be included at once and in perfect proportion: 
[W]hich not unlike to a well tuned dyapason in musicke, where the base is 
to the treble aptly proportioned, carrying with it the shew of a Monarchie, 
hath notwithstanding a correspondency with the popular government, and 
finally a middle sort of Magistrates being betweene them both interposed, 
doth grow (as it were) into a wel concenting harmony of an excellent 
commonwealth.37 
 
 As the musical figure hints, the simultaneity of the one, the many, and the few is at 
once fact and value. In a quite specific sense, the orders exist simultaneously because not 
successively, and the job of a mixed government is to work constantly to produce the one 
kind of time rather than the other. This almost metaphysically daunting task is made 
easier (at least, easier to theorize) by Contarini’s somewhat abstract way of counting a 
particular group as incorporated into the government. For instance, the Consiglio 
Grande’s way of choosing magistrates is said to be most excellent because it combines 
“popular” with “aristocratic” government. What this really means is that it combines an 
instrument by which all citizens are treated as equal—the naming of electors by drawing 
lots—with one by which unequal citizens are treated as unequal—the vote on the 
                                                        
37





candidates the electors propose. Hence the claim to have included “the form of a popular 
state” has less to do with the relations of distinct sociological groups than with 
harmonizing different kinds of procedure, which are supposed to be intrinsically 
democratic or aristocratic as a matter of principle. In fact, of course, Contarini’s 
government explicitly excludes “the common people,” and most emphatically the vulgar 
rich, “that apply themselves to filthy artes, and illiberal occupations.”38 His real interest is 
not in giving a broader vision of the actual social basis of a state that many had concluded 
was oligarchic in practice, but in reconstructing the deliberative process as the virtual 
image of a total society, by combining types of procedure corresponding to the potential 
dominance of each of its parts. 
 It is important to have some sense of what Contarini’s version of republicanism 
looks like, because otherwise it is easy to take for granted the style and imagery of the 
commendatory sonnet, disarmingly familiar as they should be for Spenserians, without 
asking how they do or don’t fit with the work commended. Spenser’s offering is not, 
perhaps, the most likely of his occasional poems to repay aesthetic attention. But its 
conventionality is not that of a dutiful rundown of Contarini’s themes (as it is with some 
of the sonnets by other contributors). Instead, it rehearses a very characteristically 
Spenserian rhetoric for dealing with political themes, upon which a reading of the 
Commonwealth and Government at first seems barely to have impinged at all. 
The antique Babel, Empresse of the East, 
 Upreard her buildinges to the threatned skie: 
 And Second Babell tyrant of the West, 
 Her ayry Towers upraised much more high. 
But with the weight of their own surquedry, 
 They both are fallen, that all the earth did feare, 
 And buried now in their own ashes ly, 
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 Yet shewing by their heapes how great they were. 
But in their place doth now a third appeare, 
 Fayre Venice, flower of the last worlds delight, 
 And next to them in beauty draweth neare, 
 But farre exceedes in policie of right. 
Yet not so fayre her buildinges to behold 
 As Lewkenors stile that hath her beautie told. 
 
 Critics who discuss the poem tend to remark on the ambivalence of 
complimenting Venice by calling her, in effect, a third “Babel,” the first two of which have 
met an ignominious end that the poet stops well short of saying Venice will avoid.39 A 
“flower of the last worlds delight” may be made for plucking. True that she “farre exceedes 
in policie of right,” but—to quote Michelle Pfeiffer in Scarface—nothing exceeds like 
excess, and there’s a way in which the language of sheer emulative competition is more 
persistent and memorable here than that of moral improvement. What isn’t generally 
noticed is how deeply, even self-consciously embedded that particular ambivalence is in 
the metahistorical tradition Spenser is drawing on; nor, indeed, have I seen it explicitly 
recognized just what that tradition is. 
 The identification of Rome with Babylon is standard-fare Protestant reading of 
Revelation. Their arrangement into a series of distinct imperial rises and falls, with one 
following the other, and then giving way to a final, vaguely messianic successor, puts us 
more specifically in the area of Daniel’s Four Empires, symbolized alternately in the vision 
of four beasts, or in the idol made of four metals to be finally destroyed and displaced by 
the “stone cut out without hands.” But with the telescoping of that series of empires into a 
relation between the first and the fourth, Babylon and Rome, at once like and unlike, the 
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same and different, the one arising out of the other’s end… Here we are dealing with that 
overlay of the Four Empires and the Two Cities that had become the organizing scheme of 
the medieval “universal history.” 
 Again it is in the City of God where we find the view that: 
the city of Rome was founded to be a kind of second Babylon, the daughter, 
as it were, of the former Babylon. It was God’s design to conquer the world 
through her, to unite the world into the single community of the Roman 
commonwealth and the Roman laws, and so to impose peace throughout 
its length and breadth.40 
 
Augustine repeats the widely current opinion that the date of Rome’s founding coincided 
exactly with that of the fall of Babylon—the implication being that the intervening 
empires of Media-Persia and Greece are to be seen as largely incidental to the overall 
pattern.41 This latter remains focused on the concept of “Rome,” the philosophical and 
historical status of which can be clarified by understanding its relation to what will follow 
it as well as to its spiritual archetype and antecedent, the city of Babylon. In other words, 
by contrast with the Babylon-rhetoric of, say, John Foxe, the analogy here has less to do 
with identifying uniquely wicked tyrants and oppressors than with specifying the role of 
political power within the total history of God’s dealings with His people. Katharine Firth 
has shown that Reformation readings of Daniel tended to split between a “German” 
interpretation, which followed the traditional view of “Rome” as somehow still intact and 
its authority as having been “translated” through later history, and an “English” version 
according to which the political Rome was well and truly done with, long since submerged 
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in the Antichristian power of the papacy.42 The older tradition remained widely available 
in Elizabethan England, however, through such sources as John Sleidan’s highly popular 
Brief Chronicle of the Four Principal Empires.43 At any rate, the design of Spenser’s sonnet 
suggests an interest in what it means to be a successor-state to a Rome which has 
collapsed in terms of its own secular power, but which continues to define the “place” 
subsequent empires will have to claim. 
 How central, and how complicated, this question is in the universal-history 
tradition is perhaps best suggested by a work which Spenser may not have known directly, 
but which is the most complete and influential statement of his sonnet’s archetypal 
pattern: Otto of Freising’s twelfth-century History of the Two Cities. Otto’s models are 
Augustine and Orosius, and in understanding metahistorically the rise and fortunes of 
Rome, he simply doubles down on the established view. Rome follows Babylon “as a son 
succeeds his father; the short-lived empires of the Medes and the Persians and of the 
Macedonians intervening (like the guardians of a little child) not by right of permanent 
inheritance but by mere temporary succession.”44 Babylon, in turn, is connected not only 
etymologically and spiritually to the Tower of Babel, but is actually built from its 
discarded bricks and pitch (as is the House of Alma, notably).45 We can see from all this 
how, as Pocock puts it, Rome is “simply a second Babylon; a ‘mystical’ Babylon, reiterating 
the history of the first to the point where it contains, occasions, but does not generate, 
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something which is to succeed it.”46 And we can see, too, how a Spenser could shrink 
symbolically the whole of that reiteration into the still more primordial movement of 
human pride’s endless building up and falling down. 
 But what of the “something which is to succeed it?” At the other end of the Roman 
epoch, Otto’s task gets more complicated. On the one hand—following yet another 
Hellenistic interlude—Rome was destined to be replaced by the “translated” empire of the 
Franks. Otto explicitly analogizes this to Rome’s own previous, quasi-lawful inheritance of 
the Babylonian mantle.47 To that extent, he implies that the Danielic system might need 
only to be augmented by adding more (and more and more?) successive holders of worldly 
authority, without that authority undergoing any real change in its nature or ultimate 
destiny. On the other hand, there was a sense in which the Franks were the Romans, and 
in which the whole Roman/post-Babylonian era, that of Daniel’s “iron mixed with clay,” 
was no longer centered around the rise and fall of competing empires, but rather around 
the relationship of empire tout court (call it Roman) to the Church, a new institutional 
actor with its own very complicated relationship to the “stone cut out without hands.”48 
 So to come “after Rome” was, in the terms of universal history, to occupy an 
extraordinarily ambiguous position. It suggested coming next—that is, insofar as the 
Danielic scheme had set down an invariant but repeatable pattern for secular power in its 
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historical dimension, as a series of familiar exercises in glorious transience and moral 
imbecility. And it also suggested coming last—insofar as that same scheme implied that 
the empire of the Romans was to be the final one on the Babylonian model, such that its 
true successor must be something genuinely different. So different, indeed, as to mark the 
end of history and of the essentially negative relation between political power and 
spiritual freedom that obtains within that history. The city after Rome might be yet one 
more entrant in that amoral competition whose episodic winners God has always made 
use of for ends they themselves could hardly have authored. But it just might also be that 
final victor whose coming would conclude the sequence and give it its retrospective 
intelligibility. 
 Spenser, then, has designed his sonnet in such a way as (1) to create, in its abstract 
dimensions, this “place” for occupation, after a Rome that is itself “after Babylon”; (2) to 
slot Contarini’s Venice into it; and (3) to ratchet up as much as possible the ambiguity 
about which of the two narratives I have just sketched it belongs to. All of which is 
remarkably underdetermined by the character of Contarini’s own arguments. So where is 
it coming from? My suggestion is that it reflects Spenser’s way of processing, not 
Contarini’s specific claims, but the intellectual problem he saw contained in the very 
premise of Contarini’s praise of Venice, namely, that the endurance of the particular, time-
bound, politically and institutionally structured society could in itself be praised as an 
ethical achievement. 
 One final point needs to be made about how Spenser creates ambiguity in the 
sonnet, that is, how he hedges between Venice’s standing as a repetition of its 
predecessors and as a transcendence of them. Partly, as I have noted, this has to do with 





about the growth of “policie of right” is more easily seen and heard as yet another return 
of Babylon’s policy of height. But this one-after-another is also made to suggest not just a 
formal pattern but a sort of moral vacuousness in action: the sublimely stupid glory of 
mine-is-bigger-than-yours meeting well-yes-but-mine-is-prettier. And in the Spenser 
canon, all this can point inexorably only toward one thing: giants. 
 There are not, literally speaking, any giants in the commendatory sonnet. But in its 
total ambience—the repetitiveness, the evocation of a grand but ultimately pointless 
mimetic competition, the “ashes” and “heapes,” the personifying of geopolitical expansion 
as a relentlessly vertical “surquedry,” the use of the sonnet form’s structural breaks to 
demarcate rising from falling and rising again—the poem reaches back, beyond The 
Ruines of Time, to the translations Spenser made of Joachim Du Bellay’s Antiquitez de 
Rome, where the myth of the giants’ war against the gods is a standard metaphor for both 
the spirit and the fortunes of Rome’s secular ambitions.49 We might recall that Spenser’s 
Mutabilitie, herself a giantess of surpassing beauty, calls her challenge to Jove a family 
tradition, an act of rebellion she has read about “mongst records permanent.”50 It is as if to 
say: this is how fortuna transcribes itself as history. Abstracted from the coherence of a 
providential design—which is in any case external to their own systems of value and 
perception—the translatio of cities comes to look like a series of episodes in the 
resurgence of gigantism. It might, on this view, be rather a matter of indifference whether 
one chooses to name the states that come to prominence one after another, or simply says 
that there are giants, and this is their abiding sort of activity. When Spenser repurposes 
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Virgil’s famous tree simile describing the fall of Troy, it is to use it in connection with the 
fall of Orgoglio.51 
 Gigantism, then, is the subjective side of that discontinuous, irrational temporality 
that organizes itself into series like the Four Empires; just as those empires are the 
concrete objectification of the gigantic impulse. We are now in a position to summarize 
the full symbolic complex of the Venice sonnet. The truly new city (hypothetically Venice) 
would mark a break with the Babylonian template, and in so doing recast the translation 
of power as something historically intelligible above and beyond mere gigantism. There is, 
we know, a kind of temporal break that does not belong to Mutabilitie, but now we are 
getting into serious stone-cut-out-without-hands territory; and if we’re considering any 
historically existing society, it’s going to be hard to say that its self-image as something 
transcendent isn’t ultimately another bit of mimetic “surquedry.” The Du Bellayan insight 
about Rome, for instance, is that the claim to last forever is not only tragically unverifiable, 
it is also not logically distinguishable from the will to aggressive expansion. (It is, as it 
were, the aggressive appropriation of the dimension of time.) There are of course good, 
though limited and contingent, reasons for keeping up the outward order that the relative 
permanence of states subserves. But to claim, as a political society, to be so constituted as 
to do more than that is tantamount to asking to be evaluated on terms either gigantic or 
eschatological—and maybe both at once.  
 Apocalypse is emphatically not where Contarini is heading, though: he is no 
Savonarola. Still less does he think of Venice as belonging to any sort of world-imperial 
succession. The city does not command an epoch, and at a more abstract level its real 
achievement has been to remove itself from the whole epochal, crisis-based form of 
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history that Spenser’s sonnet insists upon. It is, in this sense, supposed to be the least 
gigantic of cities. In fact, Contarini represents a fairly extreme version of some republicans’ 
tendency to see tension between the commonwealth’s flourishing in liberty and the scalar 
expansion of its power.52 He implicitly accepts Machiavelli’s polar opposition of 
expansion-driven and stability-centered republics, of Rome versus Venice, and inverts its 
values to produce a myth of Venice as constitutively anti-Roman, un-imperial in spirit if 
not quite in practical fact. The “Adriatique wonder” is a sort of design miracle, a 
masterpiece of organizational complexity that relies on a highly conservative political 
culture and foreign policy to minimize shocks to a refined but brittle system. Its 
achievements are real—1100 years of freedom from any shattering crisis, summed up in the 
epithet Serenissima—but they require a different scale of values than states that generate 
and master instability, where Venice tries only to permanently neutralize it. Perhaps 
Spenser, by contrast, could imagine no way of figuring civic achievement except as a literal 
or metaphorical version of imperial expansiveness; or perhaps (unlike Harrington, 
Algernon Sidney, and the other republicans for whom the Venice/Rome polarity became 
an analytic warhorse) he did not really grasp what Contarini or Machiavelli were saying 
about Venice; or perhaps he was too disengaged from the project to care.  
And yet there’s something almost too neat to be entirely accidental about the way 
in which the first-second-third-Babel pattern of the sonnet displaces Contarini’s 
ostentatiously tripartite analysis of the Venetian constitution. Recall the level of artist 
we’re talking about in terms of the ability to dispose poetic space into different kinds of 
conceptual or mnemonic architecture. It’s hard not to think that it would have occurred to 
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Spenser as an option to use the sonnet’s natural subdivisions to convoke a triumphal 
procession of one, few, and many, Doge, Senate, and Council; the volta could perhaps 
have gestured to that great number of non-citizens included in the Venetian state virtually 
but not actively or analytically. To have done so, however, would have been highly 
untypical in one crucial sense. It would have been the only Spenserian processional 
pageant in which the participants represent the simultaneously existing parts of a sociable 
collective, as opposed to personified dispositions dispensing a continuous influence on 
social behavior (the show at the House of Pride, Busirane’s masque of Cupid, and so on), 
or individuals literally successive in time whose cue to appear is usually the demise of 
their predecessor (the chronicle-pageants read by or displayed to Arthur, Guyon, and 
Britomart; as well as the cycles of months and seasons Mutabilitie parades around Arlo 
Hill). The one partial exception, the Marriage of Rivers at Proteus Hall, turns out to prove 
the rule. By geographic convention the rivers all exist simultaneously (though the 
confluence of Thames and Medway is being mythologized here as if it constituted a 
discrete event in time). But each is really individuated by its particular style of flowing or 
way of channeling a perpetual flux, so that the Marriage becomes a kind of meta-
processional in which each participant personifies its own parade of moments, its own 
mode of connecting one thing after another. 
 Whether by outright intention or by deeply ingrained habit, the displacement of 
the one-few-many into the one-after-another precisely encapsulates what stands between 
Spenser and Contarini. This is not the moral language, clearly common to both, by which 
a city can be praised for enacting “policy of right.” It is, rather, their radically different 
understandings of the role played by structure in, alternatively, grounding or ungrounding 





gives political activity its ethical bona fides, and the consequence is that action becomes 
more morally coherent the more comprehensively articulated it is with the harmonious 
organization of the state. For Spenser, in the Augustinian line adumbrated by The Ruines 
of Time, structure is not only subject to but essentially is finitude, “the process where the 
dying pass away and are succeeded by those who will die in their turn.” It marks not the 
identity of morality and politics but the necessary divorce of the latter from the final ends 
in terms of which it should be conducted. More than this: Contarini proposes that the 
right structure, by freeing participation from perturbation, can overcome the strictly 
successive character of political history, can make narratives of the “and then so-and-so 
came to power” sort less and less relevant. Spenser invokes an argument according to 
which the attachment to particular structures is precisely what situates political life in the 
dimension of material contingency, committing it to a history of endless rises and falls. 
 
III 
Spenser’s rendering of Rome as “second seat of soueraine king” in the stanza on the three 
Troys, which earlier I pointed to as a sign of indifference to the distinction between 
republic and principate, now begins to appear in a somewhat different light. At the least, 
the indifference to constitutions now seems less blithe and more like a matter of 
intellectual principle. Moreover, if setting the Troy stanza alongside the Venice sonnet 
makes it all the more apparent what Spenser characteristically elides—how a given polity 
systematically relates multiple contending actors to one another—it should make clear 
that this elision also means a correspondingly amplified attention to the relations between 
successive actors, whose tenures border but do not overlap one another. It could, indeed, 





which the social or political world is shrunk to include exactly one actor at every point so 
often leaves us virtually no other relations in which to take an interest.53 
Recall that Contarini thinks that to get right the synchronic problem of how, and 
how far, to include each citizen in the polity is effectively to eliminate the problems of 
political continuity and change. Take care of participation and time will take care of itself. 
Spenser, more in the Augustinian tradition, appears conversely to believe that to ask how 
a political entity relates to a past moment and a future is already to have asked the really 
important questions about it; and, further, that this is best done by bracketing the whole 
issue of inclusion and exclusion out of existence. I say “a political entity” with deliberate 
generality, because I take it that the basic objects of Spenser’s political thought are not 
constitutions but dispositions, and dispositions that can be predicated of corporate actors 
as easily as individuals. Indeed, the point here is that Spenser’s corporate actors are 
“individuals,” in the literal sense of being without internal divisions, though this is 
presented not as the outcome of a positive achievement of integration, but as the bare fact 
of being the exclusive occupant of a particular moment in a temporal series. 
As the Troy stanza makes explicit, a state no less than a person can be thought of 
as inheriting an office (recall Otto on the transfer from Babylon to Rome). Each inheritor 
being as finite as another, what matters is the use made of it: how past authority is 
maintained and extended in view of its future work, without either falling into slavish 
complacency or rushing into heedless innovation. This is not to say, of course, that 
republicans are uninterested in dispositions of this sort. But I have been arguing that the 
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dispositions republicans value are defined in reciprocal relation with the objective 
structure that allows for their continued expression, and that for Spenser no such 
structure exists, or can exist. Nothing in the political world can make time take care of 
itself. But the will to take care of time—to stay a course, to avoid making false gods of 
repetition or rupture, to keep one’s end in sight while understanding the constraints of 
one’s beginning—is what gives to political institutions and instruments their real but 
entirely provisional validity. 
At crucial moments in the View of the Present State of Ireland, indeed, the 
argument turns on an appeal to just this distinction, between two kinds of analysis 
stemming from different assumptions about the sources and implications of stability in 
political bodies. At the midpoint of the dialogue, Spenser’s Irenius turns from cataloging 
Irish “abuses” to outlining a program for redressing them, which, he says, must be by “the 
strength of a greater power.” 54 His interlocutor Eudoxus objects: surely incremental legal 
reform would comport better with conservative wisdom about the perils of “innovation” 
than a root-and-branch reconception of “the whole forme of the government.” Eudoxus is 
in a sense attacking a straw man, however, since Irenius’s basic position on “the whole 
forme of the government” is that he has no position. Ireland is to receive a “universall 
reformation” breathtaking in its comprehensiveness, yet the View repeatedly downplays 
the significance of constitutional prescription to this program. Certain laws, common and 
statute alike, are patently counterproductive and should be replaced, but nothing strikes 
Irenius as a more serious category mistake than the belief that it matters very much what 
Ireland’s fundamental law is.55 
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More tractable to Irenius’s argument is Eudoxus’s concern to minimize disruption 
to traditional institutions, whatever they may be. Here Irenius rejects not the general 
premise, but rather its applicability to the Irish situation. His retort is that one can hardly 
worry about disrupting the status quo when this consists already in a state of permanent 
structural volatility.56 Irish society fosters an indisposition to legal order reinforced at 
every level of economic and cultural organization. But the solution to structural volatility 
is not another structure, at least not one embodied in legal form. Rather, Irenius shifts our 
attention to the restraining force of “one noble person,” presumably Essex: 
who being himself most stedfast to his soveraigne Queene [sic!], and his 
countrey, coasting upon the South-Sea, stoppeth the ingate of all that evill 
which is looked for, and holdeth in all those which are at his becke, with 
the terrour of his greatnesse, and the assurance of his most immoveable 
loyaltie: And therefore where you thinke, that good and sound lawes might 
amend, and reforme things there amisse, you think surely amisse.57 
 
The passage brings into direct relation two of the View’s leitmotifs, and implies that they 
are the negative and positive complements to one another. A preview of this juxtaposition 
has come shortly before, when Eudoxus hazards that the common law must be very apt 
for application in the Irish context, given its success in raising the English to civility from a 
“stoute and warlike” condition much like that of the Irish today. No, Irenius says, the 
common law was, in fact, first brought in from Normandy and had no features whatsoever 
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making it specially amenable to English conditions. That it eventually took hold was 
therefore not a function of its own virtues (whatever these may be), but solely “by reason 
of the continuall presence of their King; whose onely person is oftentimes in stead of an 
army, to containe the unrulie people from a thousand evill occasions, which this wretched 
kingdome, for want thereof, is dayly carried into.”58 First, then, the View warns against 
overestimating the intrinsic value of even the best-considered laws. It is not only that legal 
values are dependent on context; even their functioning in the societies where they seem 
to fit supervenes on the work of a powerful official, at once enforcing and modeling the 
law’s “continuall” discipline. Hence, second, the View takes an acute interest in the role 
played by Ireland’s governors, typically seen as dramatically isolated individuals, in 
creating through the sheer force of personal habitus the sort of disciplined continuity that 
Ireland otherwise entirely lacks. 
 This latter theme is most explicitly developed in Irenius’s praise of Lord Grey’s 
suppression of the Desmond rising: 
Nevertheless thorough the most wise and valiant handling of that right 
noble Lord, it got not the head which the former evills found; for in them 
the realme was left like a ship in a storm, amidst the raging surges, unruled, 
and undirected of any: for they to whom she was committed, either fainted 
in their labour, or forsooke their charge. But hee (like a most wise pilote,) 
kept her course carefully, and held her most strongly even against those 
roaring billowes, that he safely brought her out of all; so as long after, even 
by the space of 12 or 13 whole years, she roade at peace, thorough his onely 
paines and excellent indurance, how ever Envy list to blatter against him.59 
 
Initially it looks as if Grey’s “indurance” is so uniquely a personal characteristic that the 
loss of him must be very consequential to the state indeed; yet by the end of the passage 
its payoff is precisely the capacity of good order to keep sustaining itself whether he is still 
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there or not. Perhaps it should not surprise us to find Spenser more keen to praise Grey on 
multiple grounds than concerned with the appearance of strict logical consistency 
between them. Yet the problem of continuity both within and between the statecraft of 
successive officials is in fact among the View’s most pervasive and seriously considered 
themes. Indeed, in the one place in the tract where Spenser is best known for having 
seemingly taken a strong (but ambiguous) position on the balance of constitutional 
authority, it can be shown that this theme is its driving force: a concern not with the form 
of the polity, but with how governors behave over time and what factors promote or 
impede the regularity that preconditions the success of any law (but also leaves it 
relatively less important which law it is envisioned as making possible). 
 Near the end of the View, Irenius proposes both that the executive power of the 
Lord Deputy be made “more ample and absolute,” and that he be placed under the 
intermediate authority of a Lord Lieutenant, a figure of great public respect whose role 
will be to vouch for the Irish program as a whole.60 Both measures are intended to expand 
the Lord Deputy’s latitude, the first by freeing him from the cumbersome process of 
getting prior approval “to follow the necessitie of present actions,” and the second by 
allowing the Lord Lieutenant to run interference with public opinion at home. Taken in 
isolation, it can appear as if the significant thing about the passage is that Spenser is 
setting the relation between the Crown and a colonial magistrate on a new basis. 
(Especially as he cites Machiavelli for a precedent.) But its readers have struggled to reach 
a satisfactory interpretation of the passage on these terms, because it is difficult to find 
any set of general constitutional considerations in the View with which to connect it. And 
if one assumes that a general constitutional principle of some sort has to be motivating 
                                                        
60





Spenser’s proposal, then multiple contradictory principles, “republican” or “absolutist,” 
seem equally available (which is to say, equally underdetermined by any sustained 
discussion in the View itself).61  
 If that assumption is set aside, however, it becomes clear that the overriding 
concern in the passage (“the chiefe evill in that government”) is that “no Governour is 
suffered to goe on with any one course, but upon the least information here, of this or that, 
hee is either stopped and crossed, or other courses appointed him from hence which he 
shall run.” Not only does this formulation of the problem make the governor sound rather 
more familiarly like a Spenserian hero—who typically has more ado to figure out how to 
sustain his or her quest, or to discern its true end, than to define his or her measure of 
formal autonomy—but it can be placed within a sustained and consistent pattern of 
analysis in the View. This line of thinking has as its object the reasons why most officials 
fail to present the same galvanizing image of awesome persistence which has been the 
great contribution of men like Essex and Grey. At the present juncture the reasons Irenius 
is considering have to do with untimely interference from the metropole, and call out for a 
pragmatic reordering of the lines of command. But this is by no means the exclusive or 
even the primary way in which the problem manifests itself, and in its most challenging 
forms it has much less to do with the autonomy of the governor’s office (or lack thereof) 
than with the dispositional qualities its successive holders impart to it. 
Central to what can without irony be called the View’s ethical vision of politics is 
its diagnosis of the vacillations that arise from the governors’ failure to perceive steady, 
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cumulative progress as compatible with their personal glory. This arises after Irenius, 
having covered the demerits of Irish laws, customs, and religion, surprises Eudoxus by 
declaring that he has still to consider vices “that though they be in private men, yet their 
evill reacheth to a generall hurt.” 62 He initially singles out just one of these for discussion: 
the collusion between English captains and their ostensible enemies, both of whom have a 
material interest in continuing hostilities at a low level. At this point it looks like we are 
going to get a fairly straightforward treatment of corruption and the perverse incentives of 
colonial warfare. But the discussion then shifts abruptly to what Irenius takes to be the 
moral equivalent of such behavior among the governors, the rewards of which are less 
material than reputational and psychological, a matter of shaping the narrative of Irish 
governance to their own purposes rather than subsuming themselves in its longue durée. 
On the one hand, simply to continue, even to build on, the framework of the previous 
governor would diminish one’s own distinction, so new officeholders usually prefer to 
announce sweeping shifts of direction. On the other hand, there is little incentive to try to 
solve problems that arise at the end of one’s term, since one’s successor is likely to enjoy 
the credit anyway. Thus the cumulative effect of an otherwise salutary ambition for glory 
is to further exacerbate the instability of a society already dominated by a “virtue” its 
native elites have cast as fundamentally violent and episodic.63 
If there is a connection between the View’s account of political virtue and some 
proposed structure of government, then, it consists in the minimal demand that the latter 
not become one of many potential impediments to the “continuall” character of its own 
exertions. But the claim is not that such an arrangement will in itself make Ireland any 
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more stable, only that it will accomplish as a practical matter what Spenser already has 
conceptually: the isolation of the individual officer, disposed for perseverance or against it, 
as the only factor to which stability can possibly be staked. It is, moreover, the practical 
equivalent to the representational principle we have seen preempting and displacing the 
very premises of republican theory in Spenser’s poetry. The View reproduces at the level of 
policy analysis what Spenser habitually does at the level of form when he considers the 
political state in texts like the commendatory sonnet and the stanza on the three Troys. 
First, isolate a single agent occupying the space of action for a stretch of time. Then direct 
our attention to the character of the transitions separating one such tenure from another, 
where “excellent indurance,” or its failure, is made most dramatically apparent. 
To some degree, we are so used to Spenser operating in this mode that we can fail 
to see it as a particular formal choice. For instance, we know well that the chronicle of 
Faery emperors that Guyon reads in Alma’s turret represents a kind of civic ideal against 
which to measure the losses and reversals of the Briton chronicle taken up by Arthur. But 
generally we take no specific notice of the fact that it is still a chronicle: if it stands for an 
ideal “body politic,” it cannot do so by any sort of more complete, more balanced, more 
harmonious synoptic incorporation of parts; there is nothing more, and nothing less, to 
incorporate than there is in Arthur’s chronicle.64 What distinguishes it from the ravages of 
its British counterpart is only the fact that each new occupant of the imperial seat 
functions to mark only the absolute minimum of orderly departure from his predecessor. 
 In other words, Spenser’s representation of political society and his vision of 
political virtue come together precisely where the former is least apt to appear as a 
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synchronically organized system, a regular structure of relations among discrete actors. 
This preference for the chronicle of one-after-another has a kind of loose affinity with 
monarchism, but in Spenser it is not so much a positive argument for the government of 
one man, as a reversal of the whole republican method of distinguishing social formations 
by measuring the relative distribution or consolidation of authority. Rather than being 
realized more fully the greater the scope, diversity, and rational ordering of collective 
participation, a distinctively political virtue comes more clearly into view the less it looks 
like “participation” at all. Or, rather, the more what it “participates” in looks like the lonely 
stewardship of an officeholder to whom has fallen the job of producing, out of his own 
style of action, what continuity there is in a world where this can be reliably grounded in 
no objective structure, no better arrangement of society’s disparate parts. 
 The point might also be put like this. That Spenserian entity known as “second 
Troy” (alias second Babel) is, for all its constitutional vacuity, not so much subtracted from 
the language of political description, as it is abstracted from it, set out as its basic unit. 
Among Virgil’s attractions for Spenser was surely his having narrated the founding of that 
universal empire so as to make it sound quite literally like a story about that favorite 
Spenserian emblem, the steering of the ship of state. Spenser’s Rome, in turn, is a political 
society so comprehensively identified with the intuition behind ship-of-state symbology 
that practically its only positive characteristic, all there is to say about it, is that it gets one 
from A to B (or, better, from A1 to A3).65 Yet it is only once a political society is seen in this 
fashion, as a conveyance from one set of realities to another, that it becomes the sort of 
thing to which the whole fecundity of Spenser’s moral language of the quest and its 
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discipline—prematurely abandoned or aimlessly distended, contracted into an episode of 
pseudo-finality or spun off into infinite protean variations—could profitably apply. 
Whether one wishes to call such a strategy of representation an evasion of “the political” 
simpliciter; or whether one is inclined to see it as developing an alternative kind of 
political theme, one habitually obscured by the tendency to see the issues of inclusion and 
exclusion, scale and distribution, balance and hierarchy, as definitive of the set of properly 
political problems, will depend, probably, on how one feels about a number of things 
beyond the scope of this chapter. What I hope to have demonstrated here is that if 
Spenser is “good to think with” about republicanism, it is by directing our attention, not to 







Othello and the Unweaponed City 
 
What has Othello to do with republicanism? Not so long ago the question might have 
seemed improbable or even perverse; nowadays it has become virtually unavoidable. 
There are a couple distinct but complementary reasons for this. First, where Lynda Boose 
once quipped that “the Moor of Venice” connoted something on the order of “the Eskimo 
of Texas,” the 2000s-era boom in Mediterranean studies has produced a revised picture in 
which Othello’s situation looks less emblematically exotic and more realistically plausible, 
embedded in a highly specific Venetian social, economic, and political milieu.1 Second, the 
long-established fact that one of Shakespeare’s main sources for Othello’s Venice was 
Contarini’s Commonwealth and Government has taken on a new significance for critics 
who have seen in this a means of triangulating Shakespeare, Contarini, and the culture of 
English republicanism posited by such historians as Collinson and Peltonen.2 The play 
itself invites such an approach for at least one readily graspable reason. Othello’s 
connection to Venice seems to be secured by maximally civic and minimally cultural ties: 
he fights (and, in his own histrionic framing of the event, dies) for the city, while still 
                                                        
1
 See especially Daniel Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theater and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570-1630 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 77-106; Emily Bartels, Speaking of the Moor: From Alcazar to Othello 
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2008), 1-20 and 155-90. Two valuable book-length studies of Shakespeare’s 
Venice have appeared in recent years: Graham Holderness, Shakespeare and Venice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); 
and the collection of essays edited by Laura Tosi and Shaul Bassi, Visions of Venice in Shakespeare (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2011). See also David McPherson, Shakespeare, Jonson, and the Myth of Venice (Newark: U of 
Delaware P, 1990). Boose’s remark appears in “‘The Getting of a Lawful Race’: Racial Discourse in Early Modern 
England and the Unrepresentable Black Woman,” in Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker, eds., Women, 
“Race,” and Writing in the Early Modern Period (London: Routledge, 1994), 38. 
2
 The primary protagonist has been Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Renaissance Politics, 163-70; 
Shakespeare and Republicanism, 214-20. See also Mark Matheson, “Venetian Culture and the Politics of 
Othello,” Shakespeare Survey 48 (1995), 123-33. A contrary view is suggested by Peter Platt, “‘The Meruailouse 





retaining the signs of his alien birth. For Julia Reinhard Lupton, the critic who has given us 
the most sophisticated treatment of these themes, republican citizenship thus emerges as 
Othello’s central political problematic. The “citizenship structure” described by Contarini 
becomes, according to Lupton, the framework within which Shakespeare plays out the 
tension between the hypothetical inclusiveness of the civic norms instantiated in Othello’s 
military service and their incomplete extension to those at Venice’s cultural margins.3 
 The trouble with such a reading is that it belies what an Elizabethan reader might 
very well have regarded as the definitive feature of Contarini’s theory of citizenship. Here 
we need, in a sense, to invert the previous chapter’s reading, concerned with the sort of 
structure Contarini thinks is consistent with good action, and turn our attention instead 
to the sort of action Contarini thinks is consistent with good structure. Especially for a 
reader who knew Machiavelli’s Discourses and Art of War as well as the Commonwealth 
and Government, the latter book would probably not have appeared purely as an 
exposition of the mixed constitution as a generic form, shared by Venice with the 
republics of the ancient world. Rather, it would have been read also as a theoretical 
defense of a quite specific and much debated type of republic: one in which the political 
classes do not involve themselves personally in warfare, and the state’s forces are 
marshaled by foreigners who, conversely, are constitutionally disbarred from taking any 
role in its public life. On this view, a general “of Venice” is virtually the last figure one 
would use to represent a paradigm of the Venetian citizen. As Contarini sees it, military 
leadership like Othello’s is not a sort of variant form of the deliberative citizenship 
                                                        
3
 Lupton, Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005), 103-23. “Job in 
Venice: Shakespeare and the Travails of Universalism,” in Tosi and Bassi, eds., Visions of Venice, 105-21, 






personified in Lodovico or the Duke; rather, they are, from a constitutional perspective, 
mutually exclusive. 
The significance of this for a reading of the play’s politics is not merely negative—
Othello’s service in arms is so far from mitigating his status as outsider that it actually 
compounds it—but might rather enable some qualitatively new insights into how 
Shakespeare conceives of that status and its implications. To see this, however, will 
require restoring to view a line of argument that modern scholars have sometimes treated 
as Renaissance republicanism’s unwanted stepchild, that which concerns the differences 
between societies defended by citizen-soldiers and societies defended by mercenary 
professionals. (Since the question of Othello’s “citizenship” is so unusually pressurized and 
so subject to varying interpretations, it may be useful to say from the outset that 
throughout this chapter “citizen” has the same Aristotelian meaning it has for Contarini: a 
member of a class eligible to participate in political life through the holding of offices and 
the exercise of deliberative judgment on matters of public importance.4) Contarini is 
taking a strong position in an intra-republican debate over the relative merits of different 
types of republics, and Shakespeare’s writing a play about mercenaries in Venetian service 
indicates in turn that his interest in Contarini revolved around just that point on which 
the latter’s work is most liable to criticism on republican terms. 
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 Critics interested in Othello as a document in the history of political thought have 
not, I think, sufficiently reckoned with these facts.5 It might be said that in failing to do so 
they have effectively replicated the Venetian division of the military from the political as 
spheres of concern, but without any of the acute self-consciousness about the nature of 
that division and its consequences that distinguishes the work of Contarini, of Machiavelli, 
and—as I intend to argue—of Shakespeare. My argument will proceed in three parts. The 
first shows that the dialectic of citizen-soldier and mercenary is an interpretive scheme 
powerfully if obliquely invoked in Othello itself. I suggest that in constructing Othello’s 
“otherness” Shakespeare appeals not only to the familiar problematic of the citizen’s other 
as the culturally particularized alien, but also to the rather more specifically republican 
problematic of the citizen’s other as the functionally specialized professional: the two meet 
in the figure of the foreign mercenary, who must be absolutely separated from the civic 
body if he cannot be entirely integrated into it. The second section turns directly to 
Contarini, examining how he justifies Venice’s opting for the path of separation over that 
of integration by presenting such a choice as uniquely consistent with the values implicit 
in the city’s celebrated mixed constitution. In sixteenth-century republican thought, I go 
on to show, the choice between an armed and a disarmed citizenry comes to be seen as 
entailing a larger antithesis between different ideas of the republic and their affiliated, and 
strongly gendered, modes of virtue: one expressing itself in dynamic action and mastery of 
temporal events (Rome), the other in the preserving of an inviolate structural integrity 
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(Venice). This sets the scene for a more expansive discussion of Othello in the chapter’s 
third section, in which I propose that its tragedy arises out of the incommensurability of 
each mode of virtue to the demands and expectations of the other, staged in Othello as a 
kind of epistemological crisis. At the center of that crisis is the disarticulation of visible, 
dramatic action from public, political values; the loss of each domain’s ability to inform 
and irradiate the other emerges, in Shakespeare’s accounting, as the ultimate cost of the 
mutual estrangement of citizen and soldier. 
How, in defining the virtue appropriate to the citizen, to structure the relationship 
between those capacities necessary to the maintenance of the republic’s internal order and 
those necessary to its external defense is a characteristic and recurring problem for 
classical republicans.6 Historically, the dominant approach to this problem is represented 
by what we may call the citizen-soldier tradition.7 This tradition includes Aristotle, 
Polybius, Sallust, Bruni, Machiavelli, Harrington, and the early American anti-Federalists. 
It involves three basic intuitions about the mode of military organization appropriate to a 
republican polity. First, that for a republic’s defense to rest upon anything but the totality 
of the citizen body, possessing its own arms and not being the clients of a magnate or a 
permanent military establishment, is to risk the loss of its independence. Second, that 
there is a virtuous circle linking war as conducted by citizens and politics as conducted by 
sometime soldiers: each actually does the job better, pragmatically speaking, than those 
engaged in one activity to the exclusion of the other; and this is because war, properly 
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waged, sharpens the commitment to a common good irreducible to any aggregate of 
sectional interests. Third, that a people on whom the state relies for its arms will possess a 
moral and practical claim to political representation overwhelmingly difficult for elites to 
deny, so that societies in which this is the case are empirically most likely to sustain 
popular governments. 
Venetian theory, as represented by Contarini, rejects the first two intuitions, and 
denies the third not as an empirical fact but as a normative desideratum. This puts it 
sharply at odds with the thought of Machiavelli, who in synthesizing two centuries of 
civic-humanist anti-mercenary polemic into an authoritative statement of the citizen-
soldier ideology also codifies the antithesis of ancient Rome to contemporary Venice as a 
standard heuristic for assessing the merits and demerits of each position. The antithesis—
with the value signs reversed—is almost as strongly marked in Contarini himself, and it 
proves strikingly durable in guiding assessments of Venice both abroad and at home, 
furnishing for instance the organizing paradigm of Paolo Paruta’s widely influential philo-
Venetian Political Discourses at the century’s end.8 The Italian republicanism available to 
English Renaissance audiences consists, then, not in a single stream of thought but in at 
least two, splitting precisely at the point where they encounter the choice between the 
paired figures of the citizen-soldier and the mercenary professional. 
As for how much this fact should matter to our understanding of the formation of 
a distinctively Anglophone republicanism, scholars have themselves been divided in their 
views. At one pole is Pocock, who argues that English republicanism came into being as a 
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self-conscious combination of Machiavellian “military populism” and philo-Venetian 
aristocratic constitutionalism.9 Where the latter furnished patterns for institutionalizing 
balance among different agencies of government, the former consisted in a “theory of the 
possession of arms as necessary to political personality,” and the decisive English 
development was the application of this theory by Harrington and his followers to the 
conditions of an agrarian territorial state.10 Although critics writing about republican 
currents in English Renaissance literature routinely cite Pocock’s work, they often do so in 
such a way as to excise or at least to minimize the visibility of this line of argument, thus 
tacitly adopting a view of the subject closer to that found in Quentin Skinner’s equally 
influential Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Skinner firmly emphasizes the 
importance of arguments for a citizens’ army and against the use of mercenaries in the 
main traditions of Italian republicanism. Yet he treats these arguments with a certain 
condescension: they amount to an “almost hackneyed claim” made by men who 
“resolutely refused to see” its lack of practical significance.11 Happily, we are told, thinkers 
based in the northern monarchies, “given the capacity of their rulers to raise massive 
national armies,” readily and universally recognized what was so obscure to Machiavelli, 
and “clearly regarded the alleged problem of mercenaries as little better than an 
irrelevance.”12 
The premise of the present essay is that, at least in this one regard, Pocock’s 
narrative offers a better guide to understanding Shakespeare’s engagements with Italian 
political thought than does Skinner’s. This is not to say that Shakespeare advocated for a 
citizens’ militia and was an early exponent of the polemic against standing armies, nor 
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that he held views opposite to these. But if Othello does not imply any particular answers 
to pragmatic questions about the ordering of a society’s military capacity, nonetheless the 
play does have something to say to us about the consequences of relegating such 
questions to the domain of the merely pragmatic. To a degree unusual among 
Shakespeare’s tragedies, Othello does not depict a society’s failure—the city itself is left 
serenely unshaken, if moderately queasy, by what transpires at the distance to which it has 
geographically and existentially removed its arms—so much as it counts the costs of that 
society’s chosen way of defining and securing its success. If the accounting takes on a 
peculiar, and peculiarly Shakespearean, intensity, it is because its object turns out to be 
the half-remembered link between the soldier’s actions and the forms of public value that 




Othello opens with Iago’s lengthy complaint at the promotion of Cassio, a complaint that 
is also a précis of his view of the relationship between citizen-statesmen (“great ones of 
the city”) and military professionals at Venice (1.1.7-34).13 Iago’s fundamental premise is 
that there is a bright line to be drawn between the city and the unequal but separate 
sphere of the army, which the city ought to command but not confuse itself with or 
presume fully to understand. “Toga’d consuls,” his epithet for the civil authorities, is 
almost certainly a paraphrase of one of the better-known lines in Lewkenor’s translation of 
Contarini, where (as we will see later) he speaks of the anomaly of “unweaponed men in 
                                                        
13
 All references to Shakespeare’s plays cite The Complete Works of Shakespeare, ed. David Bevington, 5
th
 ed. 





gownes” holding authority over men in arms.14 The implied sexual insult of Lewkenor’s 
turn of phrase is in turn transferred to Cassio, who according to Iago knows battle roughly 
as well as a “spinster.” Cassio and the senators are also plainly linked with one another in 
Iago’s mind, not only by their explicit equation as practitioners of “bookish theoric,” but 
also by the word “election,” suggesting the deliberative choosing of magistrates held up, 
by Contarini especially, as the glory of Venetian governance. Iago thus begins from a 
complex but clearly demarcated set of oppositions: practice versus theory; masculine 
versus effeminized; military versus civil. Yet, for all this, Iago is not deprecating the 
citizens’ authority—he assumes that left to themselves they would have given the 
commission to him—but lamenting that Othello has been allowed to bluster his way, 
“horribly stuffed with epithets of war,” to getting appointed as lieutenant a man who 
ironically belongs more to the city than to the camp. 
 The play’s opening monologue thus offers us something in retrospect unsurprising: 
Iago venting his disgust at what he regards as the preposterous and sexually charged 
crossing of a boundary he would vividly and loquaciously restore to view. What is perhaps 
surprising is that the boundary in question should have to do not with sanguinary purity 
but rather with professional specialization. Iago speaks for the self-containment of the 
military order, which will best carry out its tasks if its organization reflects exclusively its 
own internal standards and measures of merit, without reference to those which may 
happen to prevail in the broader society. The arguments are neither unfamiliar nor 
altogether implausible: a military too affected by civilian sensibilities, as Iago seems to 
think Othello is, will concede too much to those for whom war is an intellectual 
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abstraction; too much military influence in civilian politics will make it too easy for 
senators to be bamboozled by the false gravitas of celebrity generals such as Othello. 
The intriguing thing is that these sentiments should be given voice at just the time 
and place where we “ought” to be hearing about the Moor’s miscegenated marriage, the 
boundary-crossing scandal of which is not even mentioned until Iago has already mapped 
out the play’s conceptual geography around the line dividing the sphere of military from 
that of civic activity. It may be impossible to say whether we should therefore read the 
terms of Iago’s opening speech as supplying him with the logical matrix for his subsequent 
vehemence against miscegenation, or instead read the latter as bringing to light the 
motives submerged beneath his general preference for separation over integration. Either 
way, though, the effect is to draw the play’s more overt concern with Othello’s status as a 
cultural alien into a mutually intensifying relation with the more typically republican 
problematic of military specialization and its potential to generate an alienated, 
potentially dangerous element standing over and against the citizen body at large. Indeed, 
the position to which Iago assigns Cassio, crossing in one direction between the opposed 
domains of war and civil society—as Othello’s influence with the senate crosses in the 
other—corresponds exactly to that which Machiavelli valorizes: the citizen-soldier who, 
unlike the professional, moves seamlessly between peacetime and wartime occupations, 
each informing the conduct of the other.15 
 Machiavelli’s basic argument in the Art of War, presented through his principal 
speaker Fabrizio Colonna, is that only the citizen, who has a distinct interest in resuming 
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his peacetime vocation, can truly conduct war in a proper fashion.16 The professional, by 
contrast, has a fundamental incentive to try to prolong hostilities while minimizing the 
cost and danger to himself. Machiavelli’s surprising but only apparently paradoxical 
conclusion is that a soldier who is so apt for war that he makes military service his 
permanent occupation is just as undesirable as one who has to be coerced into fighting. 
What one really wants are men who serve under a sort of compulsion, albeit a compulsion 
that collaborates with an internalized willingness to further the public good.17 To have a 
militia composed of such persons requires a thoroughgoing integration of military and 
civic orders. On the one hand, its objective condition is that the citizen-soldiers must be 
commanded by what Machiavelli’s first English translator calls their “ordinary lord,” 
meaning their duly constituted political authority, whether this is a prince or a 
representative of the commonwealth.18 In other words, the political relations 
characterizing society at large are to be carried over and replicated in the military. Its 
subjective condition, on the other hand, is that the people must have some notion of the 
public good, over and above the aggregate of their particular enterprises, each of which 
must be temporarily neglected while its practitioner goes to war. Machiavelli, without 
fully specifying how such a thing is to be inculcated, clearly connects it with the 
experience of wartime service, so that there is a converse movement whereby the cohesion 
and discipline characterizing military society are carried over and replicated in civil life.19 
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War does not so much make volatile and unruly citizens, as many Renaissance 
commentators allege, as it makes potentially self-dealing individuals into citizens in the 
first place. (The Machiavelli of the Discourses has a more complicated take on unruliness, 
as we will see later on.) Venice, therefore, features for Machiavelli as a standard negative 
example: for all their apparent abundance of caution in forestalling a military coup, the 
Venetians are actually both weaker and more vulnerable than they think, the safest policy 
in the long run being to avoid putting one’s arms in the hands of a private, special 
interest.20 The Florentine emerges as the logical foil to the Iago of the opening speech, 
even as the ensign himself starts to look like a strangely conventional defender of 
Venetian practices. 
This is not, however, the only relevance to Othello of the Art of War. Machiavaelli’s 
treatise and Shakespeare’s play converge not just on the topic of the relationship between 
civilian and military activity, but also on the formal location upon which the dramatic 
interest of that relationship is focused. That formal location comes into view when we 
consider that, in spite of his self-consciously ironic title, Machiavelli’s real interest is in 
exempting war from the general class of “arts,” and insisting that those who engage in it 
not do so as an “art.” An “art,” in the relevant sense, is a self-sustaining vocation 
continuously practiced by specialists, like farming or weaving or surgery. Machiavelli’s 
proposal is that princes and republics should reserve the art of war to themselves, as a 
public monopoly, and forbid their subjects or citizens from making it their own. War is 
the legitimate profession of everybody, taken collectively, and the legitimate profession of 
nobody, taken as individuals. 21 The crucial point is this: Only the citizen really conducts 
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war as an affair of discrete actions, arising from particular circumstances and terminating 
in the achievement of particular ends, whereas for the professional war is really an 
eccentric species of production, turning on the efficiency with which one engagement can 
generate the conditions for another.22 Machiavelli, therefore, becomes intensely interested 
in what happens at the moment when action is potentially completed and a campaign 
brought to a close. The citizen packs up, celebrates a triumph, and goes back to his farm. 
The professional attempts to reframe the campaign as still ongoing, angles for a new 
contract, or finds another way to prolong wartime by setting himself up as a freebooter.23 
   Othello is likewise a text strangely obsessed with what happens when a term of 
military service reaches its endpoint. Or, rather, it appears obsessed with the question of 
just what an endpoint is in such a context, refracting the moment into various dramatic, 
institutional, and psychological aspects so as to restage it again and again. Beginning with 
Iago’s counterfactual—“the state … cannot with safety cast him,” implying that otherwise 
they would—Othello is decommissioned in fact, fantasy, or ritual symbolism at on at least 
seven different occasions (1.1.146-8). These include, of course, his famous “Farewell” to “the 
big wars,” in which he declares that “Othello’s occupation’s gone” (3.3.347-59), 
prematurely but presciently anticipating Lodovico’s arrival with letters ordering him home 
and replacing him with Cassio (4.1.228-9). To these we need to add the actual effective end 
                                                                                                                                                                     
I reply that since war is not an occupation by which a man can at all times make an 
honorable living, it ought not to be followed as a business by anyone but a prince or a 
governor of a commonwealth; and if he is a wise man, he will not allow any of his subjects 
or citizens to make that his only profession. (14) 
Whitehorne has: 
Whereupon I say, as this being an art, whereby men of no manner of age can live honestly, 
it cannot be used for an art, but of a common weale or of a kingdome: and the one and the 
other of these, when they be well ordeyned, will never content to any their Citizens, or 
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of the Cyprus campaign, when news comes of the apparently total destruction of the 
Ottoman fleet, an event described by Othello himself in not less than metaphysical terms 
as a threshold between states of war and peace, a metamorphosis of chaos into an almost 
intolerably satisfying calm (2.1.178-88). Then, finally, there is the formal stripping of 
“power” and “command” delayed until the play’s last moments (5.2.330), long enough to be 
preceded by not one but two symbolic depositions in which Othello loses his sword (242, 
286). His suicide, too, might be added as an eighth decommissioning, taking as it does the 
form of a report of service to the state that literally produces its own “bloody period” (355). 
 One character alone ventures an account of what will happen to Othello after the 
end of his term. Iago tells Roderigo that “he goes into Mauretania and taketh away with 
him the fair Desdemona, unless his abode be lingered here by some accident” (4.2.224-5). 
There is no reason to believe this is true, but neither is there any particular reason to take 
it for a lie, and the very fact that Iago supposes it a plausible story might lead us to raise 
some interesting questions about the three-way configuration of Othello’s status in Venice, 
his pecuniary interests, and the late cessation of hostilities with the Turks. Making use of a 
combination of Machiavelli’s skepticism about mercenaries and Iago’s cynicism about 
Othello, one could, in fact, arrive at a reasonably coherent reading of the play in which 
Othello’s half-conscious motivation from Act Two forward is to manufacture a sense of 
general paranoia so as to make believe that the crisis that occasioned his employment is 
still somehow going on. This would explain, for instance, why after the destruction of the 
fleet he is the only character to make any mention of the Turks for the remainder of the 
play. 
 I find oddly tempting this notion of Othello as a sort of one-man military-





of speculation has the heuristic value of reminding us that Othello is a play about a state’s 
military apparatus, set in a time that can only be called “the postwar,” ultimately it is the 
wrong track to go down. Thinking through Machiavelli-type questions about what the 
professional soldier will do at the moment when his work is no longer in demand is 
precisely what Shakespeare declines to do, or flirts with only briefly and through the 
imagination of Iago. Indeed, Iago’s fancifully eponymous dispatching of the Moor to 
Mauretania epitomizes how the play generally recasts Machiavelli’s temporal disconnect, 
between war as discrete action orchestrated by the community as a whole and war as 
vocational “art” pursued continuously by a segment of it, as the spatial dislocation of war’s 
representative, Othello, to a point outside the community entirely. The question of 
whether the soldier will or will not go home is enfolded into, even as it continues to 
inform, the question of whether anything can count for Othello as a home to go to—as in 
this passage in which he tries to explain why it should not bother anyone that he has yet 
to put down his weapons: 
Be not afraid, though you do see me weaponed: 
Here is my journey’s end, here is my butt 
And very sea-mark of my utmost sail. 
Do you go back dismayed? ’Tis a lost fear: 
Man but a rush against Othello’s breast, 
And he retires. Where should Othello go? (5.2.265-70) 
 
Othello claims, in other words, that his retention of the signs of a professional martial 
identity, beyond the point at which he is authorized to exercise it, is not so much a 
potential threat to the community as it is a way of confirming the finality of his separation 
from it. 
 Othello thus generates a nearly obsessive awareness of the impermanence of 





between the citizen-soldier’s capacity to transition out of wartime and the professional’s 
need to sustain it, Shakespeare instead turns our attention to the social alienation 
experienced by a soldier who finds himself, perforce, a foreigner. Put another way, the 
tragedy is not so much about returning to Venice as it is about being on Cyprus. This very 
fact makes it, paradoxically, an eminently “Venetian” story. Venice, by codifying the 
soldier’s dislocation, enforcing it in geographical as well as constitutional form, offers itself 
as the ideal site for thought-experiments around the place, or placelessness, of military 
activity in the social organism.24 
To see such experimenting at work, let us turn from Iago’s invective against Cassio 
to Brabantio’s against Othello. Brabantio, of course, is concerned with literal and not 
figurative miscegenation between representatives of Venetian arms and Venetian civility. 
Just how far that fact, in itself, bothers him turns out to be intriguingly difficult to say. 
Iago and Roderigo deal in lurid representations of Othello’s bodily difference, and it is 
from them that we hear of “the gross clasps of a lascivious Moor,” and so on (1.1.125). 
Brabantio’s language affects a genteel distance: his theme is that a nice Venetian girl like 
Desdemona wouldn’t have done a thing like that, and he leaves it largely to others to fill in 
exactly what makes “that” so improbable (and thus to his mind unacceptable) a choice. 
For I’ll refer me to all things of sense, 
If she in chains of magic were not bound 
Whether a maid so tender, fair, and happy, 
So opposite to marriage that she shunned 
The wealthy curlèd darlings of our nation, 
Would ever have, t’incur a general mock, 
Run from her guardage to the sooty bosom 
Of such a thing as thou—to fear, not to delight. (1.2.64-71) 
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“The sooty bosom / Of such a thing as thou” is nasty, as audibly nasty as Brabantio will get. 
Taken along with his later exclamation—“To fall in love with what she feared to look on!” 
(1.3.99)—it conjures up an image of Othello as physically disgusting, even grotesque. The 
anathema appears to have fallen on the Moor’s bodily presence, on his self-evidently 
“racial” characteristics. 
And yet that self-evidence is qualified by Brabantio’s need to supply an immediate 
explanatory gloss: “to fear, not to delight.” Here, Othello seems instead to have become 
one term in a sort of allegorical contrast between qualities roughly divisible into the 
spheres of war and of peace. This reading gains support as it sends us back to the “wealthy 
curlèd darlings” who stand in as Othello’s opposite numbers. The junior varsity of Iago’s 
“toga’d consuls,” they are likewise imagined in terms of physical features that have less to 
do with ethnic identity than with a kind of cultivated distension that distinguishes pacific, 
commercial society from that organized for and by war. This is by no means to say that 
Brabantio would have had exactly the same reaction were Desdemona to have married a 
white condottiere. It is only that his expressions of racial animus appear not clearly 
detached from but ambiguously compounded by a logically separate type of occupational 
prejudice, allowing him to shift back and forth between thinking of Othello as literally 
frightening in his person and thinking of him as evoking “fear” as the defining quality of 
what stands outside and against a demilitarized society. Othello’s Venice, it seems, is 
conceived as a place where soldiers attract the same mixture of contempt, envy, curiosity, 
paranoia, armchair theorizing, sexual fantasy, and social snobbery that foreign races do in 
Europe at large.25 
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 Interesting as that may be, though, as breaking critical news its importance 
appears prima facie limited. As Dennis Britton resignedly notes in a recent essay, “Othello 
as outsider is such a critical commonplace that it is impossible to fully document.”26 And 
so we have, inter alia, Othello as black African and rebuke to apartheid (Martin Orkin); as 
colonial “honorary white” (Ania Loomba); as mestizo from “the borderlands” (Carol 
Thomas Neely); as feminized representative of “monstrous” sexuality (Karen Newman); as 
woman-hating class aspirant (Peter Stallybrass); as crypto-Turk (Daniel Vitkus); as Judeo-
Islamic legalist (Julia Lupton); and, perhaps most inventively, as converso done dirty by 
Spanish Catholic chauvinists (Eric Griffin).27 Adding “Othello as military professional in a 
pacific polity” to the list might at this point do little more than confirm, without doing 
anything to explain, its apparently indefinite extensibility.28 Nor would doing so in any 
obvious way explain, rather than merely describe, the facts with which all of these analyses 
have to contend: that Othello initially manages with seeming ease to transcend the 
alternately utilitarian and titillating uses official Venice has for him, then rapidly 
deteriorates into the worst possible caricature of what his detractors take him to be—
paranoid, fickle, honor-obsessed, obtuse, inarticulate, and predatory. But framing the 
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issue of “Othello as outsider” in this way does have one unique advantage: it allows us to 
connect that issue with the explicit, self-conscious account of the relation between 
citizenship and exclusion to be found in Shakespeare’s principal source for Venetian 
political theory; Contarini’s Commonwealth and Government will, in turn, offer some 
surprising resources for setting these old problems on a new basis. 
 
II 
Contarini’s account of the Venetian constitution as a perfect “mixture” or “temperature” of 
monarchy, aristocracy, and popular rule has been discussed in Chapter Two, but we 
should briefly recall its outlines before turning to the role played in it by the stipulation of 
a nonmilitary governing class. Society can be analyzed into a multiplicity of different 
potential centers of authority, which may be heuristically simplified to three: the single 
ruler; the small group of optimates unusually gifted with resources and prestige; and the 
enfranchised population as a whole. In Contarini’s hands this is an analysis of the 
participatory structure of an already delimited civic class, not in any sense an argument 
for the extension of participation beyond its bounds.  In the usual course of things, a 
government will be constituted around one of the three possible centers of agency, but 
over time it will begin to look to its own parochial notion of the good, become obnoxious 
to society at large, and be overthrown by one of the other two. The only way to avoid a 
cycle of continual degeneration and instability, then, is to devise a system in which the 
one, the few, and the many can all claim authority at the same time and in such a measure 
that each neither predominates over nor is eclipsed by the others. Conversely, to have 





appropriate degree, is to have solved the fundamental political problem of avoiding 
“perturbation.” 29 
Contarini takes it for granted that Venice has in fact well earned its epithet, la 
Serenissima: the city has had a uniquely long run without any notable internecine conflict, 
foreign invasion, or crisis in its governing institutions. For this the mixed constitution has 
been necessary, but not sufficient. Rome and Sparta had roughly the same thing, and those 
republics did not enjoy anything like Venice’s sublime imperturbability over time.30 All 
genuine republics, Contarini asserts, take as their ultimate good the flourishing of their 
citizens in virtue. But there are different ways of defining what virtue consists in, and what 
typifies failed republics is their having treated military office as virtue’s paradigmatic 
expression; whereas in those capable of sustaining mixed government, a set that includes 
Venice and possibly Venice alone, military capacity is seen not as definitive of virtue but 
rather as a mere instrument “to be referred to the offices of peace.”31  
There are, then, not just one but two distinct levels of constitutional argument in 
the Commonwealth and Government. One, as we have seen, is the analysis of Venice’s 
tripartite form of government, the success of which is attributed to its fulfilling criteria of 
balance and mathematical or musical harmony drawn from classical theory. This, in 
Contarini’s view, is the city, and it determines the aspirations and channels the behavior 
of those three thousand or so men who can with pride and justice identify themselves with 
its continuance. The other level of argument, however, is concerned with identifying and 
neutralizing whatever cannot be included in the city’s participatory structure, though 
subsisting in some kind of attenuated relationship with it. If the first is essentially an 
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account of the forms of inclusion, determined by the premise that maximizing inclusion 
among the parts of a system is the best way to minimize disruptions to its functioning, the 
second is an account of how inimical elements can be excluded, without their returning for 
just that reason as disruptive, anti-homeostatic actors. 
Contarini is not, in other words, interested in claiming that Venice is especially 
pacifist in its statecraft: you can do a hell of a lot of damage with a mere instrument. 
Likewise, he shows little to no interest in what the effects on the state might be of its 
commerce with soldiers belonging to other national cultures. Rather, the problem of the 
mercenary is in an important respect not different from that of the native-born 
commoners who fall below the level of leisure and disinterestedness necessary to join the 
political class. “For though the citie is the company of Citizens,” Contarini notes: 
yet all those men whose travaile the Citie needeth, yea and that dwell 
within the walles thereof, are not generally to be reckoned in the number, 
nor registred in the right of citizens: for every citie standeth in neede of 
artificers, and many mercenarie people, and hired servants, of which none 
can truely be tearmed a citizen: for a citizen is a free man, but those are all 
servile, eyther privately or publikely: for mercenarie men & artificers, are 
all to be accounted as publique servants.32 
 
“Public service,” here effectively a pejorative, is a way of “dwelling in” the city without 
actually being the city, and in this regard the mercenary is seen simply as analogous to the 
rude mechanicals as well as the vulgar rich. But insofar as these groups are not given a 
direct formal role in the governing process, this must also mean that they are not 
incorporated into the Polybian synthesis, and thus remain a possible source of 
perturbation. With the commoners, though, this turns out not to be much of a problem. 
Their interests being understood as almost by definition economic, they can easily be 
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neutralized by generous subsidies and social insurance programs.33 The military magnate, 
however, raises issues of a qualitatively different sort: he presents to the Venetian nobility 
a plausible alternative mode of leadership and distinction in whose image they might well 
be tempted to fashion themselves. It is less, then, that this figure has to be excluded 
because he is foreign, than that he has to be foreign because his activity cannot safely be 
brought into the ensemble that composes the citizen. 
 Why, exactly, should this be? Contarini’s answer rests upon three interlinked 
values, appeals to which are common across the whole of his treatise, with which the 
Venetian way of war must not be allowed to become inconsistent.34 These are unanimity 
over faction; proceduralized impersonality over heroic individualism; and the city’s stable 
self-containment over its openness to potential causes of mutability. In the first place, if 
Venice conducts wars to maintain or expand its territories, those who wage them will 
perforce spend long periods of “divorcement, as it were, from the civile life,” in an insular 
world with its own modes of organization and standards of conduct.35 This will, in itself, 
already erode the city’s cultural unity, creating “a kinde of faction different and disjoyned, 
from the other peaceable citizens.” War, it seems, is really another country; and the 
Venetians employ mercenaries ultimately because they fear less to entrust warmaking 
power to foreigners than to entrust their own sons to its foreign ways. 
 But the problem ultimately transcends that of splitting the city into factional 
groups; rather, the military’s tendency to act as a cultural centrifuge culminates in each 
                                                        
33
 Contarini, Commonwealth and Government, 140-1. 
34
 On the question of how well Contarini’s presentation of traditional Venetian approaches to military defense 
matches the historical reality, Michael Mallett and J.R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: 
Venice, c.1400-1617 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), 330, conclude that the “myth,” if in need of some 
qualification, contains a hard kernel of truth, particularly as regards the political class’s being disabled from 
accepting military commands and discouraged from unapproved intercourse with soldiers.   
35





war captain’s coming to view himself almost as a faction of one. This fear makes most 
sense in the context of the high value Contarini sets on Venice’s renunciation of the ethos 
of competitive virtuosity that counts for so much with, say, the Florentine civic humanists. 
The celebrated impersonality of the republic’s electoral mechanisms has its cultural 
counterpart in the absence from its civic spaces of tributes to individual achievement, “no 
stately tombes erected, no military statues remaining, no stemmes of ships, no ensigns, no 
standards taken from their enemies.”36 War, to Contarini, is the inevitable corrosive of 
such a culture unless its influence is strictly circumscribed. At Rome, war bred “high and 
ambitious thoughts,” engendering “strange effects in sundry of their Cittizens,” and 
leading finally to Julius Caesar’s scandalous disregard of senatorial authority; today, young 
Venetians’ susceptibility to its blandishments has set off a creeping cultural rot that 
represents the one thing capable of subverting the city’s equipoise.37 
 The employment of mercenaries and the laws against citizens’ assuming military 
commands having thus been presented as pillars of public order, it may initially seem 
curious that the same strictures do not altogether apply to naval service, which Contarini 
tends to present rather as in keeping with the Venetian character. A clue to the logic of 
the distinction appears, however, in the care he takes to describe the almost ritual 
disarming of galleys and disbanding of their crews at Istria, a far distance from the city 
itself.38 The way of war appropriate to Venice, in other words, is one in which the ethical 
divide between the civil and the military domains can be reinscribed at the level of 
geographical fact. War and warriors are causes par excellence of perturbation and 
subversion of balance; the function of the Venetian constitution is to separate a 
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harmonious, unperturbed inside from an outside caught up in the contention of 
individuals and the disorder of temporal events; the test of the fit between Venice’s 
military apparatus and its public values is that each should lodge itself safely to either side 
of the dividing line. 
 We are now in a position to assess more fully the relation between this theoretical 
complex and the Machiavellian theory of the citizen-soldier. Both Contarini and 
Machiavelli look to a narrative of Roman history in which it is the development of the 
army into an autonomous center of interest that precipitates the republic’s downfall. But 
they hold antithetical views of how such an event might have been forestalled. For 
Contarini, the fundamental answer is to hold the military apparatus at such a distance 
that it never has a chance to involve itself in the political system at all. Machiavelli’s 
symmetrically opposite program, as we have seen, calls for integrating the state’s military 
capacity so thoroughly into the structures of ordinary politics that it never has a chance to 
set itself apart as an independent agency. Where Machiavelli is engaged in setting out the 
practical requirements for such an integration, in the Art of War, his treatment of 
Venetian policies is straightforwardly polemical: he casts them as deeply 
counterproductive, if not in fact simply an expression of collective pusillanimity. In the 
Discourses, however, his consideration is more nuanced. Venice and Rome emerge as 
dialectical counterparts, each having developed arrangements appropriate to its own 
particular conception of the values against which the republic is to be measured.39 
Machiavelli still believes there are rational grounds on which the Roman option ought to 
be preferred. But given certain assumptions about the nature of the republic as a structure 
                                                        
39





subsisting in time, and the ends it is capable of fulfilling, the Venetians are not wrong to 
claim the disarming of the citizenry as the crucial step in attaining their ideals. 
If your main priority is permanence, Machiavelli concedes, you should indeed do 
what Venice has done: design a system capable of running without “animosities and 
tumults,” and then tenaciously police its boundaries so as to minimize changes that could 
compromise its perfection.40 In other words, keep the political class small, disarmed, 
geographically protected, and distrusting of outsiders. All of this, Machiavelli thinks, will 
on the other hand make it impossible for your commonwealth to expand, and more 
broadly to exist in a world of action in response to new contingencies. What keeps the 
republic running is a capacity for self-corrective friction inseparable from the truculent, 
combative virtue of its people.41 Therefore you must arm the citizens and put up with 
animosities and tumults, for this is the fee that active virtue charges for its maintenance. 
The Rome Machiavelli envisions, indeed, is rather like a society in which Othello’s 
ambivalent effects in Act One would be precisely those of a citizen, not a foreigner: 
politically empowered even though outside the legally closed nobility, collaborating  with 
the latter in a tense but ultimately productive relationship, in which the commoners’ pride 
and confidence stems from their profound sense of identity as the soldiers of a militant 
city, and in which it is explicitly understood that the tradeoff for periodically ugly airings 
of grievance is a flexibility and responsiveness to circumstances unmatched in countries 
where the political class is more narrowly restricted. 
What emerges in the republican tradition, then, is a reasonably clear consensus 
view of the equal and opposite ethical qualities associated with the two polities. Venice is 
stable and serene, Rome dynamic and contentious. Venetian virtue lies in the preservation 
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of an original and still inviolate perfection. Roman virtue lies in the dynamic adjustment 
to an ever-expanding scale of mastery. The one is negative and passive, defined by the 
absence of irrational perturbation. The other is positive and active, defined by the 
reciprocal interplay of a capacity for internal self-control and a capacity for external self-
assertion. The Venetian citizen preserves his identity by scrupulously observing the 
boundary between himself and the means of his own defense. The Roman citizen confirms 
his integrity by bearing arms on behalf of a community perpetually reconstructing itself 
through the exercise of freedom. 
As we move from the Italian texts to their early English reception, we see that 
binary’s implicit gendering, basically unremarked by Contarini and more subtly registered 
by Machiavelli, coming to determine more overtly the perception of what is at stake in it.42 
The Address to the Reader that fronts Lewkenor’s translation, for instance, shows him 
rather less interested than Contarini in the notion that Venice’s system of government 
conforms to universal principles of political rationality. Indeed, it’s not clear that for 
Lewkenor the respective agencies of one, few, and many comprise a system at all, so much 
as they present a cognitively overwhelming multiplicity of happy paradoxes: majesty with 
subjection, supreme power with incapacity for tyranny, public debate with perfect 
tranquility. This rather more arcane restatement of the case for the mixed state leads 
Lewkenor into three further “marvellous and miraculous considerations” concerning 
Venice, the first of which is its “monstrously strange” physical setting. The sense of literal 
topsy-turvydom, of solid structures rising from the sea, is clearly meant to carry over into 
Lewkenor’s second prodigy, which is: 
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that unweaponed men in gownes should with such happinesse of successe 
give directions & law to many mightie and warlike armies both by sea and 
land … and long robed citizens to bee served, yea and sued unto for 
entertainment by the greatest princes & peeres of Italy.43 
 
There is nothing really like this sort of language in Contarini himself, for whom it is 
perfectly natural to suppose that the body of citizens, in whom the good life itself is 
reposed, should have at their disposal and command what is after all a mere instrument to 
the preservation of that life. If other commonwealths have failed to separate the two in the 
same manner, that only goes to explain why they have been prey to perturbation and not 
enjoyed the longevity of la Serenissima. 
Lewkenor follows Contarini in linking Venice’s demilitarization with its 
imperturbability, but on entirely different logical grounds. They now go together because 
each manifests the city’s choice of an essentially feminine mode of virtue. For thirteen 
hundred years, Lewkenor writes, “this royall Citie” (sic!) has stayed “perpetually 
flourishing & unblemished,” notwithstanding the predatory designs of “sundry & mighty 
kinges and Emperours being enamoured with her beauty and goodnesse”; from these 
providence has “kept her like a pure and untouched virgine, free from the taste or violence 
of any forraine encroachment.”44 Venice is at once unweaponed and inviolable, a 
conjuncture that baffles Lewkenor’s sense of geopolitics at the same time that it comports 
with his sense of the gendered distribution of active and passive virtues. Indeed, it appears 
that (at least for the moment) Venice for him has come to signify less a specific type of 
political organization than a displaced instance of the paradox represented by female rule. 
By the close of the Address, then, what has been most sharply articulated is a notion of 
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Venice as embodying a distinctive position in a sort of psychosexual allegory of the types 
of political virtue. 
In the writings of James Harrington and other republican thinkers of the later 
seventeenth century among whom the Venice-Rome antithesis will continue to feature 
prominently, it will come to stand for a conceivably soluble strategic problem as much as a 
choice of existential personae.45 But as for Shakespeare’s time, the associations that 
antithesis could be counted on to evoke, as well as the degree to which it had established 
itself as part of the cognitive landscape of English political thought, are best indicated by a 
work appearing a decade before Othello, Richard Beacon’s Solon His Follie. Much of this 
1594 treatise on Irish reform is directly cribbed from Machiavelli, and when Beacon comes 
to rehearse the distinction between “they which shall aime at a common-weale peaceable 
& permanent” and “such as shal ayme at honour and glory,” he flatly asserts that between 
these there can be no middle way.46 Commonwealths are either circumscribed and stable, 
such as Venice, or they are socially inclusive and strategically aggressive, such as Rome. 
This is a choice which it is necessary—and, it is also implied, possible—for each polity to 
make once and for all. Nor does Beacon leave any doubt that the grounds for choosing are 
fundamentally characterological, gendered, and bound up in how far one places a 
primitive value on the commission of memorable and glorious actions. Neither type may 
endure forever, but their decline is not “after one manner,” the one falling “by effeminacie, 
ease, rest, and security,” the other “for that the citizens are rendred bold” by “continual 
use and training in military discipline.” The advantage of the martial and populist republic 
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is ultimately its citizens’ capacity to “hold themselves upright in actions of great 
importance,” and the point of this is not so much to survive as it is to ensure a good death, 
leaving behind “the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to invest a perpetuall memory 
of a worthy and excellent Institution.” 
 
III 
There is, then, a consistent paradigm in the literature of republicanism by which 
demilitarized citizen bodies, political exclusivity, and passive or retentive virtues, on the 
one hand, are linked together and identified iconically with contemporary Venice. As, on 
the other hand, militarized citizenship, political inclusiveness, and active or assertive 
virtues are linked and identified with ancient Rome. It becomes apparent, in other words, 
that the military role is not simply one identity among others (black, Moor, Muslim, Jew…) 
of which Venice might happen to be exclusive rather than inclusive; rather, the 
nonmilitary character of Venetian citizenship in some sense defines its relation to 
exclusiveness as a category. Where the republic is instituted to the end of preserving a 
perfectly ordered system of internal relations, rather than that of achieving dominance 
over the potentially destabilized and destabilizing relations between inside and outside, 
the citizen class will be more tightly constricted numerically, conceptually, and 
geographically.47 This aspect of what might be called Renaissance republicanism’s 
comparative sociology of political capacities might give us a new way of talking about the 
striking feature of Othello criticism we noted earlier, namely, that the formal categories of 
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“insider” and “outsider” persist much more durably across different accounts of the play 
than does any particular content that might fill them out. 
For if what Venice is ultimately seen to exclude is not so much any particular 
group as it is action itself—more precisely, if Venice’s exclusions and inclusions are 
determined by the decision to constitute the republic as a system for the preserving of 
balance rather than as a stage for the attaining of glory in action—then the problem of 
Othello’s initial success and subsequent unraveling takes on a different aspect as well. The 
problem, on this view, is not to define the exogenous causal factor explaining why Othello 
finds himself alienated from the record of action that might otherwise qualify him for 
citizenship. Rather, it is to show how what happens in Othello might count as revealing 
that record, and its associated mode of personality, to be the very basis of his alienation 
from the community for which he has acted. This brings us to the antithesis between a 
“masculine” virtue that discloses itself in memorable, visible actions and a “feminine” 
virtue that does not. For these certainly are terms by which one might give a description of 
what happens in Othello. Iago, we might say, compels Othello to become aware that his 
marriage depends upon his partnership with a virtue that cannot be known, displayed, 
judged, valued in a way that would satisfy him of its reality—and, perhaps, to become 
aware that his own virtue is in its own way equally uncreditable in the eyes of the other. 
Othello’s contribution to the debate about Venice and Rome, I propose, is to stage a 
dialectical confrontation between their antithetical modes of virtue, presenting that 
confrontation in the form of an epistemological crisis overtaking the protagonists’ 
marriage. 
It may be useful to begin with Shakespeare’s notion of republican Rome as a point 





indicating that Coriolanus may have been written with Machiavelli’s Discourses in mind, 
suggested that if so, the Machiavelli in question is specifically the one who privileged 
Rome’s conflictual over Venice’s consensual politics; this raises the question of what such 
a view of Rome might tell us in turn about Shakespeare’s view of Venice.48 Second, 
Coriolanus’s attention to the relation between arms and political order in early Rome is at 
once so overt and so sophisticated that even a brief consideration of how the theme is 
treated there may light up some notable points of contact and contrast with Othello. One 
such point is fairly obvious: Othello is a mercenary, and Coriolanus evidently would like to 
become one. That is, if we take “a mercenary” to mean not only someone who refuses to 
raise himself from fighting for gain to fighting for political ends, but also someone who 
refuses to, as he sees it, lower himself to fighting for merely political ends when he might 
instead fight simply to confirm the absolute and primitive value of himself.49 The two 
protagonists have, in effect, opposite problems: Venice accords Othello no opportunity to 
cash out his personal exploits in political currency; Rome accords Coriolanus no 
opportunity to do anything else. At one level, of course, Coriolanus can be read as a study 
in the tension between Rome as a society organized for war and Rome as a society 
organized for the preservation of political balance (put another way, between what the 
republic requires for freedom from external domination and what it requires for freedom 
from internal hierarchy).50 But the crucial thing is that the play’s conflicts arise against the 
                                                        
48
 Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994), 48-
54, 119-24; Anne Barton, “Livy, Machiavelli, and Shakespeare’s Coriolanus,” Shakespeare Survey 38 (1985), 115-
30. 
49
 Such is roughly Allan Bloom’s view of Othello; see his “Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: 
Othello,” in Bloom and Harry Jaffa, Shakespeare’s Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 35-74. 
50
 Many critics read the play’s politics in these terms: recent examples include Cathy Shrank, “Civility and the 
City in Coriolanus,” Shakespeare Quarterly 54.4 (2003), 406-23; Rita Banerjee, “The Common Good and the 





background of a political system whose ordinary workings are intended to produce an 
integral synthesis of the two spheres.51 Coriolanus is genuinely horrified at the implication 
that his deeds might have been done “for” the judgment and approbation of the electorate, 
but nonetheless even he does not seem to imagine that such deeds could lead to anything 
but standing for consul. Conversely, the plebs turn out to be basically right in suspecting 
that failing to elect Coriolanus is not much of an option, since the entire Roman system 
depends on military talent’s being cultivated and succored through elevation to political 
office. 
Coriolanus identifies this constitutional situation with a specific dramaturgical 
correlative, namely the institution of the triumph. As Anthony Miller points out in his 
useful book on triumphs in the Renaissance, since the New Historicism it has been a 
scholarly habit to associate triumphal culture with absolutism, but historically this is 
somewhat anomalous.52 There is, in fact, a very long tradition, exponents of which include 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Gibbon, of seeing in the Roman triumph a definitively 
republican mode of theatrical representation.53 At one level this simply reflects the 
historical fact that the triumph was a crucial and regularized institution under the 
republic and fell into etiolation and irrelevance after Augustus—a development that 
Shakespeare himself goes out of his way to pinpoint in Antony and Cleopatra through the 
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figure of Ventidius.54 The deeper intuition is that the triumph works to hold up the 
imperator’s actions for the consideration and appreciation of those on whose behalf they 
were taken: action is not glorious unless it serves the city’s common good; but what is 
good for the city is in part that it should offer occasions for the exemplary citizen to attain 
glory in the sight of his fellows. This is the ideal limned in Cicero’s remarks on the 
triumph, restated at length in the quattrocento humanists’ praise of the citizen-soldier, 
and rejected with great vehemence by Coriolanus.55 For what ultimately horrifies 
Coriolanus about the staging of his actions is that it makes them unavoidably and 
unequivocally public property, denies them any significance independent of their 
answerability to public values—values that the political system as a whole, plebs included, 
is entitled freely to determine. 
Against this background, the seemingly simple fact that Othello, by contrast, never 
actually returns to Venice following the Turks’ demise begins to acquire a sharper 
significance. In the Roman play, the theater space is itself mimetic of the political 
institutions that mediate between Coriolanus’s actions and their judging public. In Othello, 
no such thing is possible because public values and martial actions have been so 
comprehensively assigned to separate spheres. And this leads to the following intuition: 
For Shakespeare, the distinction between the two kinds of republic and their concomitant 
modes of virtue is ultimately to be understood metadramatically, as a matter of their 
respective relations to the possibility of dramatic representation. Relevant here are the 
claims recently made by a number of critics that Shakespeare shares Hannah Arendt’s 
notion that the disclosure of persons to one another through dramatic action is the sine 
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qua non of politics as such.56 But I think that for Shakespeare this is not so much as a 
matter of the ontology of politics as of its historical sociology, one in which the place of 
arms in relation to the civic body is taken to be the decisive variable. 
At Rome the republic constitutes itself as a structure for the display of individual 
and individuating actions, and it is through the dramatically adjudicated performance of 
such actions that individuals in turn assume a position of relative significance within that 
structure. For such a society the challenge is to figure out how to hold something apart 
from the universal exposure of all values to the test of the political stage, to define a 
sphere of virtue not commensurable with the relentless publicity of action and 
judgment.57 At Venice the republic constitutes itself as a body deploying action outwardly 
and instrumentally but remaining untransformed by it, conserving its rational structure 
over and against the force of particular and perturbing actions. For such a society the 
challenge is, rather, to figure out how any value can be raised to the level of dramatic 
confirmation at all, how virtue can be visibly affirmed and distinguished from corruption, 
given its inaptitude to be disclosed through the deeds of any particular person. 
Iago’s posing of just such a challenge to Othello hits the Moor especially hard 
because he is so volubly committed to the notion that all social relations depend upon 
one’s knowledge of another’s virtue, and that the natural medium of such knowledge is 
disclosure through visible action. In response to Iago’s initial insinuations Othello insists 
that he will neither fear any depreciation of his own “merits,” “for she had eyes, and chose 
me,” nor will he derogate from hers for anything short of direct revelation: “No, Iago,/ I’ll 
                                                        
56
 Halpern, “Eclipse of Action”; Paul Kottman, A Politics of the Scene (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008); Julia 
Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2011). 
57
 Rome’s reputation as a singularly public-facing ethical culture has been the subject of much discussion 
among Shakespeareans: for contrasting evaluations see Gary Miles, “How Roman Are Shakespeare’s Romans?,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 40.3 (1989), 257-83; Coppélia Kahn, Roman Shakespeare: Warriors, Wounds, and 





see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove;/ And on the proof, there is no more but this.” 
(3.3.203-5). Iago’s peculiar genius resides partly in his capacity to make such a moment of 
“proof” appear to be beyond the level of merely human powers of discernment while 
simultaneously affirming Othello’s conviction that it is the irreplaceable ground of the 
assurance without which no human relation can be sustained. 
I know our country disposition well; 
In Venice they do let God see the pranks 
They dare not show their husbands; their best conscience 
Is not to leave’t undone, but keep’t unknown. (215-18) 
 
One might take from this the implication that one who could see and know would have to 
be in the position of God; or one might take it that our confidence in our social relations 
must be founded on something less than the definitive certainty of visibly realized actions. 
As Katharine Maus has nicely demonstrated, Othello applies both implications to himself, 
without noticing the contradiction in attempting to make them converge on the same 
epistemological subject.58 The play thus begins to resemble a judicial ordeal, Othello 
attempting to contrive situations in which the “essence that’s not seen” (4.1.16) will 
somehow be conjured into dramatic and forensic space, if not as action—“It were a 
tedious difficulty, I think,/ To bring them to that prospect” (3.3.413-14)—then as tokens 
that he can accept as substitutes so long as they fulfill the minimal condition of making “a 
scene.”59 From this impulse there follows the familiar call-and-response: the demand for 
“ocular proof,” Iago’s barnyard occupatio (“It is impossible you should see this,/ Were they 
as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys…”), the dream, the promise of the handkerchief, the 
dumb-show with Cassio staged for Othello’s edification. 
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 So far this is largely familiar terrain for Othello critics. But consider now how the 
misalignment between the sort of thing Othello wishes to see and the manner in which he 
expects to see it is set in a new context by his famous “Farewell” speech, in which he 
identifies his loss of mental composure with the end of his “occupation”: 
Farewell the tranquil mind! Farewell content! 
Farewell the plumèd troops and the big wars 
That makes ambition virtue! Oh, farewell! 
Farewell the neighing steed and the shrill trump, 
The spirit-stirring drum, th’ear-piercing fife, 
The royal banner, and all quality, 
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war! 
And O you mortal engines, whose rude throats 
Th’immortal Jove’s dread clamors counterfeit, 
Farewell! Othello’s occupation’s gone. (3.3.363-73) 
 
This is the one point in the play at which a character speaks directly in the idiom of 
classical republicanism: “the big wars/ That makes ambition virtue” could virtually have 
come from the pen of, say, Leonardo Bruni.60 It is a slightly incongruous presence in a 
speech otherwise crowded with stuff, especially considering that all this “pomp” 
represents external accompaniments of office of precisely the sort to which an over-
attachment might cause virtue to revert into ambition. But it is immediately following this 
that Othello takes his stand upon ocular proof, and so perhaps it is not a coincidence that 
the war of which he mourns the virtue-making powers should be defined by its sense of 
perceptual immediacy and sheer public-facing pomposity. We might even say that Othello 
idealizes to the point of fetishizing precisely that which disgusts Coriolanus: the 
possibility of public virtue’s enthrallment to the conditions of its own publicity, its 
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aptitude for being set on display. Othello is not, I take it, lamenting the end of the 
profession of arms so much as the disappearance or defunctioning of what we might call 
the episteme of martial virtue. That is, the episteme in which the demand that virtue 
confirm itself can be answered by offering a record of particular, memorable actions, 
capable of being staged or re-staged in the spaces of public judgment for the sake of their 
doers’ just valuation. Instead, Othello now finds himself thrust into a situation in which 
the demand has retained its force but its intended object cannot answer in the terms in 
which it has been posed.61 
I am suggesting that Othello shows traces of something almost like nostalgia for 
the specifically dramatic dimension of the ideal depicted as contested but mentally 
dominant in Coriolanus, in which martial heroism and pluralist politics are bound in a 
mutually sustaining and mutually restraining relationship, whereby the political structure 
must open itself to the force of the individual’s display of virtue in action, but the content 
of such virtue must itself be informed by goals and values arising out of political 
deliberation. In back of my suggestion is the broader proposal that for Shakespeare the 
costs and benefits of a disarmed citizenry are counted by measuring the distance it is 
obliged to travel from such an ideal, and that assaying the stage’s capacity in different 
contexts to mediate between individual action and political structure is Shakespeare’s way 
of conducting the measurement. I would like to conclude by bringing these thoughts to 
bear on a reading of Othello’s suicide, in which he presents something like a triumph 
manquée, convening official Venice to witness his reenactment of the prodigious deeds he 
claims to have done on behalf of “the state,” and asking that his status be revalued 
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accordingly. Because Othello’s suicide is also at the core of the account of the play given 
by Julia Lupton, this will have the added benefit of allowing me to articulate something of 
what is at stake in the difference between our approaches. 
Lupton’s reading of Othello begins from the premise that the play’s Venice stands 
for the world of Pauline Christianity, caught between its parochialist and its cosmopolitan 
drives. But Venice gives this dynamic a twist because it also possesses a republican 
“citizenship structure,” which empirically speaking includes some and excludes others, but 
which, being “structurally predicated on the possibility of pluralism,” acts as the concrete 
vehicle by which the city will move toward a closer approximation of its own universal 
aspirations, opening itself to those previously set apart.62 Othello begins by conferring 
upon the Moor a “provisional membership” in Christian Venice, which he proceeds to 
forfeit through his spiritual degeneration. The specifically religious dimension of Lupton’s 
argument falls outside the scope of our present concerns; the important thing for us to 
consider is not Othello’s road out of Venice but his way back in, which Lupton presents as 
fundamentally civic in character, an “entry into the archives of state memory as a citizen-
soldier.”63 Othello’s suicide is a “death into citizenship”: it stands in for an exemplary deed 
of state service, reminding the city of his identification with its institutions of “civic 
participation”; the cost of such identification is too high for Othello to survive it, and yet 
even in death he compels an extension of citizenship’s “equalizing package of rights” on a 
basis other than that of simple cultural assimilation. 
I should say at the outset that this seems to me a reasonably plausible account of 
what Othello takes himself to be trying to accomplish in framing his suicide as he does. The 
question is whether, given what we know both about Venice’s citizenship structure and 
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about the content and context of Othello’s speech, it is equally plausible to see the 
performance as successful. Three points appear to me significant in this regard. First, 
there is the fact that Lodovico and the rest of Othello’s onstage audience are not notably 
impressed by his attempt to bring the discussion back around to the Turkish menace. 
They speak instead of his sanguinity, his propensity to violence when not deprived of a 
weapon, his greatness of heart. It is the voice of exasperated civil authority dealing with 
the martialist who cannot bring his conduct into line with peacetime expectations, the 
same voice we hear in Timon of Athens when the senators reject Alcibiades’s bid to have a 
fellow soldier exonerated on the basis of the service he has done the state. Second, such a 
reaction is of a piece with the larger symbolic pattern of events of which the suicide is a 
culmination—I mean how Othello in this scene is repeatedly brought to a threshold which 
he may only cross by being deprived of his arms, only for it to be discovered that however 
many swords he is made to give up he remains “weaponed” right unto death. The seeming 
gratuitousness of adding a second disarmament scene between that of his failure to kill 
Iago and his suicide is perhaps best explained as enforcing precisely this point: Othello’s 
martial identity is not so much the vehicle that will allow him to cross over from Venice’s 
outside to its inside, as it is the sticking-point from which he will be left suspended 
between them. 
Third, it is if we keep all this in mind that we may finally be able to listen, with the 
sort of unadorned literalism that Othello himself requests, to his account of the service he 
actually claims to have done: 
And say besides that in Aleppo once, 
Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk 
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, 
I took by th’ throat the circumcisèd dog 






A wholly unallegorical paraphrase might run: “This one time in a foreign trading city, 
when a local got too highhanded with one of our own, I looked to our honor and killed the 
bastard.” One wonders, as a matter of fact, just how well the state did appreciate this 
rather free interpretation of its foreign policy priorities.64 A possible tipoff is “Aleppo”: not 
a theater of war in Shakespeare’s time nor for two centuries previous, but a commercial 
entrepôt and zone of multicultural cohabitation in some sense symmetrical with Venice 
itself.65 The tenor of his auditors’ responses suggests that they are, indeed, more inclined 
to reflect on the dangerousness of mentalities such as Othello’s in peacetime society than 
they are moved to join him in imagining the whole world as an arena of nonstop 
aggression between Venice and its rivals.66 This is not to reduce Othello quite to the level 
of Timon’s anonymous, alcoholic veteran, whose “plenteous wounds” inflicted on the 
enemy the senators of Athens repudiate as “too much plenty,” archly commenting on the 
arte della guerra’s problematic relation to the ordinary forms of economic production.67 
All the same, the relentlessly martial variety of civic commitment to which Othello lays 
claim strikes his observers less as a point of common identification than as a singularly 
impressive but ultimately inassimilable disruptive force—one that cancels itself out in a 
final shudder of perturbation. What Lupton sees as Othello’s “dying into citizenship,” then, 
                                                        
64
 Venice’s keenness to sustain undisturbed commercial relations with the Turks even during periods of armed 
conflict was widely known (and a source of friction with the Papacy in particular). For a discussion of Othello 
sensitive to such nuances see Virginia Mason Vaughan, “Supersubtle Venetians: Richard Knolles and the 
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(London: Chatto & Windus, 1952), 152. 
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I am more inclined to regard as his dying in such a way as to confirm that, and just how, 
he has always been out of it. 
 If this is so, then the stakes for Venice would seem to be at once very low and very 
high. Low, in the sense that it is ambiguous at best what significance these events will 
have beyond the particular grief of Desdemona’s kin; the historical Cyprus was to endure a 
grisly fate in 1571, months before the celebrated Holy League victory at Lepanto, but 
Shakespeare gives no indication what relation, if any, the state’s loss of Othello is 
supposed to bear to that history or to any other.68 High, in the sense that the very 
containability of Othello’s violence, the ease with which moral and physical barriers can 
be thrown up to separate the centers of public life from the coercive force at their disposal, 
might be said to bespeak a loss of a wholly different order. What is “gone” is not, in fact, 
Othello’s “occupation” in the usual sense, but rather something nearly the opposite: a 
world in which there remains some living tissue of connection between the conduct of 
that occupation and the distinctive mode of political life it is engaged to defend. Without 
that, calling into being a stage on which to display the glorious actions expressive of one’s 
commitment to the res publica does indeed become the hollow, almost solipsistic gesture 
critics since T.S. Eliot have seen in Othello’s last moments. But the reasons for this are 
structural as much as individual: Othello is dramatizing a situation in which such actions 
now appear more as potential disruptions to the polity’s functioning than as disclosures of 
its ethical basis.69 
                                                        
68
 Othello’s speech does contain an apparent allusion to King James’s brief epic Lepanto, which speaks of 
“circumcised Turband Turks,” but the significance of this is equivocal: does Shakespeare’s line—if it is more 
than a complimentary tip—point toward an ominous future or toward a past that Othello insists on replaying 
for the benefit of his auditors? For commentary see Emrys Jones, “Othello, Lepanto, and the Cyprus Wars,” 
Shakespeare Survey 21 (1968), 47-52. 
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To the extent that Othello’s Venice might thus be seen to describe an enduring 
problem at the republican nexus of structure and action, citizens and professionals, 
internal balance and external defense, we can see too what is at stake for the critic in 
insisting that we read the tragedy without bracketing the differences between Rome and 
Venice, militarized and demilitarized citizenships. There is no dishonor in deciding with 
open eyes that one would rather be Venice than Rome. But it seems a dangerous thing to 
let the choice be made while forgetting the normative and analytical vocabulary best 
suited to assessing the full range of its consequences. One service Shakespeare’s plays 
might do for our moment would be to recall from its current status as a quaint curiosity, 
not the mystique of the citizen-soldier—concerning which Shakespeare held as few 
illusions as it is possible to hold—but rather the long and deep history of reflection on the 
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